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INTRODUCTION 
This volume is a compilation of four ECLA documents and is divided into 
the following two parts: 
Part I. Report of the Trade Committee of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (E/CN.12/C. l /7 /Rev. l ) 
Part II. Main background documents 
1. The payments system and the regional market in inter-Latin-
American trade (E/CN.12/C.1/3) 
2. Inter-Latin-American commodity trade in 1954 and 1955: 
situation and prospects in 1956 (E/CN.12/C.1/5) 
3. Payments and the regional market in inter-Latin-American 
trade (E/CN.12/C.1/4) 
The documents presented in this volume should be read in conjunction with 
the already published Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade (E/CN.12/369/ 
Rev.l) in order to obtain a complete picture of the situation with regard to this 
important subject. 
iii 
EXPLANATION OF SYMBOLS 
The following symbols have been used throughout this document: 
Three dots ( . . . ) indicate that data are not available or are not relevant 
A dash (—) indicates that the amount is nil or negligible 
A minus sign (—) indicates a deficit or decrease 
A full stop ( . ) is used to indicate decimals 
A comma (,) is used to distinguish thousands and millions 
A slash ( / ) indicates a crop year or fiscal year, e.g. 1954/55 
Use of a hyphen (-) between dates representing years, e.g. 1950-54, normally 
signifies an annual average for the calendar years involved, including the 
beginning and end years. "To" between the years indicates the , full period, 
e.g. "1950 to 1954" means 1950 to 1954 inclusive 
References to "tons" indicate metric tons, and to "dollars" United States dollars, 
unless otherwise stated 
The term "billion" signifies a thousand million 
Details and percentages in tables do not necessarily add up to totals, because of 
rounding 
iv 
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REPORT OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE TRADE COMMITTEE OF THE 
ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA (E/CN.12/C. l /7 /Rev. l ) 
(Santiago, 19-29 November 1956) 

INTRODUCTION 
Scope of the report 
1. The present report reviews the proceedings of 
the Trade Committee of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America, which met in Santiago (Chile), 
at the headquarters of the Commission, from 19 to 
29 November 1956. 
2. It may serve a useful purpose for this report 
to open with a brief reminder of the antecedents of 
the Committee. At its sixth session the Commission 
decided (resolution 101 (VI ) ) to establish such a Com-
mittee with a view to the preparation and recommenda-
tion of specific proposals for the solution of the 
problems analysed in the Study on Inter-Latin-Amer-
ican Trade1 presented by the secretariat, together with 
others relating to trade policy, payments, maritime 
transport and trade in specific commodities. The aims 
of the Committee include the promotion of an inter-
Latin-American trade policy consistent with the expan-
sion of the region's trade with the rest of the world. 
In the course of the discussions at Bogotá it was 
also agreed that, at its first session, the Committee 
should give priority to the problem of payments. 
The exchange reforms introduced in some of the 
Latin American countries subsequently to the resolu-
tions adopted at the sixth session of the Commission, 
and the problems which their execution brought in 
its train, gave rise in Latin America to concern which 
the Commission could not disregard and which was 
in itself sufficient to indicate that the time was ripe 
for the Committee to begin its work. The secretariat 
then set up a group of three experts who, in May and 
June 1956, visited the seven Latin American countries 
which account for the largest proportions of intra-
regional trade. The group contacted foreign trade and 
Central Bank authorities, as well as members of 
parastatal institutions and private organizations con-
nected with trade and production. The findings of the 
conversations and consultations held, and those of 
the survey carried out in the circles cited, were com-
piled in several documents which were sent to the 
Governments well in advance of the meeting.2 
1 Document E/CN.12/369/Rev.l. United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: 1956.II.G.3. 
2 See especially Payments and Trade in Latin America. Cur-
rent problems (E/CN.12/C.1/3) and Inter-Latin-American com-
modity trade in 1954 and 1955. Situation and prospects in 1956 
(E/CN.12/C.1/5) in part II of this volume. 
These papers represented an attempt by the secre-
tariat to provide the Trade Committee not only with 
the background information it would need at its first 
session, but also with a summary of recent developments 
in Latin American payments and commodity trade 
which might facilitate an objective and practical study 
of the situation. Similarly, the secretariat presented for 
consideration first by the Governments and later by 
the Committee the analyses and recommendations 
regarding payments problems and a regional market 
submitted to it by the two ad hoc consultants included 
in the group.3 
3. The present report on the proceedings of the 
Trade Committee is divided into two sections. Section 
I, in addition to indicating the membership of the 
Committee, attendance at the session and the organiza-
tion of the work, together with the agenda on which 
the Committee's proceedings were based, offers a brief 
account of the statements made and the discussions held, 
and an objective interpretation of the conclusions 
reached by the Committee in the course of its delibera-
tions. Section II contains the resolutions adopted by 
the Committee on the completion of its work. 
4. The text of the inaugural address delivered on 
19 November 1956 by His Excellency Mr. Osvaldo 
Sainte-Marie, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile; 
the reply made by Mr. Antonio Correa do Lago, 
representative of Brazil, on behalf of the delegations; 
the speech delivered by the Chairman of the Com-
mittee, Mr. Arturo Maschke, upon the assumption of 
his responsibilities; and the statement made on the 
same date by Dr. Raúl Prebisch, Executive Secretary 
of the Commission, are contained in the mimeographed 
version of document E/CN.12/7/Rev. l . The appendix 
contains the Committee's rules of procedure, adopted 
at this first session. 
5. The text of the present report was adopted by 
the Committee for submission to the consideration 
of the Commission, at the closing meeting held on 
29 November 1956. 
3 See Payments and the regional market in inter-Latin-Amer-
ican trade (E/CN.12/C.1/4), the paper presented to the secre-
tariat on 13 August 1956 by Mr. Eusebio Campos (Argentina), 
and Mr. José Garrido Torres (Brazil) in part II of this volume. 
I. THE TRADE COMMITTEE 
A. Membership, attendance and organization 
1. O P E N I N G AND CLOSING MEETINGS 
6. The opening meeting of the Committee was held 
in the conference hall of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America on 19 November 1956. The inaugural 
address was delivered by His Excellency Mr. Osvaldo 
Sainte-Marie, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 
to whom Mr. Antonio Correa do Lago, the represen-
tative of Brazil, replied on behalf of the delegations 
3 
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present. Mr. Arturo Maschke, Director of the Central 
Bank of Chile and Head of the Chilean delegation, 
made a speech after his election as Chairman of the 
Committee. Lastly, the Executive Secretary of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America, Dr. Raúl 
Prebisch, presented a statement to the Committee (see 
above paragraph 4) . 
7. The closing meeting of the Committee was held 
in the same place, on 29 November 1956. The Com-
mittee, after listening to the Rapporteur, Mr. Daniel 
J. Bello (Mexico), unanimously adopted the report 
on its work, as well as the rules of procedure to which 
it will in future conform (see appendix). Addresses 
were delivered by Mr. Emilio G. Barreto, of the 
Delegation of Peru, Mr. Pierre M. Viaud, representa-
tive of France, Sir Charles Empson, representative 
of the United Kingdom, Mr. Louis N. Swenson, 
Deputy Director of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, and Mr. Arturo Maschke, Chairman 
of the Committee. 
2 . M E M B E R S H I P AND ATTENDANCE 
8. The meeting was attended by representatives of 
all the States members of the Commission, namely: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
France, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nether-
lands, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
9. In accordance with paragraph 6 of the terms of 
reference of the Commission, the following countries 
which are Members of the United Nations but not 
of the Commission attended the first session of the 
Trade Committee in a consultative capacity: Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia. 
10. In accordance with resolutions 515 B (XVII) 
and 581 (XX) of the Economic and Social Council, 
Japan attended the first session of the Trade Com-
mittee "on a basis similar to that provided in paragraph 
6 of the terms of reference of the Commission for 
States Members of the United Nations not members 
of the Commission". 
(a) Report of the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen 
on credentials 
11. The Credentials Committee, in accordance with 
paragraph 14 of the Commission's rules of procedure, 
reported to the meeting held on 28 November 1956 
that the credentials of the delegations to the first 
session of the Trade Committee, as presented to the 
Executive Secretary, had been examined and found 
to be in order. 
(b) List of delegations 
Argentina 
Representative: Manuel San Miguel, Under-Secre-
tary for Trade 
Members: Benjamín Cornejo, Manuel Aris, Rodolfo 
Korenjak, Leopoldo Port Noid, Italo José Peretti, 
Gabriel Martinez 
Bolivia 
Representative: Luis Peñaloza, Economic Counsellor, 
Bolivian Embassy in Argentina 
Member: Juan Enrique Zalles Valenzuela 
Brazil 
Representative: Antonio Correa do Lago, Minister 
Plenipotentiary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Members: José Garrido Torres, Abeillard Barreto, 
Fernando Bergstein, Arnaldo Walter Blank, Sergio 
Armando Frazao 
Advisers: Frederico Carnauba, Helio Schlitter Silva, 
Sergio Bath, Edmundo Radwanski, Benedicto Fon-
seca Moreira 
Technical consultants: Affonso Assumpgao Vianna, Sal-
vador Nogueira Diniz 
Chile 
Representative: Arturo Maschke, President of the 
Central Bank 
Members: Felipe Herrera, Manuel Casanueva, Oscar 
Salas Elgart, Luis Adduard, Félix Ruiz, José 
Piñera, Pedro Daza, Oscar Videla, Ulises Pinto, 
Samuel Radrigán 
Colombia 
Representative: Manuel Bejarano, General Manager 
of the Banco Popular Colombo-Chileno 
Member: Enrique Duarte 
Costa Rica 
Representative: Alfonso Goicoeschea Quiros, Ambas-
sador to Chile 
Cuba 
Representative: Fernando Porcel Carreras, from the 
Department of Economic Affairs of the Ministry 
of State 
Dominican Republic 
Representative: Franz Baehr, Counsellor, Acting 
Charge d'Affaires 
Ecuador 
Representative: Carlos B. Gómez Mancheno 
Members: Tarquino León Argudo, Héctor Custode 
Mosquera 
Adviser: Raúl Maldonado Ortega 
El Salvador 
Representative: Hugo Lindo, Charge d'Affaires in 
Chile 
France 
Representative: Pierre M. Viaud, Financial Attaché 
for Latin America 
Members: Henri Bonnet, Pierre De Bourran 
Guatemala 
Representative: Jesús Unda Murillo, Ambassador to 
Chile 
Haiti 
Representative: Arnaud N. Merceron, Charge dfAf-
faires in Chile 
Honduras 
Representative: Jorge A. Coello, Charge d'Affaires 
in Chile 
Members: Jesús Castro Blanco, Antonio Collart Valle 
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Mexico 
Representative: Daniel J. Bello, General Manager of 
the Bank of Mexico 
Member: Rito Raúl Villalobos 
Netherlands 
Representative: Charles J. H. Daubanton, Ambassador 
to Chile 
Member: Jacob van der Gaag 
Nicaragua 
Representative: Ricardo García Leclair, Charge d'Af-
faires in Chile 
Panama 
Representative: Gaspar Estribi G., Delegate ad hon-
orem 
Paraguay 
Representative: Ildefonso A. Britos, Director of the 
Department of Trade Policy of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 
Peru 
Representative: Enrique Goytisolo Bolognesi, Ambas-
sador to Chile 
Members: Emilio G. Barreto, Alejandro Busalleu, 
Jorge Lorente de Patrón 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
Representative: Sir Charles Empson, Ambassador to 
Chile 
Members: J. H. Wright, P. S. Ross, J. G. McGillivray 
United States of America 
Representative: Harold M. Randall, United States 
representative, Inter-American Economic and Social 
Council 
Members: Alexander M. Rosenson, Margaret Potter, 
Robert J. Dorr 
Uruguay 
Representative: Crisólogo Brotos, Deputy Director 
of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Member: Luis Carlevaro 
Venezuela 
Representative: Alfredo Vásquez Madriz, Counsellor 
in Chile 
Member: Juan Salazar Rondón 
(c) Representatives of States Members of the United 
Nations, not members of the Commission, attend-
ing in a consultative capacity 
Canada: Louis David Burke 
Czechoslovakia: Miroslav Maruska, Jaromir Pesek 
Italy: Tommaso Mancini, Francesco Spinelli 
Poland: Tadeusz Malewiak, Zygmunt Stazenski 
Romania: Antonio Albu 
Spain: José María Doussinague, Miguel Sainz de 
Llanos, José Aragonés Vila 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Aleksei Nico-
laevich Manjoulo, V. Muraviev 
Yugoslavia: Ante Markotic 
(d) Representatives of States not Members of the 
United Nations attending in a consultative capacity 
Japan: Katsushiro Narita, Noburo Asakura 
(e) Representatives of specialized agencies 
International Labour Organisation (ILO): Hernán 
Santa Cruz 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO): John G. Tauber, Mordekai Ezekiel, 
P. G. H. Burter, Victor Bruce 
International Monetary Fund: Edgar Jones, Jorge 
Marshall 
( f ) Representatives of other United Nations organs 
Technical Assistance Administration: Bruno Leuschner 
(g) Representatives of inter-governmental organizations 
Organization of American States: Joao Oliveira-
Santos 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council: Wash-
ington P. Bermúdez 
Inter-American Training Centre for Economic and 
Financial Statistics: Leonel Torres 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): 
Jean Royer 
(h) Special observers 
Argentina: 
Torcuato Sozio, Director of Siam di Telia' 
Gino Miniatti, Secretary-Director of Fiat-Someca-
Concord 
Juan Carlos Fernández Rivas, Second Vice-Chairman 
of the Asociación de Industriales Metalúrgicos and 
representative of the Unión Industrial Argentina 
Brazil: 
Herbert Levy, Superintendent of the Banco de Amé-
rica-Brasil, Federal Deputy 
Silvio Brand Correia, Director of the Federa^ao das 
Indústrias do Estado de Sao Paulo 
Og Francisco Leme, Economic Adviser to the Fede-
r a d o das Indústrias do Estado de Sao Paulo 
Chile: 
Osvaldo Vial, Chairman of the Chilean Commission 
for the Study of the Trade Treaty between Brazil 
and Chile 
Juan Enrique Merino, Head of Department in the 
Corporación de Ventas de Salitre y Yodo 
Walter Müller, formerly President of the Sociedad de 
Fomento Fabril de Chile 
Vivian Schwartz, Director of the Customs Department 
of the Ministry of Finance 
Raúl Mardones, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Germán Vergara Donoso, Representative of the Chilean 
Central Chamber of Commerce 
Max Nolff, Economic Adviser to the Confederación 
de la Producción y del Comercio 
Luis Moller Lyon, Department of Copper of Chile 
Patricio Jarpa Yáñez, Department of Copper of Chile 
Colombia: 
Rodrigo Llórente Martínez, Representative of the 
Federación Nacional de Comerciantes de Colombia 
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(i) Representatives of non-governmental organizations 
Category A 
International Chamber of Commerce: Valerio Quesney 
Besa 
International Federation of Christian Trade Unions: 
R. Venegas, R. Vautherin 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions: 
Hugo Salazar, Roberto Gutiérrez 
Inter-American Council of Commerce and Production: 
Juan Carlos Fernández Rivas, Abraham Scheps 
3 . ORGANIZATION OF T H E WORK OF T H E 
TRADE COMMITTEE 
(a) Election of officers 
12. At the first plenary meeting on 19 November 
1956, the following officers were elected: 
Chairman: Arturo Maschke (Chile) 
First Vice-Chairman: Enrique Goytisolo Bolognesi 
(Peru) 
Second Vice-Chairman: Manuel San Miguel (Argen-
tina) 
Rapporteur: Daniel J. Bello (Mexico) 
(b) Sub-Committees 
13. At the meeting on 19 November 1956, it was 
agreed that two Sub-Committees should be set up: 
the first to examine problems relating to payments 
and agreements; and the second to study those con-
nected with products and the regional market. The 
officers elected for each of these Sub-Committees are 
listed below: 
Sub-Committee I (Payments and Agreements): 
Chairman: Antonio Correa do Lago (Brazil) 
Rapporteur: Luis Peñaloza (Bolivia) 
Sub-Committee II (Products and the Regional 
Market): 
Chairman: Crisólogo Brotos (Uruguay) 
Rapporteur: Ildefonso A. Britos (Paraguay) 
14. In the course of their work the Sub-Committees 
designated various working groups to deal with special 
questions. In connexion with some of these problems 
the delegations solicited and obtained the technical 
advice and the opinion of the representatives of the 
International Monetary Fund and of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The working 
group attached to the Sub-Committee on Payments and 
Agreements was made up of the representatives of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, Peru and the 
United States under the chairmanship of Mr. Luis 
Carlevaro (Uruguay). The working group nominated 
by the Sub-Committee on Products and the Regional 
Market was composed of members of the Argentine, 
Bolivian, Brazilian, Chilean, Cuban, Paraguayan and 
United States delegations, and its Chairman was 
Mr. José Garrido Torres (Brazil). 
15. The Trade Committee, apart from discussing the 
items on its agenda, also afforded an opportunity for 
the holding of an Informative Regional Meeting of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The GATT held its meetings on 23 and 26 November 
1956. 
(c) Secretariat 
16. The secretariat of the Trade Committee was 
composed of the following members: 
Raúl Prebisch, Executive Secretary 
Louis N. Swenson, Deputy Director 
Esteban Ivovich, Chief of the Trade Section, General 




Nuno F. de Figueiredo 
B. Agenda 
17. At the meeting held on 19 November 1956 the 
Committee adopted the following agenda: 
1. Opening addresses 
2. Election of officers 
3. Adoption of the agenda 
4. Adoption of the rules of procedure of the Com-
mittee 
Background document: 
Draft rules of procedure prepared by the Secretariat 
(E/CN.12/C.1/6) 
5. Trade and payments agreements and recent exchange 
reforms in selected Latin American countries 
(a) Parities for units of accounts used in trade 
between Latin American countries; 
(b) Negotiation of multilateral agreements on the 
exclusion or inclusion of invisible items; 
(c) Specific problems of trade in selected primary 
products. 
6. Problems arising from bilateral settlement of ac-
counts and the non-transferability of balances. 
Background documents: 
Study of inter-Latin-American trade (E/CN. 12/ 
C. l /2 and E/CN.12/369/Rev.l) ; United Nations 
publication, Sales No.: 1956.II.G.3 (see chapter V 
in particular) 
Payments and trade in Latin America. Current 
problems (E/CN.12/C.1 /3) 
Payments and the regional market in inter-Latin-
American trade (E/CN. 12/C. 1/4) 
Inter-Latin-American commodity trade in 1954 and 
1955. Situation and prospects in 1956 (E/CN.12/ 
C. l /5) . 
7. Possibilities for expanding inter-Latin-American 
trade in intermediate and manufactured products 
(a) Effect of exchange reforms 
(b) Creation and expansion of industries for the 
regional market. 
Background documents: 
Payments and trade in Latin America. Current 
problems (E/CN.12/C.1/3). (see in particular 1.4: 
"Repercussion of reforms".) 
Payments and the regional market in inter-Latin-
American trade (E/CN.12/C.1/4) (see in partic-
ular I I : "The regional market".) 
8. Adoption of the report of the meeting 
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9. Place and date of next meeting. 
18. Each of the two Sub-Committees, between which 
the work of the meeting was divided, adopted a special 
agenda, as follows: 
Sub-Committee I. Payments and Agreements 
1. Examination of the effect on intra-regional trade 
of recent exchange reforms in certain countries of 
the region. Alternatives with which the above reforms 
have confronted inter-Latin-American trade through 
clearing accounts: 
(a) Abolition of bilateral accounts, or 
(b) Their revision and co-ordination. 
2. Problems arising in connexion with the use of clear-
ing accounts to promote the establishment of multi-
lateral patterns within Latin America: 
(a) Parities; 
(b) Inter-Central Bank credits; 
(c) Inclusion or exclusion of invisible items; 
(d) Transfer of balances; 
(e) Re-export regulations, in relation to the system 
for the transfer of balances; 
( / ) Special measures to promote trade. 
3. Consideration of specific forms of action suggested 
in the course of the recent survey in Latin America: 
(a) Early establishment of some method of circulat-
ing information on balances and voluntary 
transfers; 
(b) Medium-term measures designed to facilitate 
transfers: application of a standard agreement; 
liberalization of trade in given lines; working 
capital. 
Sub-Committee II. Products and the Regional Market 
I. Trade in traditional products 
1. Longstanding and recent problems of trade in 
traditional products. 
(a) Overpricing; 
(b) Negotiation of annual contracts; 
(c) Participation of State organizations in the 
marketing of products. 
2. Trade policy to be adopted for intra-regional trade 
in traditional products. 
II. Trade in manufactured goods and the regional 
market 
1. General discussion. 
2. Definition of what will be understood by the term 
"regional market", and determination of its principles 
or basic characteristics. 
3. Characteristics of the products which can most feas-
ibly be included in the regional market. 
4. Scheme for the regional market. 
(a) Type and degree of liberalization of trade in 
products to be included in the regional market; 
(b) Minimum duration of the regional market 
agreement; 
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I . INTRODUCTION 
19. It is not enough in the present instance— 
as was the case on previous occasions in connexion 
with other activities of the Commission—merely to 
give an orderly account of the questions discussed and 
the decisions reached at a working meeting. The 
achievements of this first session of the Trade Com-
mittee must be presented in such a dynamic way that 
a just appraisal can be made of the advantages secured 
and a basis can be laid for future work. 
20. Through the studies carried out by ECLA in 
connexion with economic phenomena in the Latin 
American countries and through the discussions and 
exchange of views held under the auspices of the Com-
mission, a better grasp of the situation and of the 
problems to be solved has gradually been obtained, 
and increasingly accurate and thorough analyses of 
the real position in Latin America have become possible. 
21. These studies have also helped to create a com-
mon consciousness of fundamental questions, which 
has provided the basis for further undertakings and 
for deeper research into the real nature of the situa-
tion. There can be no doubt that the ultimate aim of 
such studies has been, and still is, to assist in improving 
standards of living in all the Latin American republics, 
though on occasions the choice has lighted on those 
countries whose special circumstances render the solu-
tion of their problems a more pressing necessity. 
This does not mean that due consideration has not been 
given to the results of other countries' experience in 
analogous situations. 
22. With specific reference to the subjects dealt with 
by the Trade Committee, attention should be drawn 
to the following background data. Trade is, and has 
been, a prerequisite for the maintenance of the levels 
of economic activity in the Latin American countries 
and for the promotion of their development; hence, 
one of the first ways of ensuring the practical applica-
tion of the studies previously carried out was by 
placing on record a clear definition of the undoubted 
importance of trade for raising the standard of living 
of the peoples of the region. 
23. To this end, it was necessary to clarify various 
points of view which were deeply ingrained in those 
responsible for the policies to be adopted. There were 
some who thought that all efforts should be aimed at 
encouraging traditional activities in most of these 
countries, which are primarily agricultural and which 
produce foodstuffs and industrial raw materials; and 
that full advantage should be taken of favourable 
environmental conditions and of the experience ac-
quired, without any attempt at industrial development, 
since in any case the increased resources accruing from 
the sale of such primary products would be used for 
the purchase of goods produced by the industrial 
countries and a satisfactory formula for the interna-
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tional division of labour would thus be established. 
What actually happened was that under such condi-
tions less advantage was taken of the human resources 
in which Latin America is so rich, and is likely to 
become even richer, since the introduction of improved 
techniques in agriculture and in primary production 
in general—a prerequisite of higher productivity— 
means there is not sufficient work for some part of the 
active population hitherto occupied in this branch of 
economic activity. Such a situation has an adverse 
effect on the level of wages, preventing them from 
rising in consequence of the greater productivity result-
ing from better techniques, and thus causing a deteriora-
tion in the standard of living of the peoples concerned. 
It seems much wiser to make simultaneous progress 
in industrial activity, which would utilize the productive 
effort of the population with a view to total employ-
ment, a procedure that would be in no way incom-
patible with the maintenance and even the expansion 
of traditional agricultural production. 
24. In contrast, others assumed that the best path 
to follow was to apply the greatest effort and the 
largest proportion of resources to industrialization as a 
means of accelerating the economic development of 
their respective peoples and to relegate foreign trade 
in exportable primary products to a secondary plane 
in order to attain as quickly as possible the higher 
standards of living characteristic of the more industri-
alized countries. In such cases it had also to be pointed 
out that the development of production for export 
would not conflict with a process of industrialization 
which, while absorbing surplus manpower to the benefit 
of the community, would ensure higher income and 
would thus facilitate the acquisition of the goods re-
quired for industry, since they could be largely derived 
from the country's own domestic activity. 
25. Again, it was observed that to encourage only 
export activities by promoting the production of agri-
cultural or primary products might nullify the benefits 
of the better techniques employed, since the surplus 
manpower that existed because the introduction of 
such techniques had not been accompanied by a pro-
portionate effort towards industrialization would consti-
tute a burden on these economies with a resultant 
relative decline in wages. This would be a serious 
obstacle to any improvement in the standard of living 
of the population concerned. It was admitted that the 
road leading to industrialization should be followed stage 
by stage, and hence that it was desirable first to produce 
commodities which could replace imports, due advan-
tage being taken of the country's own resources, both 
natural and human, so that the increased capacity to 
import could be used to obtain other goods required 
by industry. This would not mean that trade with the 
industrial centres would decrease, but simply that a 
change would take place in its composition. Such a 
phenomenon has already been noted in certain Latin 
American countries, which have witnessed an increase 
in the volume of their imports while registering greater 
industrial development. 
26. It is impossible to disregard the argument that 
indiscriminate industrial development is not advisable. 
Indeed it seems wise for countries to select those 
industries in which, as a result of the use of their 
own natural resources and because of other favourable 
conditions, productivity in the initial stages will differ 
least from the levels attained in the large industrial 
centres. 
27. At a later stage, consideration could be given 
to heavy and semi-heavy industry, which require con-
sumer areas much wider than those existing within 
the frontiers of the Latin American countries, and 
which, if they were to be established under optimum 
conditions, woulld have to rely on broader markets. 
In the search for a satisfactory solution to this problem, 
attention was devoted to the procedure adopted by 
highly industrialized countries, such as those of Western 
Europe, which when confronted with a similar diffi-
culty, did not hesitate to merge through the European 
Coal and Steel Community in order to avoid the 
setbacks they had already experienced as a consequence 
of the policy pursued by each country within its own 
boundaries to the detriment of increased activity. Simi-
larly, in those Latin American countries that have en-
countered the aforesaid problem of limited markets, 
thought has been given to the desirability of forming 
integrated areas for trade in certain industrial goods 
as a step towards the development of productive acti-
vities. In any event, the attempt would be made to 
select industries which would afford equal opportu-
nities of development to all countries within the 
region by means of new productive activities of a 
complementary nature. These would be considered with 
due regard to the special aptitude of the countries 
concerned for taking adequate advantage of the com-
mon market and would enable a new pattern of inter-
Latin-American reciprocal commodity trade to emerge 
in future. 
28. Once the importance of trade as an instrument 
for the maintenance and development of the economic 
activity of the Latin American countries was estab-
lished, the secretariat, in compliance with resolutions 
adopted by the Commission, proceeded with the study 
on inter-Latin-American trade4 which was presented to 
the sixth session of the Commission in August-Sep-
tember 1955. Resolution 101 (VI) was then adopted 
setting up the Trade Committee with a view to the 
intensification of inter-Latin-American trade without 
prejudice to the expansion of trade with other regions 
and with due regard to the fundamental necessity of 
increasing over-all world trade. The Committee was 
therefore requested to study, inter alia, the payments 
problems arising in certain countries of Latin America 
in particular, the trade policy pursued and all those 
circumstances which had been observed to constitute 
the most serious hindrances to commercial development, 
in order that it might suggest whatever resolutions it 
considered appropriate. 
29. As a preliminary to the work of the Committee, 
the ECLA secretariat decided upon the preparation 
of supplementary studies, to be undertaken by the 
secretariat's own Trade Section, with the assistance of 
Mr. Eusebio Campos and Mr. José Garrido Torres, 
experts from Argentina and Brazil respectively. The 
working group thus set up carried out a survey in the 
seven countries of the southern zone of Latin America 
4 Op. cit. above, note 1. 
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which had the largest share of intra-regional trade and 
which were encountering the most serious obstacles in 
maintaining this trade. 
30. The survey provided an opportunity for a broader 
understanding of these problems, since the group estab-
lished contact not only with the government officials 
responsible for trade policy and the negotiation and 
implementation of agreements, but also with the private 
sectors playing a leading part in the activities in 
question. The sectors consulted did not confine them-
selves to describing the obstacles encountered in the 
course of their operations, but also helped to formulate 
suggestions as to the measures that would have to 
be adopted if an attempt were to be made to remedy 
such drawbacks.5 
31. The studies referred to certainly drew the atten-
tion of the various countries to the main aspects of the 
situation which would require consideration if any 
improvement was to be achieved; moreover, they gra-
dually created a common consciousness of these prob-
lems and provided a more effective guide to possible 
solutions. The results of the research were embodied 
in several documents which were sent to member 
countries for their consideration. The studies give an 
accurate picture of the problem. As already stated, 
most inter-Latin-American trade is conducted in the 
southern zone, and during the past few years—except 
in the case of Peru—it has been developed, among the 
countries covered by the survey, through a system of 
bilateral clearing accounts. The countries in question 
were obliged to adopt this system because of the situa-
tion affecting their best customers—the countries of 
Western Europe—as a result of the Second World 
War, and because they had to maintain their terms of 
trade not only with the latter but also with countries 
in the southern zone of Latin America itself, which, 
for similar reasons, had no transferable foreign ex-
change to use for their reciprocal trade payments. The 
payments and trade agreements in force between them 
enabled them to extend their reciprocal trade operations, 
without the need for payment in cash, since they were 
able to take advantage of the swing credits established 
for this purpose. Moreover, their operations were thus 
free from foreign competition, a circumstance which 
in turn frequently led to a sacrifice in the quality 
and price of the products purchased, while some semi-
finished and manufactured goods also came to be 
included among the commodities traded within the 
region. Such practices had obliged these countries to 
keep their markets practically in watertight compart-
ments and had prevented them from taking advantage 
of the lower prices or more favourable conditions 
offered by other countries. 
32. The secretariat study coincided with the adoption 
by some of these countries of new measures of eco-
nomic policy, as well as with exchange reforms aimed 
at some degree of multilateralism and liberalization of 
trade, which gave rise to new terms-of-trade diffi-
culties. In effect, with the abolition of the import 
licences which formerly constituted a means of deter-
mining the source of imports, the importer can now 
buy new products on other markets. At the same time, 
5 See E/CN.12/C.1/4 in part II of this volume. 
the fact that the units of account have not been 
accorded parity with the transferable dollar has in 
other cases reduced the possibilities for using them, 
with the natural result that the vendor of products to 
be negotiated through the agreements quotes higher 
prices to indemnify himself for the smaller amounts 
he will receive in payment; this discourages such 
operations still further,-
33. The conclusions reached in the secretariat studies 
determined the topics discussed by the Committee, 
which dealt principally with two questions. The first 
was the problem of payments, in which context an 
examination was to be made of the intra-regional trade 
position in the countries of the southern zone, which, 
because their trade was effected through payments 
agreements—that is, on a bilateral basis—were expe-
riencing very serious difficulties in their trade within 
the region. The aim of this examination was to study 
the possibility of eliminating such accounts, or, if that 
proved impossible, of adjusting or co-ordinating them 
so as to mitigate their drawbacks and thus find a way 
of effecting voluntary transfers of balances which 
would facilitate the liquidation of debts resulting from 
such trade, as a first step towards broader multilateral 
formulae. The second question was that of the com-
modities traded, and here a distinction was drawn 
between traditional products and manufactured goods. 
The objective was to remove some of the obstacles to 
trade in these products, such as overpricing, and the 
lack of continuity in the negotiation of agreements, 
further accentuated by the intervention of official 
agencies as contractors. There was a clear need, as was 
pointed out by some of the existing industries, to 
maintain complementary foreign markets and even to 
expand them sufficiently for the success of current 
manufacturing operations to be promoted and the crea-
tion of new industries fostered. In the studies prepared 
for the Trade Committee it was considered that this 
result could be more easily achieved through a multi-
lateral and competitive regional market than through 
markets which were of a strictly national character or 
in which there was limited complementarity between 
two countries. 
34. When the work of the Committee began, the 
interest aroused by the studies prepared was clearly 
evident from the list of countries and organizations 
represented, as well as from the very large number 
of special observers attending on behalf of private 
development activities. During the meetings, the views 
of non-member countries were expressed, besides those 
of representatives of private enterprise, and these 
opinions will undoubtedly be taken into account by the 
secretariat in the course of its further studies in this 
field. 
35. Some indication must be given here of the 
importance attached by the various delegations attend-
ing the Committee to the work ahead, and of the 
results anticipated. The following concepts were put 
forward in statements made at the inaugural meeting 
by countries represented: 
(a) That the preliminary studies before the Com-
mittee had given a complete picture of those trade 
problems which had a profound effect on the economic 
life of countries parties to payments agreements; 
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(b) That, through the work of the meeting, better 
understanding and co-operation would be achieved 
among the countries in the region which were affected 
by such conditions; 
(c) That the time had come to consider practical 
measures which would facilitate the solution of com-
mon problems. The examination of such problems by 
all the countries together and not only by each one 
individually, would help to overcome the difficulties 
involved, since the measures to be adopted would tran-
scend the limited sphere of action of each separate 
country; 
(d) That the conviction prevailed that the solution 
of intra-regional trade difficulties would pave the way 
towards the expansion of trade with other areas; 
(e) That the aim should be a gradual liberalization 
of trade relations, whereby bilateralism would be dis-
carded in favour of an increase in over-all trade. A 
transition period should in any case be envisaged which 
would mitigate the effects of any sudden change of 
system; and for this purpose close co-ordination 
between existing agreements should be sought, and 
transferability of balances promoted as a step towards 
multilateralism; 
( / ) That no measures of policy ought to be adopted 
which repeated the errors of bilateralism or continued 
certain discriminatory trade practices, and that, with 
a view to long-term development, restrictions and 
official controls should be reduced to a minimum; 
(g) That some contribution might be made to the 
maintenance of established industries and to the pro-
motion of future industrial growth, since that would 
eventually lead to more vigorous regional development; 
(h) That the atmosphere of the Committee would 
be favourable to the frank expression of opinions and 
views, a fact which might help towards a clearer under-
standing of the situation and a more efficient co-
ordination of effort; 
(i) That, although the problems were extremely 
complex and possibly not all the progress required 
for their solution would be made, it should be possible 
to achieve some co-ordination of effort and the pre-
paration of more important measures for the future; 
(/) That, once existing obstacles had been removed, 
an expansion of commodity trade might be expected in 
view of the region's potential resources; 
(k) That the suggestions made in the studies would 
have to be adapted to the dictates of economic policy 
and to the foreign trade position of the countries con-
cerned, and that the common denominator which it 
would be possible to reach on the present occasion 
could not be determined beforehand; 
(I) That the foundations had to be laid for co-
ordination between the individual countries' economies, 
with a view to achieving closer co-operation whereby 
the capacities of all could be combined in the interests 
of improved production, to the benefit of the entire 
region, and 
(m) That the encouragement of exports would pro-
vide means for financing imports. 
36. The delegation sent by Spain in an observer 
capacity drew the attention of the Committee to the 
fact that, in view of the similarity between Spain's 
trade and payments problems and those of the countries 
of Latin America, the former was especially interested 
in participating in any Latin American multilateral 
payments system and in any organizations that might 
be created with a view to the expansion of trade among 
the countries of the region and between them and other 
parts of the world. This delegation also expressed the 
interest of Spain in taking part in the activities designed 
to promote the exchange of information on the state 
of the clearing accounts and the transfer of their 
balances. 
37. The representative of the International Monetary 
Fund stressed that agency's interest in removing ob-
stacles to world trade, among which the most serious 
was bilateralism. He offered the collaboration of his 
organization, of which all the countries taking part 
in the Committee were members. 
38. The representative of IA-ECOSOC said that 
this organization was convinced that the region's eco-
nomic development depended on the volume and vigour 
of its foreign trade, and that one of the immediate 
objectives for the progress of regional trade would 
be the establishment of a multilateral payments system. 
39. The GATT representative in turn pointed out 
that his organization's primary objective was the organ-
ization of trade in all countries, and that this was 
considered to be a means of raising standards of living, 
improving the utilization of world resources and con-
tributing to the progressive development of national 
economies. He also indicated that the GATT secre-
tariat was prepared to collaborate in the work of the 
Trade Committee, just as it had helped other countries 
to deal with similar situations and to put into effect 
projects resembling those under consideration by the 
Committee. GATT had acquired some experience in 
recent years on the subject of common markets, and, 
if the Committee took steps to create a regional com-
modities market, the matter should be placed before 
his organization so that the necessary authorization 
might be obtained, as had been done in the case of 
the European Coal and Steel Community and in that 
of the Free Trade Agreement between El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. One of the delegations requested that 
the Committee should take note of the desire of those 
countries which were Contracting Parties of GATT 
that a recommendation should be made to GATT invit-
ing it to convene Latin American regional meetings 
whenever future meetings of the ECLA Trade Com-
mittee or the General Sessions of the Commission were 
held. The request was seconded by other delegations. 
40. Various special observers, who attended the 
Committee meeting on behalf of private firms and 
organizations, made statements6 to the effect that the 
industrial development of the Latin American countries 
under consideration called for a study of the possibility 
of complementary integration of new industrial pro-
grammes with a view to building up a common regional 
market. In such a market the formalities that at present 
had to be complied with in trade between two or more 
countries in the zone would be eliminated. Some of 
these observers remarked on the desirability of the 
6 See Information Papers Nos. 14 to 19. 
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ECLA secretariat's undertaking studies on the prevail-
ing situation in certain of the existing industries. 
41. An outline will now be given of the proceedings 
of the two Sub-Committees between which the work 
of the Committee was divided on the basis of the 
general and special agendas adopted,7 together with 
the results of the discussions held. 
2 . P A Y M E N T S AND AGREEMENTS 
42. The following facts were emphasized during the 
discussions of the Committee on questions of payments 
and agreements: 
(a) That 90 per cent of inter-Latin-American trade 
is concentrated in South America, and of this, 85 per 
cent is conducted through clearing accounts resulting 
from bilateral agreements in which neither Peru nor 
Venezuela participate. These two countries—like those 
of the northern zone—have remained within the free-
convertibility régime and hence do not have to cope 
with the problems examined by the Committee. For this 
reason, the situation under consideration does not affect 
them except as members of the Latin American com-
munity who are anxious that all the countries of the 
region should attain optimum economic conditions; 
(b) That the value of the exchange obtained from 
trade effected through clearing accounts within the 
region is in many cases lower than that of convertible 
exchange, a situation which results in higher prices 
for products purchased within the region; 
(c) That outstanding balances accumulate from time 
to time, causing a freezing of. resources of creditor 
countries, which occasionally has special repercussions 
on private exporters, who do not receive the price of 
their sales until the situation improves; 
(d) That the agreements in force make no provision 
for uniform treatment for the payment of services and 
other invisible items, so that such payments have to 
be effected outside the agreements-accounts, whence 
difficulties in making them sometimes arise; 
(e) That some countries in the zone—particularly 
Argentina and Chile—have recently modified their ex-
change systems and trade policies, thus creating new 
disturbances and difficulties in intra-regional commodity 
trade; and 
( / ) That, where Chile is concerned, the new meas-
ures have led to the accumulation of balances in 
its agreement-accounts with other countries of the 
area, and that it is studying ways and means of recover-
ing equilibrium; while, in the case of Argentina, the 
measures adopted have raised the market price of its 
export products, because, when importers within the 
region prefer to liquidate their operations in units of 
account, the vendor is obliged to raise his prices in 
order to indemnify himself for the smaller sums re-
ceived on deals negotiated at an exchange rate lower 
than that of the free market. This has induced Argen-
tina to conclude agreements with Paraguay—which it 
hopes to extend to other importing countries—so that, 
by means of an agreement-dollar market mechanism 
supported by the Central Bank for negotiating units 
of account at the same level as transferable currencies, 
7 See paragraphs 17 and 18 of the present report. 
the exporter may receive the same sum whether or 
not he operates in units of account. 
43. With regard to the preceding points, the following 
opinions were expressed in the Committee: 
(a) That the bilateral system should be replaced by 
that of free convertibility; 
(b) That such a process should take place gradually, 
in order to avoid reducing the volume of trade and 
to allow some countries to make progressive adjust-
ments to the new situation, so as to facilitate the 
expansion of trade at the highest possible levels; 
(c) That under these circumstances it would be 
advisable to embark at once upon the search for some 
machinery to permit the transfer of account balances 
from one country to another; 
(d) That the constant fluctuations in commodity 
prices resulting from exchange conditions have intro-
duced a new factor of disequilibrium into the buying 
and selling capacity of the different countries; 
(e) That non-convertibility is often caused by dis-
equilibria in the economies of the countries concerned 
and can be remedied only through the implementation 
of satisfactory monetary and fiscal policies as has been 
observed in those countries which have abandoned their 
former bilateral régime, and that the liquidation of 
frozen balances would be the first step to be taken in 
this direction; 
( / ) That economic development is affected by the 
watertight compartments into which trade is divided 
as a consequence of bilateral agreements, since such 
a system restricts the purchase of goods required for 
industrialization; 
(g) That lack of the necessary factors of produc-
tion reduces the possibilities of productive activities; 
and 
(h) That an unsatisfactory economic policy is re-
flected in low standards of living. 
44. To remedy such a state of affairs, the Committee 
was unanimously of the opinion that it was advisable 
to apply the following measures: 
(a) The introduction—since it was impossible to 
proceed to the immediate elimination of the bilateral 
agreements in force—of certain reforms in present 
conditions, which the individual countries themselves 
might consider practicable in their own peculiar cir-
cumstances, in order to modify existing situations due 
to bilateralism and to bring about a gradual evolution 
towards multilateralism; and 
(&) The immediate initiation of a study, under the 
direction of the most highly-qualified experts attached 
to the Central Banks in the payments-accounts coun-
tries, with a view to determining as soon as possible 
the joint measures to be adopted for the purpose 
of metamorphosing the bilateral clearing system and 
advancing towards increased convertibility. 
45. The delegations of those countries actually bound 
by such agreements were all of the opinion that, 
even without awaiting the termination of the studies 
in question, it was possible to decide on the advisability 
of transferring the balances in their respective accounts, 
on a voluntary basis in each instance, so that the liqui-
dation of operations in the zone might be facilitated 
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and the situation during this transitory stage might 
be improved. The Committee noted that the practica-
bility of the measure was demonstrated by the fact 
that in recent years intra-regional compensation pos-
sibilities had patently improved. The delegations men-
tioned were of one accord in suggesting that a feasible 
means of achieving such an objective was to establish 
equal quotations in their respective markets for units 
of account and convertible currencies. One represen-
tative's objection that it was not easy to attribute the 
same value to freely convertible currencies as to the 
units of account, which could only be employed in a 
more restricted area, gave rise to conflicting views; but 
these were successfully reconciled, when the principle 
in question was made applicable concurrently with those 
indicated below. 
46. Agreement was also reached on the need to 
maintain future prices, in trade operations between 
payments-accounts countries, at levels not higher than 
those prevailing on the world market. 
47. One delegation pointed out that the transfera-
bility of balances would be practicable only if the 
agreements provided ample swing credit margins, since 
it would thus be possible to overcome difficulties in 
the prompt settlement of balances deriving from 
declines in production due to seasonal factors or other 
circumstances beyond the producers' control. In this 
way a simpler procedure would be acceptable when the 
transfer mechanism was used for amounts in excess 
of the swing credits. In any event, care would have 
to be taken not to fix such credits at disproportionate 
levels, so that they should not become in effect the 
creditor country's investment in the debtor country, 
to the detriment of the former's own economy. The 
parties to existing bilateral agreements finally decided 
to collect information on the amount of the balances 
of their respective accounts with the aim of promoting 
transfers, and to consider, in the light of the data thus 
obtained, the advisability of establishing norms which 
in the future would serve as a basis for transfers and 
even for the creation, should the case arise, of some 
organ or agency which would facilitate the effecting 
of the transfers in question. 
48. In the opinion of the delegation of another 
country, private credits might replace those granted 
by the Central Banks through the application of the 
stipulated swing credits, and, in consequence and 
for this purpose, the maintenance of the bilateral 
accounts would not be necessary; it was remarked, 
however, that this would mean diverting large resources 
in the form of convertible currencies which were at 
present used as working capital for trade with other 
regions. 
49. As regards the desirability of including invisibles 
among the payments authorized to be made through 
the agreement-accounts and of effecting payment for 
such items on a basis of parity with the convertible 
dollar, some delegations expressed their anxiety lest 
this might make it impossible to use the sums registered 
in the accounts under the head of invisibles, as at 
present, for the compensation of disequilibria in 
balances in units of account. In contrast, other delega-
tions pointed out the difficulties involved in the control 
of movements of this kind and the advisability of 
extending liberalizing measures to cover the elimination 
of invisibles from the accounts. It was finally decided 
that specific invisible items should be incorporated in 
such measures, under the terms of the resolution 
adopted by the Committee in this connexion. 
50. When the possibility of re-exporting goods traded 
on account from one importer country to a third party 
was considered, the opinion was voiced that the wisest 
course would be to settle each case as it arose, by 
direct consultation between the parties. 
51. Resolution 1 (I) adopted by the Committee in 
connexion with these problems, embodied the fore-
going decisions. 
3 . PRODUCTS AND T H E REGIONAL MARKET 
(a) Traditional products 
52. In connexion with this topic the following points 
were brought out in the Committee: 
(a) That, in the case of traditional products, the 
level of productivity attained in Latin America was 
very satisfactory; 
(b) That a substantial proportion of intra-regional 
trade in traditional products had been conducted pre-
cisely through the payments agreements; 
(c) That for some of these products prices higher 
than those prevailing on the world market had been 
quoted in units of account; 
(d) That trade in certain items handled through 
the agreements was negotiated by means of arrange-
ments of short duration which introduced elements of 
uncertainty or interruptions into trade in such pro-
ducts ; 
(e) That, in given instances, the intervention of 
state organizations or enterprises in import or export 
trade of this nature had led to operations which were 
disadvantageous to the parties; 
( / ) That illicit trade in some of these commodities 
had increased, which meant that the agreement-accounts 
were deprived of the corresponding income, and that 
for this reason balances were maintained at unduly 
high levels; 
(g) That the adoption of exchange reforms and new 
trade practices in several exporting countries had given 
rise to further disturbing factors; 
(h) That some of the countries taking part in regular 
trade in these products had been effecting substantial 
purchases outside the region; 
(i) That certain Latin American countries' libera-
lization of the import licence régime had also helped 
to divert import trade towards markets of origin out-
side the area, and 
(/) That the increase in the output of synthetic raw 
materials was bound to reduce the natural market for 
primary products. 
53. When these aspects of the problem had been 
defined, comments were made by participants in the 
Committee to the effect that a greater liberalization 
of intra-regional trade in traditional products would 
constitute a very important incentive for its expansion. 
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54. The delegations were unanimous in their ex-
pression of the view that the sale of products at world 
market prices would facilitate operations. The best 
approach—in the opinion of almost all the delegations—-
would be to establish equal quotations for units of 
account and convertible currencies. 
55. Some delegations pointed out that certain barter 
transactions had enabled trade in the products con-
cerned to be maintained at high levels. 
56. The Committee reached the decisions incorporated 
in resolution 4 (I), after some delegations had expres-
sed the view that the proposed liberalization of intra-
regional trade constituted a first step towards broader 
measures relating to other geographic areas, to the 
extent permitted by the balance-of-payments situations 
of the Latin American countries, and with the aim of 
making a satisfactory contribution to the expansion of 
world trade, an aspiration shared by all the countries 
represented at the meeting. One delegation stressed 
that discriminatory exchange rates should be discon-
tinued for imports of traditional products, unless the 
restrictions were justified by payments difficulties. 
Another pointed out that preferences might neverthe-
less be maintained when the general interests of a given 
national economy were involved, 
(b) Manufactured goods 
57. The following points emerged from the state-
ments made before the Committee: 
(a) That idle resources, both natural and human, 
exist in the Latin American countries, as well as others 
of which the best use is not being made; if they were 
utilized in an appropriate industry productivity would 
be greater, and the standard of living of the populations 
concerned would also be higher; 
(b) That some of the countries of the region are 
prevented by the shortage of foreign exchange, a con-
sequence of the small size of their export market, 
from obtaining the manufactured goods they need both 
to meet the requirements of their populations and to 
increase their degree of industrialization, an essential 
prerequisite for raising their standard of living. 
(c) That the level of trade in manufactured goods 
is relatively low, owing to the quantitative restrictions 
imposed on imports in order to protect domestic pro-
duction of a similar nature, and also because they are 
not marketed in competitive conditions as regards 
prices, quality and even payments; 
(d) That the system of bilateralism which has 
existed in the region since the Second World War has 
led to the formation of watertight compartments, and 
that this has facilitated the establishment of industries 
producing manufactured goods capable of replacing 
those formerly obtained from the traditional industrial 
suppliers, even enabling them to secure a large share 
in the market so far as other countries in the region 
are concerned; 
(e) That on several occasions the process of indus-
trialization has not been properly directed and has 
not operated with satisfactory efficiency, and that the 
prices of many manufactured goods have therefore 
proved excessively high, so that, on renewal of com-
mercial relationships with industrialized countries, they 
have been rapidly ousted from trade; 
( / ) That, under the stimulus of circumstances 
favourable to the operation of industries producing 
goods which could not at that time be obtained outside 
the region, similar enterprises were installed in adja-
cent countries; and that such enterprises now encounter 
difficulty in selling their products, while at the same 
time they constitute installed capacity which is in excess 
of the possibilities at their command, and therefore 
has to remain idle, to the serious detriment of the 
economies of the countries concerned; 
(g) That a beginning has already been made on the 
installation of light, semi-heavy and even heavy in-
dustries which by their very nature require abundant 
resources and more complex techniques, and conse-
quently must have access to sufficiently large consumer 
areas; and 
(h) That, to judge by the experience of the indus-
trialized countries, the installation of semi-heavy and 
heavy industries, if they are to operate on adequate 
technical bases, calls for such large markets that those 
of the Latin American countries, taken individually, 
may in many cases prove too small to permit the 
development of such industries. 
58. On the basis of these data, the following opinions 
were expressed in the course of discussion: 
(a) That it was necessary to co-ordinate the resources 
and efforts of the Latin American countries through 
the creation of a regional market that would open up 
wider sales prospects for their industrial products; 
on\y thus could the drawbacks encountered at earlier 
stages be avoided, through the utilization of installed 
capacity which at present is standing idle because it 
exceeds the limited consumer possibilities of the coun-
tries concerned; 
(b) That the European Coal and Steel Community 
provided an example of what could be done by coun-
tries at a more advanced stage of development, in 
face of new situations in which greater solidarity 
and co-operation had been achieved, thanks to the 
interest felt in maintaining and developing basic ac-
tivities ; 
(c) That the creation of a regional market would 
enable all the countries to decide what enterprises to 
install in the conditions most favourable to them, since 
the alternative solution that had been considered, con-
sisting in distributing the possibilities of industrial 
activity among two or more countries of the region 
and thus setting up a kind of monopoly, was not ac-
ceptable to countries interested in fostering their eco-
nomic development; 
(d) That the creation of a regional market constituted 
a means of affording every country in the region an 
opportunity of undertaking development activities, with-
out discrimination, since, in any event, it seemed 
practicable to attract the interest of investors, who 
are always prepared to place their capital where possible 
operating conditions will allow them to work success-
fully on economically sound bases; and 
(e) That rational industrialization, rather than limit-
ing international trade, tends to increase and expand 
it by developing a wider range of export products 
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and augmenting the economic potential of the country 
concerned and thus creating new requirements in 
respect of goods essential to the country's industrial 
activity. 
59. The Committee also noted the need to standardize 
products in order to give them easier access to markets. 
The representative of the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council stated that his organization was 
already engaged on a study of this matter, being con-
vinced that the rational development of industry tended 
to expand rather than to restrict international trade. 
60. The delegations agreed that it was necessary 
to define with absolute clarity and precision all points 
relative to the possible structure of the regional market 
and the most suitable procedures for bringing it into 
being. The Committee decided that the pertinent studies 
should be carried out, and to this end recommended to 
the secretariat that a group of experts be formed to 
complete the research already undertaken. It was felt 
that this measure would facilitate the transition to 
a broader system of multilateral trade within which the 
possible building-up of a regional market would con-
tribute to the sound development of Latin America's 
industries (see resolution 3 ( I ) ) . 
61. In view-of the suggestion put forward by some 
delegations that international commitments, particularly 
those entered into through GATT, should be taken 
into account in carrying out the study, the Committee 
took note of the ECLA secretariat's statement that in 
due course it would discuss with the Executive Secre-
tariat of GATT the possibilities offered by the Agree-
ment for putting into practice the regional market 
formula to be recommended by the group of experts. 
The ECLA secretariat also declared that, at future 
sessions of the Committee, it would report on progress 
made with respect to common markets in Europe 
or other parts of the world, so that advantage might 
be taken of such experience and due consideration 
might be given to the possible repercussions of the 
measures concerned on Latin America's trade with 
other areas. 
62. It was also decided to carry out, on the basis 
of the foregoing considerations, more thorough studies 
aimed at drawing up an inventory of industries already 
existing in Latin America, in order to determine what 
measures would be advisable to solve the problems 
deriving from the parallelism and idle capacity which 
have already been described (see resolution 2 ( I ) ) . 
IL RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE 
63. At its first session, the Trade Committee adopted 
the following resolutions: 
1 (I) Gradual establishment of a multilateral payments 
régime in Latin America 
2 (I) Preliminary studies for the creation of a regional 
market 
3 (I) Procedures for the creation of a regional market 
4 (I) Trade in traditional products 
5 (I) Place and date of the next session 
GRADUAL ESTABLISHMENT OF A MULTILATERAL 
PAYMENTS REGIME I N L A T I N A M E R I C A 
Resolution 1 (I)f adopted on 28 November 1956 
(E/CN.12/C.1 J 8) 
The Trade Committee9 
Considering that the studies carried out by the ECLA 
secretariat and the discussions of the Trade Committee 
suggest that it would be desirable for certain countries 
gradually and progressively to adapt the bilateral pay-
ments agreements and procedures in force between 
them to multilateral systems which will facilitate the 
expansion of trade at the highest possible levels, 
That obstacles to unrestricted multilateralism still 
exist, and that it is therefore advisable that the transi-
tion from one régime to the other be effected without 
causing a contraction of the volume of trade, 
That the best practical results would be achieved by 
establishing a working group, comprising highly-
qualified experts from the payments-accounts countries, 
to study alternative solutions and steps to be taken, 
That the States members of ECLA are also members 
of the International Monetary Fund, that the col-
laboration of the Fund would be of the greatest value 
and further that, in view of the experience acquired 
in such matters by the Organization for European 
Economic Co-operation, the technical co-operation of 
both organizations with the above-mentioned working 
group would be desirable, 
That it would be desirable for the Latin American 
countries between which bilateral agreements are in 
force to exchange information on balances in their 
intra-regional payments accounts, thus creating the 
possibility of compensating those balances the reciprocal 
transfer of which is agreed upon by the countries in 
question, and 
That the experience thus acquired will indicate the 
preliminary steps that should be taken or the alternative 
solutions which would have to be studied in order gra-
dually to arrive at a multilateral payments system, 
I. Resolves: 
1. To invite the Central Banks, or, failing these, 
the appropriate monetary authority in those Latin 
American countries that maintain bilateral agreements 
among themselves, to set up a working group which 
would study the possibilities of gradually establishing 
a multilateral payments régime and would suggest the 
measures best calculated to achieve that end. This 
Working Group shall present the findings of its studies 
at the earliest opportunity to the Trade Committee, 
which will consider them at a forthcoming session; 
2. The working group shall have at its disposal any 
technical studies provided by the ECLA secretariat 
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and shall request, through this secretariat, the technical 
assistance of the International Monetary Fund. It shall 
likewise be empowered to ask for the assistance of the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation, in 
view of its experience in the operation of the European 
Payments Union, and the collaboration of other inter-
national organizations, of the monetary authorities of 
other States members of ECLA and of experts em-
ployed at its request by the ECLA secretariat; 
II. Takes note of the fact that the Latin American 
countries between which bilateral payments agreements 
are in force are prepared, during the transitional 
period before the multilateralism envisaged in this 
resolution can be achieved, to apply measures designed 
to impart greater flexibility to their existing payments 
relations; and that likewise, to this end, and as steps 
towards progressive multilateralism, the said countries 
deem it advisable to adopt and apply concurrently, at 
the time they consider appropriate, the following basic 
principles: 
(a) Equal quotations for units of account and con-
vertible currencies on the exchange markets concerned, 
for the same operations; 
(b) Trade at prices not higher than those prevailing 
on the world market. If no bases for comparison are 
available, quotations shall not exceed prices paid by 
any third country under the same conditions; 
(c) Payment through the agreement-accounts of the 
following items, inter alia: 
(i) The value of traded commodities; 
(ii) Freight charges relating to direct traffic; 
(iii) Insurance and re-insurance; 
(iv) Other expenditures accessory to trade; 
(v) Other items agreed upon by the contracting 
parties; 
(d) Reciprocal credits adequate for the satisfactory 
development of trade, due allowance being made for 
seasonal fluctuations; 
(e) Automatic transfers to the accounts of other 
countries participating in the system of transfer of 
balances, through communication with the Central Bank 
of the debtor country, of sums in excess of the sti-
pulated swing credits; 
( / ) Reciprocal transfer of the above-mentioned 
countries' accounts of favourable balances within the 
swing credits by prior agreement between the Central 
Banks concerned; 
III . Takes note likewise that the said countries, in 
order to facilitate the voluntary reciprocal transfer of 
the balances in these accounts, are willing to exchange 
information periodically and opportunely, through the 
appropriate Central Banks, or, failing these, the mone-
tary authorities, on the state of the clearing accounts 
in force between the countries concerned; and that, 
should it be necessary to set up special machinery to 
facilitate this task, the secretariats of ECLA and of 
the International Monetary Fund shall be requested 
to suggest the bases for its operation. 
PRELIMINARY STUDIES FOR T H E CREATION 
OF A REGIONAL MARKET 
Resolution 2 ( I ) , adopted on 28 November 1956 
(E/CN.12/C.1/9) 
The Trade Committee, 
Considering that the problems arising from the paral-
lelism and idle capacity existing in certain Latin 
American countries lead to anti-economic operational 
conditions, and that this situation raises costs and con-
sumer prices, and 
Mindful that these conditions are partly attributable 
to the small size of the individual countries' markets, 
Recommends to the secretariat: 
(1) That it proceed to make an inventory of existing 
industries in Latin America with a view to determining 
what measures are advisable in order to remedy the 
situation described above; and 
(2) That it present reports on the progress of these 
studies to the Trade Committee at its periodic sessions, 
until such time as the work is completed. 
PROCEDURES FOR T H E CREATION OF A REGIONAL MARKET 
Resolution 3 ( I ) , adopted on 28 November 1956 
(E/CN.12/C.1/10) 
The Trade Committee 
Takes note with satisfaction of the study presented 
by^the Secretariat (E /CN.12 /C .1 /4 ) on the desirability 
of establishing a regional market, and 
Considering that the industrialization of Latin Amer-
ica is a necessity imposed by the need to make more 
efficient use of available human and natural resources, 
so as to increase productivity and, consequently, the 
standard of living of the population, 
That the future development of industry in Latin 
America—especially of the basic industries—requires, 
among other factors, broad markets which will enable 
such industries to attain economically adequate dimen-
sions and production at low costs in competitive con-
ditionSj 
That the heavy investment required by this type of 
industry renders indispensable, among other incentives, 
that provided by broader markets than those existing 
at present, and 
That the markets of the Latin American countries, 
taken individually, may be too small to allow the above 
industries to be developed on efficient technical bases, 
Resolves: 
(1) To request the ECLA secretariat to set up a 
group of experts which would complete the studies 
already carried out, and, as a measure to facilitate the 
transition to a broader system of multilateral trade, 
would project the possible structure of a regional 
market designed to contribute to the sound development 
of Latin American countries, especially those of a 
basic character, through the reduction of costs and 
the broadening of markets, 
In this connexion the said group of experts shall 
be required: 
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(a) To define the characteristics of the regional 
market, bearing in mind the differing degrees to which 
the countries of the region are industrialized; 
(b) To study its possibilities and projections; 
(c) To submit recommendations on basic principles 
and procedures for its establishment, within the terms 
of reference of the Trade Committee as defined in 
resolution 101 (VI) (E/CN.12/410) ; 
(2) That the conclusions of the group of experts be 
submitted by the ECLA secretariat, with its own obser-
vations and those received from other international 
organizations, directly to the member Governments for 
their consideration and comments. When this procedure 
has been complied with, the ECLA secretariat shall 
in due course promulgate as widely as possible the 
documents transmitted to the Governments; 
(3) That the study prepared by the group of experts, 
the observations of the ECLA secretariat and other 
international organizations, and the considerations and 
comments formulated by the Governments be in turn 
transmitted to the Trade Committee. Should it not 
prove possible for the final report to be presented at 
the next session of the Trade Committee, the ECLA 
secretariat shall present a preliminary report on the 
status of the work of the group of experts. 
TRADE I N TRADITIONAL PRODUCTS 
Resolution 4 (I), adopted on 29 November 1956 
(E/CNJ2/C.1/11) 
The Trade Committee9 
Considering that the secretariat has prepared and 
presented to this Committee a study on Inter-Latin-
American Commodity Trade in 1954 and 1955: Situa-
tion and Prospects in 1956 (E/CN.12/C.1/5), contain-
ing an analysis of intra-regional trade in certain basic 
products and an account of the main problems and 
obstacles affecting such trade, 
That of these problems some of the most important 
are those relating to the over-pricing of certain pro-
ducts ; to trade in certain items through agreements the 
short duration of which creates elements of uncertainty 
or causes interruptions in the flow of trade; to the 
participation in some cases of State monopolies in 
import or export trade; to the tendency to buy in other 
markets of origin commodities traditionally purchased 
within the region, 
That it is necessary to ensure stable markets for the 
products traditionally traded among the Latin Amer-
ican countries, comprising mainly raw materials and 
foodstuffs, and to restore equilibrium in given trade 
patterns of this nature, 
That measures of trade policy recently adopted by 
several Latin American countries indicate a trend 
towards liberalization and multilateralism in the foreign 
trade of the countries in question, as well as the desire 
to abolish commercial practices which are of a restric-
tive nature or which have become obstacles to the con-
tinuous expansion of inter-Latin-American trade, and 
Taking note that, in accordance with resolution 1 (I), 
the Latin American countries between which bilateral 
payments agreements are in force are prepared to 
adopt, at the time they consider appropriate, equal 
quotations for units of account and convertible cur-
rencies on the exchange markets concerned, for the 
same operations; and that these equal quotations for 
units of account will permit the abolition of discri-
minatory practices in trade in some of the natural 
products of the Latin American countries, 
Resolves: 
1. To take note with satisfaction of the study pre-
sented by the secretariat on Inter-Latin-American Com-
modity Trade in 1954 and 1955: Situation and Prospects 
in 1956 (E/CN.12/C.1/5), and to request the secretariat 
to continue carrying out studies of this type and to 
extend them to other products; 
2. To recommend to Governments 
(a) That, as regards intra-regional trade in tradi-
tional or basic products (natural products, raw materials 
and foodstuffs), they endeavour to pursue a policy of 
gradual liberalization, either unilaterally or through 
bilateral or multilateral agreements, with a view to 
encouraging and facilitating such trade and to guar-
anteeing it greater stability and equilibrium; 
(b) That such products be marketed among the 
Latin American countries at international prices and 
on terms similar to those prevailing for the region's 
trade with the rest of the world; and that, prices and 
other conditions being equal, the commodities in ques-
tion be purchased as far as possible within Latin 
America, to the extent permitted by the foreign trade 
régime of the countries of the region; 
(c) That, in accordance with prevailing world market 
conditions, countries which cannot meet their own needs 
purchase such products as far as possible from the 
usual sources of supply within Latin America, in so 
far as the producer countries are in a position to meet 
the requirements of their regular customers, and, in 
the case of countries maintaining payments agreements, 
when the payment availabilities created in the consumer 
countries so permit; 
(d) That, as far as possible, administrative pro-
cedures be facilitated and certain State import or export 
monopolies be eliminated, to the extent that they may 
exert an adverse influence on trade in traditional pro-
ducts, unless they should be justified by the supply 
requirements and domestic trade of the countries con-
cerned ; 
(e) That should trade agreements be concluded with 
respect to specific products, they be negotiated for 
periods long enough to ensure methodically organized 
production on the part of the exporter and regular 
supplies for the importer country; and 
( / ) That adjacent countries agree among them-
selves on the measures necessary for the prevention 
of illicit commodity trade between them, and for the 
direction of such trade into the regular channels. 
PLACE AND DATE OF T H E NEXT SESSION 
Resolution 5 (I), adopted on 29 November 1956 
(E/CN.12/C.1/12) 
The Trade Committee, 
Taking into consideration rule 2 of its rules of 
procedure, and 
A p p e n d i x 1 7 
Considering the proposal submitted by the delegation 
of Bolivia to the effect that advantage should be taken 
of the seventh session of the Economic Commission 
f o r La t in America, which will be held at La Paz 
in 1957, to convene at the same time a meeting of 
the Trade Committee, 
Expresses its grat i tude to the Government of the 
Republic of Bolivia for this generous invitat ion; and 
Resolves to request the E C L A secretariat to take 
whatever steps it considers appropr ia te to a r range f o r 
the second session of the Committee to be held at 
L a Paz at the same time as the seventh session of the 
Commission. 
APPENDIX 
Rules of procedure of the Trade Committee of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Rule 1 
In conformity with resolution 101 (VI), which was adopted 
at the sixth session of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America, and by virtue of which the Trade Committee is 
created, this Committee "shall be governed by the existing rules 
of procedure of the Commission in so far as they apply, without 
prejudice to its subsequent adoption of special rules for its 
operation" (see paragraph 8 of the resolution in question). 
Consequently, in all matters not explicitly covered by the pres-
ent rules of procedure, the Committee shall abide by the rele-
vant provisions of the rules of procedure of the Commission. 
SESSIONS 
Rule 2 
The Committee shall at each session determine the date and 
place of its next session, after hearitig the views of the Exe-
cutive Secretary. 
The Committee shall meet at the Commission Headquarters, 
unless it is decided otherwise by the Committee. A decision to 
hold a meeting away from ECLA Headquarters will be subject 
to the approval of the Commission and of the Economic and 
Social Council if additional financial implications are involved. 
In special cases, the date and place of a session may be 
altered by the Executive Secretary, in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Committee. 
AGENDA 
Rule 3 
The provisional agenda for each session shall be drawn up by 
the Executive Secretary, in consultation with the Chairman of 
the Committee, and shall be transmitted, at the same time as 
notice is given of the convening of the Committee, to the mem-
bers of the said Committee, to the specialized agencies con-
cerned, to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, to 
the non-governmental organizations in category A and to the 
appropriate non-governmental organizations in category B and 
on the register. 
OFFICERS 
Rule 4 
The Committee shall, at the commencement of each session, 
elect from among the representatives a Chairman, two Vict * 
Chairmen and a Rapporteur, who shall hold office until the fol 
lowing session. They shall be eligible for re-election. 
SUB-COMMLTTEES AND OTHER SUBSIDIARY BODIES 
Rule 5 
The Committee may, with the approval of the Commission, 
establish such sub-committees or other subsidiary bodies as it 
deems will facilitate the satisfactory fulfilment of its functions, 
and shall define their powers and composition in each case. It 
may also delegate to them such autonomy as is necessary for 
the efficient discharge of their technical responsibilities. 

Part II 
MAIN BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS 
1. The payments system and the regional market in inter-Latin-American 
trade (E/CN.12/C.1/3) 
2. Inter-Latin-American commodity trade in 1954 and 1955: situation and 
prospects in 1956 (E/CN.12/C.1/5) 
3* Payments and the regional market in inter-Latin-American trade (E/ 
CN.12/C.1/4) 

1. THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM AND THE REGIONAL MARKET IN 
INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE (E/CN.12/C.1/3) 
Introduction 
At the sixth session of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (Bogotá, Colombia, 
August-September 1955), the States members of the 
organization resolved to set up a Trade Committee 
(resolution 101 (VI)) . 1 It will be the task of this 
Committee to make specific recommendations for the 
solution of the problems analysed in the Study of 
Inter-Latin-American Trade (E/CN.12/369/Rev.l) or 
of others relating to commercial policy, payments, 
maritime transport and trade in certain products. 
Another of its aims will be to promote the development 
of an inter-Latin-American trade policy consistent 
with measures designed to expand the region's trade 
with the rest of the world. 
During the discussions held at Bogotá, it was agreed 
that at its first session the Committee should give 
priority to the examination of payments questions, the 
special features of which had already been analysed 
with considerable thoroughness in document E/CN.12/ 
369/Rev.l. 
Shortly after the adoption of the resolution cited, 
the exchange reforms introduced in some of the Latin 
American countries—partly as a step towards multi-
lateralism in their foreign trade—brought about radical 
changes in certain bilateral channels of intra-regional 
trade, where payments are governed by the clearing 
system. The new problems thus created, most of which 
are still existent at the date of completion of the 
present report, began to arouse feelings of concern 
in the region which relate not only to the future expan-
sion of inter-Latin-American trade, but also to the 
more immediate aim of maintaining its present levels. 
In order to prepare a background document for the 
Committee's first session, which would enable changes 
in payments systems to be discussed on the basis of 
fuller data than those presented in the Study of Inter* 
Latin-American Trade (E/CN. 12/369/Rev. 1), the 
ECLA secretariat set up a special group of three 
experts on foreign trade.2 The preliminary work of 
1 The text of resolution 101 (VI) is given in annex III. 
2 The group was composed of two ad hoc consultants— 
Mr. Eusebio Campos, from Argentina, and Mr. José Garrido 
Torres, from Brazil—and Mr. Esteban Ivovich, Chief of the 
ECLA Inter-Latin-American Trade Section. 
sending out questionnaires once completed, the group 
visited, during May and June 1956, the Latin American 
countries playing the major part in intra-regional trade, 
as well as others also feeling the repercussions of the 
reforms mentioned. In seven countries in all, the group 
contacted the foreign trade and Central Bank authorities, 
as well as officials from parastatal institutes and private 
organizations connected with trade and production. 
The present report sums up the data and suggestions 
gathered in the course of the survey; these deal not 
only with the specific problems of bilateralism, but 
also—and primarily—on the possibility of advancing 
towards a multilateral system. For the sake of brevity, 
the analyses or statistics of inter-Latin-American trade 
which appear in document E/CN.12/369/Rev.l3 are 
not included in this paper. 
The present study is divided into two chapters. The 
first, "Payments and recent exchange reforms", begins 
with a brief review of the situation up to August 1955 
and goes on to consider the subsequent reforms and 
their consequences, both in general and with respect 
to intermediate and manufactured products; the second, 
dealing with the "Search for ways of solving current 
problems" and using information and opinions gathered 
by means of the survey, analyses the bases of certain 
measures that are now being studied in competent 
circles with a view to overcoming the intra-regional 
trade difficulties created by the reforms in question. 
Lastly come the annexes, in two of which the new 
international exchange measures are examined (an-
nex 1), and a summary is given of the various coun-
tries' replies to relevant consultations by ECLA on 
aspects likely to be of use in establishing the general 
lines and, at the same time, in analysing the possibilities 
for a Latin American multilateral trade policy, both 
over the long term and during a necessary period of 
transition (annex II).4 Lastly, annex III reproduces 
the text of resolution 101 (VI) , by virtue of which the 
Trade Committee was created. 
3 A revised edition of the document containing these ana-
lyses and statistics (E/CN. 12/C. 1/2) was made available to the 
delegations to the first session of the Trade Committee. 
4 The opinions sounded during the ECLA group's survey are 
analysed, on broader lines than those laid down for the prepara-
tion of the present study, and some recommendations are pre-
sented in document E/CN.12/C.1/4, in part II, section 3, of this 
volume, drafted by the consultants, Mr. Eusebio Campos and 
Mr. José Garrido Torres. 
Chapter I 
PAYMENTS AND RECENT EXCHANGE REFORMS 
1. SITUATION I N AUGUST 1 9 5 5 
(a) Bilateralism and clearing accounts 
The situation recorded over a period of years, with 
respect to payments deriving from the movements 
of goods and services within Latin America, was ana-
lysed with considerable thoroughness in chapter V 
of the Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade, presented 
at ECLA's sixth session. The examination of the 
changes which have taken place since that session and 
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which appear to constitute the initial phase of a highly-
important process of development, may usefully be 
proceded by a brief reminder of certain features char-
acterizing the intra-regional payments system in force 
when the above document was prepared. 
The annual registered value of the transactions in-
volved in the Latin American countries' reciprocal 
trade amounted, in 1955, to 737 million dollars in 
each direction. Although all the republics take part in 
this trade on a major or minor scale, about nine-tenths 
of the total sum represent operations carried out in 
South America, largely under the clearing accounts 
system. In 1955, if petroleum values are excluded, such 
accounts covered approximately 85 per cent of inter-
South-American trade. 
The reasons for so substantial an expansion of the 
clearing accounts régime among most of the South 
American countries are not quite the same as those 
that determine the establishment of a clearing system 
with States in other regions. To begin with, under 
the exchange control régime, which often stipulates 
that an import licence be obtained in every case, the 
appropriate permit is usually granted provided that, 
at the time of issue, foreign exchange holdings exist 
in the currency in which the supplier country is to 
be paid. Under the clearing system, the licence can 
be given even if exchange is not available, since its 
issue does not imply the authorization of a transfer of 
foreign currency which will have to be effected prac-
tically at once, or within a very short period. For the 
moment, the transaction is merely an item noted on 
current account, which will affect the amount of the 
balance to be liquidated at the end of the period agreed 
upon between the parties, or when the balance con-
cerned rises above a predetermined critical level. 
There are other reasons for the extension of the 
system of clearing accounts. Some republics saw in 
others within the region an important potential market 
for their surpluses of primary and intermediate com-
modities, as well as for certain manufactured products, 
and made a sustained effort to back the sale of these 
commodities with a mutually advantageous policy. Such 
a policy was often reflected in the conclusion of short-
term but constantly renewed agreements, providing for 
the exchange of products for approximately equivalent 
values through operations liquidated within the clearing 
accounts concerned. As these accounts formed part of 
the system of selective and quantitative controls applied 
by each country to its imports as a whole, they served 
a further end, by protecting goods which the Latin 
American countries exchanged on a basis of over-
pricing—this being due to low domestic productivity 
or to over-valued export exchange rates—from the 
effects of foreign competition within intra-regional 
trade. 
The widespread adoption of the clearing accounts 
system was also connected with certain circumstances 
peculiar to trade policy in South America. The tariff 
instruments previously signed by some of the largest 
South American countries with States in other regions 
contained no saving clause that left an adequate margin 
for the granting of special intra-regional tariff treat-
ments, to the benefits of which goods exported by 
the States in question were not also entitled. Conse-
quently, these instruments prevented or hindered the 
conclusion of agreements designed to promote inter-
Latin-American trade by means of customs reductions 
and exemptions confined solely to trade within South 
America. The trammels thus imposed on commercial 
policy particularly hampered inter-Latin-American 
trade in intermediate and manufactured products. In 
these conditions, the only course open was to resort to 
instruments based on exchange control, including clear-
ing accounts, since the contracting parties could use 
these at their discretion, almost entirely uncircum-
scribed by the restraints imposed by treaties with 
countries in other regions. As a result, the system of 
payment on clearing accounts often was—and still 
is—a basic tool of commercial policy within intra-
regional trade among most of the South American 
countries. 
In those Latin American countries where foreign 
trade has been subject to direct controls, it is recognized 
that the clearing system permits the removal or reduc-
tion on reciprocal terms of the handicaps arising from 
the shortage of convertible foreign exchange, and even, 
at times, the creation of incentives to trade in inter-
mediate and manufactured products. Thus in some 
cases, by virtue of such factors as the determination, 
within the accounts, of high reciprocal credit levels, 
certain goods have been exempted from the import 
licence regulation, and flexible rules have been laid 
down for the settlement of debit balances (allowing 
their value to be covered in commodities, for example, 
instead of in United States dollars). 
(b) Heterogeneity of methods 
The heterogeneous nature of the various trade and 
payments agreements, which form the groundwork of 
the clearing system, stands out in sharp contrast to 
the homogeneity of the motives that have dictated its 
widespread adoption in South America. The basic 
clauses of these instruments differ widely from one to 
another. There are striking divergences of opinion on 
matters so important as the granting of most-favoured-
nation exchange treatment, the observance of parities, 
reciprocal credits, settlement of balances, re-exports, 
inclusion or exclusion of invisible items, etc. From 
another standpoint, even the methods of registering 
operations and the accounting procedures used vary 
so greatly that there are occasions when on one and 
the same date substantial discrepancies appear between 
the balance situation as recorded by one of the con-
tracting parties and as shown on the books of the 
other. 
(c) Lack of co-ordination among accounts 
Furthermore, the lack of a tradition of close colla-
boration among the Latin American countries, with 
respect to the practical manifestations of trade policy 
at the inter-Latin-American level, is reflected in each 
account's absolute isolation from the rest. Apart from 
the wide range of criteria and methods by which the 
mechanisms of the accounts are determined, no source 
of information has as yet been organized from which 
periodical indications of the over-all situation in the 
bilateral balances can be obtained. Neither do the re-
levant agreements contain clauses providing for trans-
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fers between more than two countries, despite the 
constant accumulation of balances in certain bilateral 
channels. Private enterprise sometimes manages to un-
freeze such balances by means of awkward combina-
tions. Hence the system of watertight compartments 
which characterizes the present structure of the ac-
counts is clearly not the most adequate to ensure 
any considerable broadening of the market which 
Latin America can offer to its intra-regional trade. 
(d) Co-ordination and transferability 
The search for solutions to these problems dates 
from several years back. In competent circles consi-
deration has more than once been given to the idea 
of instituting a multilateral clearing system, which 
would inevitably be accompanied by some measure of 
liberalization of trade in goods and services. Although 
full background data—such as those relating to the 
balance of payments between one republic and an-
other—have not hitherto been collected for a complete 
study of trade balances, some useful conclusions can 
be reached. If such an undertaking is to be success-
ful, it must be embarked upon by gradual stages. The 
magnitude of the disequilibria recorded during the 
last decade or two by some republics in their inter-
Latin-American trade is one of the factors whose 
persistence might prevent the machinery of the clearing 
system from running smoothly. However, grounds are 
not lacking for the belief that some of the most serious 
imbalances might be corrected by means of suitable 
commercial agreements and a trade expansion pro-
gramme. In certain cases a prerequisite would be the 
establishment of realistic instead of over-valued ex-
port exchange rates. For these and other reasons 
—as was pointed out during the discussions held at 
ECLA's sixth session—in present circumstances it 
seems advisable for the time being to pursue aims 
less ambitious than the institution of what might pro-
perly be termed a clearing organization. To such an 
end—and this too was suggested at Bogotá:—measures 
might be put into effect with a view to transcending 
gradually, in the course of a period of transition, the 
rigid bounds imposed by bilateralism as it exists at 
present. The steps to be taken would be directed towards 
the achievement of some degree of co-ordination in 
the system of clearing accounts, perhaps as a first 
move towards their future incorporation into an inte-
grated payments régime covering the whole or a sector 
of Latin America. This phase would have to be sup-
plemented by another giving more or less immediate 
priority—still as a means of approach to reforms of 
broader scope—to at least two complementary measures, 
i.e., (a) modification of the system of exchanging 
commodities within the clearing accounts on the basis 
of short-term agreements, delays in the renewal of 
which interrupt the continuity of trade; and (b) the 
establishment of a mechanism for the voluntary trans-
fer of balances above given levels between more than 
two countries, with a view to effecting payments both 
within and outside the region. 
(e) Commercial relations between the clearing 
and multilateral trade sectors 
To complete this brief account of the most salient 
general features of the inter-Latin-American payments 
situation up to the third quarter of 1955, and of the 
suggestions mooted in competent circles as to possible 
solutions for some of the problems connected with 
trade based on clearing agreements, mention must 
be made of a significant fact. While clearing accounts 
represented a way out of the difficulty created by the 
shortage of convertible currencies in the reciprocal 
trade of the southern countries of Latin America, 
which by this means expanded remarkably in specific 
channels, trade with those Latin American countries 
where multilateral commercial practices were prevalent 
remained at very low levels. In fact, the figures for 
transactions between one sector and the other still 
account for less than 10 per cent of intra-regional 
trade as a whole. Although various agreements aimed 
at the intensification of such trade have been concluded, 
one of the gravest impediments seems to be constituted 
by the overpricing which is the usual rule in those 
republics where exchange control imposes over-valued 
export rates. Other obstacles originate in geographical 
factors, and also in the extra costs deriving from the 
lack of direct maritime transport services on certain 
routes, and the consequent need for trans-shipments. 
In such circumstances, operations aiming, for example, 
at the establishment of a reciprocally advantageous 
commodity trade in petroleum royalties on the one hand 
and cereals, fats, tinned foodstuffs and manufactured 
goods on the other, have failed to result in a more 
or less steady trade pattern between the one sector of 
South America and the other, despite the complemen-
tary nature of many of their natural resources. 
( f ) The customs tariff and the clearing system 
An analysis of the significance of clearing accounts 
in inter-Latin-American trade would not be complete 
without an explanation of why they are used for 
purposes proper to the customs tariff. 
In the first place, it should be recalled that repeated 
endeavours have been made to co-ordinate the economies 
of Latin American countries by means of tariff agree-
ments, often signed and never subsequently ratified, 
with little or no practical success. Failure has some-
times been due to a certain vagueness in the wording 
of the commitments implied by such agreements, attri-
butable to the fact that no clearly-defined programmes 
had been drawn up beforehand. Sometimes they were 
too ambitiously conceived to be consistent with the ob-
jective possibilities of the markets it was desired to 
unify or co-ordinate. In other instances, the repudia-
tion and dispute of agreements already concluded has 
been allied to political considerations. Again, it was 
the broad scope of basic tariff treaties with countries 
in other regions, or the existence in such instruments 
of unconditional most-favoured-nation clauses contain-
ing no reservation on behalf of inter-Latin-American 
preferential treatment, that on other occasions prevented 
the agreements concerted from being put into force. 
The southern zone offers very clear cases in point. 
Moreover, the basic treaties mentioned above, and the 
national importance of the economic interests they 
involve, have some bearing upon a curious aspect 
of the region's trade, namely, the lack of agreements 
—in the case of certain countries—providing for the 
mutual application of the most-favoured-nation clause 
24 Pari II. Main background documents 
as minimum treatment in the commodity trade con-
cerned. 
A distinction must be drawn within this general 
picture. Not all the Latin American countries have so 
little freedom to use the customs tariff for purposes 
of special inter-Latin-American agreements.5 Broadly 
speaking, the limitations are most marked in those 
countries whose reciprocal trade is based on clearing 
accounts, although the two facts do not represent cause 
and effect. This situation is reflected in a very peculiar 
feature; the trade agreements concluded in the south-
ern zone of Latin America during the last fifteen years 
seldom take tariff agreements into account. 
The disuse into which agreements of this kind have 
fallen is clearly not unrelated to the special features 
of the situation in Argentina, where the inefficacy of 
the customs tariff seems to have reached an extreme; 
in 1953 the duty paid by the importer represented on 
an average little more than 4 per cent of the value 
of the goods on which it was imposed.6 Contractual 
limitations, which leave Argentina scant liberty to use 
the tariff as an instrument for import selection and 
for the encouragement of its inter-Latin-American 
trade, have probably also helped to determine the 
line of conduct almost universally followed by the 
southern countries, that is, the conclusion of treaties 
designed to regulate and expand reciprocal trade with-
out recourse to tariff agreements. Moreover, this ex-
plains the interest, plainly observable in the course of 
the ECLA survey, felt in various Latin American 
capitals as to the possible attitude of Argentina towards 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
Patently the factors influencing the decision whether 
to accede to this instrument or not differ from one 
country to another and relate both to trade policy 
proper and to programmes for expanding domestic 
production of articles similar to those negotiated under 
the terms of customs agreements. As regards the latter, 
when a country is a member of GATT, its application 
of the prohibitions or quantitative restrictions that it 
deems needful for the protection of a given line of 
domestic production is subject to certain conditions 
and consultations. If , after weighing these factors, 
Argentina were to decide to joint GATT, and the 
result, as in the case of other republics, were a strength-
ening of the country's capacity for tariff negotiation, 
much more use might be made of the customs tariff 
in future as an instrument of trade policy within Latin 
America. The role of the clearing system would then 
become less important. Opinions such as these were 
expressed to the members of the ECLA group in 
various countries. 
Yet another aspect must be considered. The adoption 
of exchange measures or of means deriving from 
quantitative controls in order to channel or expand 
inter-Latin-American trade is subject to certain limita-
tions in the case of countries that are members of 
GATT or of the International Monetary Fund. Under 
5 The five Central American countries (Costa Rica, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Nicaragua and El Salvador) are at present 
studying a draft multilateral treaty prepared with the technical 
co-operation of the ECLA secretariat. 
6 See Study of Inter-Latin-American Trades chapter IV, 
section 1, point 1. 
the regulations of both these organizations, quantitative 
restrictions may be applied, on certain conditions, if 
they can be justified on the grounds that they will help 
to stabilize the balance of payments.7 In countries that 
show a deficit in their external accounts, measures of 
this kind have at the same time served other ends, 
such as the protection of domestic industry against 
competition from alternative products of foreign origin, 
as well as the safeguarding and expansion of inter-
Latin-American trade. The support given to the latter 
by such means—subject to the balance-of-payments 
situation—would therefore be gradually weakened in 
proportion to the progressive improvement in the 
capacity for external payment. 
2 . RECENT EXCHANGE REFORMS AND I N T E R - L A T I N -
AMERICAN TRADE ON CLEARING ACCOUNTS 
(a) Revision of monetary and exchange policies 
Since September 1955, when ECLA's sixth session 
came to an end, interesting developments have taken 
place in the monetary and exchange policies of certain 
Latin American countries. Broadly speaking, these 
events reflect current trends towards economic libera-
lization and are also the outcome of a more resolute 
attitude to inflation on the part of individual countries. 
As far as the exchange system is concerned, the new 
situations arise from reforms of varying scope, but 
they are in essence dictated by the same purpose of 
establishing more realistic exchange rates, which can 
be rapidly adjusted to the evolution of the structure 
of prices at the domestic level. These measures have 
meant the modification or discarding of former systems 
based on exchange rates which were, as a rule, strik-
ingly over-valued and were separated from reality by 
a gap that widened almost as fast as inflation grew. 
Another element shared in common by some of the 
exchange reforms is the abolition or reduction of 
multiple exchange rates, which had attained considerable 
variety. This régime had fostered the increase of ad-
ministrative machinery for dealing individually with 
innumerable private applications for export and im-
port permits, on the basis of procedures in which the 
decision often did not depend solely on factors of a 
strictly economic nature. 
Furthermore, the guiding principle in the establish-
ment of export exchange rates was usually related to 
the production costs of the goods exported. Lower 
rates were assigned to export commodities in whose 
case productivity was high or satisfactory, so that these 
were at a disadvantage in relation to the sector which 
registered heavier costs or could bring greater influence 
to bear on the modification of the exchange rates in 
force. Moreover, the higher rate of exchange allotted 
to certain exports increased the price of the foreign 
currency which the official exchange control organiza-
tion bought from exporters. When this raised import 
exchange rates in general, the consequent upward move-
ment in the price of foreign exchange also meant 
heavier production costs in the most productive ac-
tivities, which had not reaped the benefit of the 
increase in the export exchange rate. 
7 See article XII of GATT and article XIV of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Agreement. 
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As a general rule, the exchange controls in force 
before the reforms were primarily aimed at restricting 
imports. But, for fear of the possible repercussions 
of an over-all modification of exchange rates on the 
cost of living and inflation, the rates were maintained 
at unrealistic levels. The inevitable consequence of 
such a system was the discouragement of exports, while 
imports felt the effects of the pressure arising from 
the artificial rates of exchange. As a corollary, stabili-
zation of the balance of payments was sought through 
the application of severe quantitative controls. In 
essence, the régime maintained low exchange rates for 
imports, the volume of which was generally consider-
ably below the country's requirements. It was by no 
means unusual in practice for profit margins intended 
to benefit the final consumer to remain in the hands 
of some of the intermediary sectors. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the private interests 
affected by the movements of exchange rates and the 
suspicions aroused by the struggle to obtain licences, 
were among the factors which helped to create a climate 
favourable to the suspension of the method in question. 
In some countries allusion was made to the "moral 
price" of the system, over and above its economic cost. 
It was obvious, too, how wearisome were felt to be 
the procedures involved in reaching a separate decision 
in each individual case. All this must have influenced 
the adoption of solutions which would afford greater 
competitive freedom to the import and export trades. 
Certain countries, therefore, within the over-all pro-
grammes of their economic and monetary policy, pro-
ceeded to modify their exchange régimes, with the aim 
of unifying the multiple rates and establishing approxi-
mate parity between the internal and external pur-
chasing power of the national currency. Argentina and 
Brazil, moreover, negotiated with European countries 
the institution of multilateral trade zones—the Paris 
and the Hague Clubs—in which use was made of 
European currencies reciprocally convertible on a parity 
basis. 
The exchange reforms to be described below8 created 
or aggravated certain difficulties for inter-Latin-Amer-
ican trade. Two circumstances constitute the focal points 
of these problems. First, the import licence system 
has to some extent lost its importance as a selective 
instrument for determining the source of imports, 
since the new regimes give the importer more freedom 
to make his purchases indiscriminately in various mar-
kets. Secondly, there are signs of a tendency, non-exist-
ent before the reforms, for buyers' decisions to depend 
mainly on considerations relating to price, quality and 
trademark prestige. Some deterioration is already ob-
servable in intra-regional exports of Latin American 
intermediate and manufactured goods for which pro-
ductivity conditions are not as satisfactory as for those 
from other regions. Again, on some of the exchange 
markets resulting from the reforms introduced, quo-
tations for the units of account utilized in inter-Latin 
American trade are lower than those registered for 
convertible foreign exchange, because of the nontrans-
ferability of these currencies and the want of arbitra-
tion mechanisms. Consequently, not even when pro-
8 See annex I. 
ductivity conditions match those prevailing for com-
peting goods, can certain intra-regional export flows 
maintain the levels hitherto attained. 
(b) Use of convertible foreign exchange 
In the context of the reforms, various circles are 
wondering whether it would not be preferable and 
feasible to use United States dollars or other trans-
ferable foreign exchange for the intra-regional trade 
payments at present effected through the fifteen clear-
ing accounts which exist in Latin America (see table 1), 
and within which operations to the value of 432 million 
dollars in each direction were liquidated in 1955. 
While the reforms were still being introduced, some 
countries thought of extending the new general prin-
ciples to inter-Latin-American trade and discontinuing 
the practice of bilateral clearing agreements. But the 
studies carried out in each case by the local authorities 
promptly led to the conclusion—as the survey showed— 
that a measure of this kind might at the present time 
be prejudicial to intra-regional trade and would at best 
be premature. It is apparently felt that years of inter-
governmental effort to consolidate trade relationships, 
based on the complementarity of certain natural re-
sources and on the new requirements created by eco-
nomic development, would be frustrated if the clearing 
accounts system were discarded, since this is not re-
garded strictly as an instrument of exchange restric-
tions in the region, but rather as an expedient employed 
in trade policy. 
The situation is further influenced by other consid-
erations. The tendency towards multilateralism in 
those Latin American countries which have put exchange 
reforms into effect bears little relation to any real 
improvement in their prospects of achieving conver-
tibility. Methods of transacting foreign trade have been 
altered, but balance-of-payments equilibrium continues 
to depend on the imposition of import restrictions, 
which in some countries affect not only luxury and 
non-essential articles, but also capital goods.9 
Despite the energetic nature of the selective and 
quantitative measures applied, there are several Latin 
American countries in whose current trade payments 
delays are frequently recorded. Moreover, they have 
to draw upon their reserves and resort to the credits 
stipulated in the payments agreements. Tension of this 
kind—most marked as a rule in relation with the dollar 
and other transferable currency areas—would probably 
increase if such exchange were utilized for those intra-
regional trade payments which up to now have been 
defrayed in units of account. At all events, this is the 
inference to be deduced from the observations—made 
to the ECLA group during the survey—of which a 
summary follows below. 
Besides securing the benefit of the reciprocal credits 
granted by the Central Banks concerned, amounting 
to an annual sum of about 85 million dollars in each 
direction, inter-Latin-American trade operations effected 
in units of account eliminate the necessity of daily 
recourse to United States dollars for the opening of 
credits and the payment of invisible items. If the 
9 At the time of drafting the present study, this situation 
exists in Argentina and Chile. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: PAYMENTS AGREEMENTS IN FORCE 
Reciprocal 
credit 
Dates of entry into (millions 
Contracting parties force and expiry Monetary unit of dollars) Liquidation of balances 
(1) Argentina-Bolivia 9. 9.54 Dollar-unit 3a Up to 18 months after the expiry of the agree-
24. 9.57 of account ment, in commodities. After that date, in 
United States dollars 
(2) Argentina-Brazil^ 25. 6.54 Dollar-unit 40a c In commodities on expiry of the agreement, in 
31.12.56 of account two annual quotas. The remainder in United 
States dollars 
(3) Argentina-Chileb 19. 2.54 Dollar-unit 15a In commodities up to 18 months after the expiry 
31.12.58 of account of the agreement. The remainder in United 
States dollars 
(4) Argentina-Ecuador^ 22. 8.53 Dollar-unit 2a After one year, in commodities. The remainder 
22. 9.56 of account in United States dollars 
(5) Argentina-Paraguay 14. 8.53 Dollar-unit 5a After 6 months, in the form agreed upon by the 
14. 8.56 of account two Governments 
(6) Argentina-Uruguay 27. 8.48 Dollar-unit 8.4a d Within a term of three years, in United States 
5. 9.56 of account dollars 
(7) Bolivia-Brazil 24.12.53 Dollar-unit 
23.12.56 of account 
(8) Bolivia-Chile 10.11.55 Dollar-unit 0.5 After 9 months, in United States dollars 
10.11.56 of account 
(9) Bolivia-Uruguay 29.11.55 Dollar-unit 0.5 In commodities, within one year after the ex-
29.11.56 of account piry of the agreement. The remainder in 
United States dollars 
(10) Brazil-Chile 19. 4.41 Dollar-unit 3.2 In United States dollars 
(no fixed date of of account 
expiry: 3 months' 
notice required) 
(11) Brazil-Uruguay 28.12.49 Dollar-unit 3a d 
(no fixed date of of account 
expiry) 
(12) Chile-Ecuador 4. 8.49 United States 0.25 Every six months 
(automatic an- dollars 
nual renewal) 
(13) Colombia-Ecuador 1. 4.49 Sucres and a Every six months, in United States dollars 
(automatic an- pesos 
nual renewal) 
(14) Ecuador-Uruguay 4. 6.55 Dollar-unit 0.2 Six months after the expiry of the agreement, 
4. 6.58 of account in United States dollars 
(15) Paraguay-Uruguay 10. 1.53 Dollar-unit 4d On expiry of the agreement, in United States 
10. 1.57 of account dollars 
TOTAL RECIPROCAL CREDITS 85.05 
Sources: Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Central Banks. 
Note: The conclusion of a payments agreement between 
Brazil and Paraguay is under consideration. 
a Establishes the observance of parity with the United States 
dollar. 
b Contains the most-favoured-nation clause with respect to 
exchange rates. 
c This credit is unlimited. The sum noted represents the 
maximum reached in October 1954. Interest (2 per cent) is 
payable on the balance only when this exceeds 15 million dol-
lars ; if it rises above 30 million, 2.5 per cent is payable on the 
excess. 
d Interest is payable on the debit balance. 
whole system were based on t ransferab le foreign ex-
change, each country would have to set aside a pro-
port ion of its holdings in such currencies large enough 
to constitute its work ing capital in the intra-regional 
sector. A s availabilities barely suffice t o finance t rade 
with other regions, this does not seem feasible, at any 
rate over the short term. 
T h e problem is complicated by another element. I t 
o f ten happens that the magni tude of the disequilibria 
between the southern countries of Lat in America is 
considerable. A t present it is only on rare occasions, 
and a f t e r a certain lapse of t ime, that these imbalances 
give rise to disbursements of convertible currency. If 
the clearing accounts were discontinued and t rade were 
conducted in hard currencies, balances would have to 
be settled immediately, to the detr iment of the availa-
bilities—small enough to begin wi th—which today are 
earmarked fo r t rade with other regions. 
In contrast, one of the countries visited was inclined 
to advocate the abolition of the present system. T h e 
feeling here is that t rade in convertible fore ign ex-
change would enable advantage to be taken of short-
term private bank credit, which would in that case 
resume the role it had played in earlier periods. I n 
so f a r as bank credit served to channel funds accruing 
f r o m financial markets outside Lat in America, it would 
facilitate the movement of goods and would help to 
ease the payments tensions described. The re seems 
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to be no approximately exact idea of the potential 
aggregate volume of credits from this source. 
These considerations apart, the survey made it clear 
that there is an almost universal consensus of opinion 
as to the inadvisability of utilizing the dollar or other 
transferable foreign exchange for intra-regional pay-
ments at the present time. This is felt more strongly 
in some countries than in others, in accordance with 
the special situation of each as regards the United 
States dollar and other transferable currencies. But, 
briefly, countries whose reciprocal trade is based on 
clearing accounts seem on the whole to favour the 
maintenance of the system. 
In this connexion, the income and expenditure situa-
tion of selected countries with the sterling area, as 
indicated by statistics for 1955, is given by way of 
illustration (see table 2). 
Table, 2 
LATIN AMERICA: INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
IN POUNDS STERLING, 1955 
(millions of pounds sterling) 
Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay 
Income 77.4 38.4 11.0 2.2 17.5 22.3 
Exports 72.1 28.8 11.0 1.6 12.7 10.3 
Other heads 5.3 9.6 — 0.6 4.8 12.0a 
Expenditure 94.8 32.3 10.6 2.1 17.9 26.1 
Imports 79.3 11.0 9.7 1.5 11.7 25.0 
Other heads 15.5b 21.3 0.9 0.6 6.2 1.1 
Balances —17.4 6.1 0.4 0.1 —0.4 3.8 
Sources: For Argentina, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay: Central Banks; for Brazil: 
Superintendencia da Moeda e Crédito; for Chile: Consejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior. 
Note: Bolivia's receipts in pounds sterling amounted to 11.7 million. Data on expenditure 
in this currency are not available. 
a Including dollars converted into pounds sterling, to cover the disequilibrium in the latter 
currency, for an amount equivalent to 10.9 million pounds. 
b Including transfers of pounds sterling against dollars. 
As can be seen, the group formed by the seven 
southern countries of Latin America registers in the 
aggregate a substantial disequilibrium in its balance 
in pounds sterling, and it should be noted that some 
of these republics resorted to their dollar availabilities 
to cover the deficits. Attention may be drawn to certain 
individual cases which deserve comment. 
Argentina. Intensive use has been made of the credit 
of up to 20 million pounds provided for in this coun-
try's agreement with the United Kingdom. A part was 
utilized to buy back the dollars with which Argentina 
had paid for purchases made in the sterling area, 
before the signing of the agreement. The current 
balance with this area shows the same unfavourable 
trend as can be observed in Argentina's aggregate 
foreign accounts. 
Bolivia. This country's receipts in pounds sterling 
amounted to 11.7 million in 1955. Statistics of expendi-
ture are not available. It should be borne in mind that 
Bolivia is included under the regulations of the "Amer-
ican accounts" sector, and that its income in pounds 
sterling can therefore in practice be computed in terms 
of dollars. 
Brazil. A surplus is shown in Brazil's balance of 
payments with the sterling area. It must be taken into 
account that during the first eight months of 1955, until 
The Hague Club agreement came into force in August 
of that year, the supply of pounds in Brazil's ex-
change auctions was severely restricted, since receipts 
in this currency were primarily used for the settlement 
of trade debts. 
Uruguay. As a considerable deficit was registered in 
its accounts with the sterling area, Uruguay allocated 
30.6 million dollars to this external payments sector. 
(c) Possible accession to The Hague and Paris Clubs 
As an outcome of the exchange reforms, attention 
has also been given, in circles directly interested in 
the development of intra-regional trade, to the possi-
bility and expediency of acceding to The Hague or 
Paris Club in order to incorporate inter-Latin-Amer-
ican trade payments into the operations of these or-* 
ganizations. 
Clearly, faced with a decision of this nature, each 
country will have to work out its own attitude by eva-
luating, among other factors, the payments position 
itself (a) in the regional sector and (b) in relation 
to the European sector. 
The problem does not appear simple. If further 
consideration is given to the cases of Argentina and 
Brazil, and the movement of trade values between 
these two countries is examined, the sharpness of the 
seasonal or short-term disequilibria is clearly evident. 
At the same time it can be seen that over three- to 
five-year periods there is a tendency for the aggregate 
values of reciprocal trade to be levelled up. In 1955, 
Brazil's deficit with Argentina stood at 30 million 
dollars. If Argentina had joined The Hague Club, 
Brazil would have settled this balance immediately and 
automatically, and availabilities for Brazilian payments 
in Europe would thus have been reduced by an equi-
valent sum—rather high in proportion to this country's 
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earnings within the Club (see table 3). Conversely an 
imbalance unfavourable to Argentina might attain con-
siderable relative magnitude if wheat production were 
inadequate to cover the usual exports to Brazil. Here 
too the resulting curtailment of Argentina's availabilities 
in Europe would be severe. 
Table 3 
BRAZIL: TRADE W I T H MEMBERS OF T H E HAGUE 
CLUB AND T H E SOUTHERN COUNTRIES 
OF LATIN AMERICA, 1955 





Federal Republic of Germany 104.4 88.0 16.4 
Sterling area 77.3 17.7 59.6 
Austria 6.0 5.9 0.1 
Netherlands 4.4 34.0 8.4 
Italy 47.5 48.7 — 1.2 
Union of Belgium and Luxem-
bourg 17.6 24.6 — 7.0 
TOTAL WITH HAGUE CLUB 295.2 218.9 76.3 
Argentina 99.8 151.9 —52.1 
Bolivia 0.4 2.0 — 1.6 
Chile 11.4 11.4 — 
Paraguay 0.02 0.2 — 0.1 
Peru 0.06 0.7 — 0.6 
Uruguay 32.8 29.1 3.7 
TOTAL WITH SOUTHERN COUNTRIES s 
OF LATIN AMERICA 114.5 195.3 —50.8 
TOTAL WITH THE WORLD 1,423.2 1,306.8 116.4 
Source: Official statistics. 
Another point that would have to be ascertained 
would be the reaction of the European countries if 
faced with the prospect of The Hague Club's being 
extended to include certain inter-Latin-American pay-
ments. The transfer of large sums—such as those in-
volved in trade between Argentina and Brazil espe-
cially—might perhaps at a particular moment modify 
a given country's balance situation in relation to the 
European Payments Union. The impression gathered 
during conversations with European experts—also in 
connexion with the survey—coincided with the views 
expressed in competent Latin American circules. It 
seems that it would be premature to take immediate 
steps towards securing the collaboration of The Hague 
Club mechanism in the transfer of inter-Latin-Amer-
ican total balances, especially with respect to those 
of Brazil with Argentina and Uruguay, where the dis-
equilibria are usually substantial. 
This would not apply to balances in intra-regional 
channels where the absolute values of reciprocal trade 
are not so high and the disparities resulting from im-
balances are intrinsically smaller. Trade between Argen-
tina and Paraguay is a case in point. For this and other 
trade flows of similar volume, the machinery of the 
Clubs might possibly be set in motion immediately 
as far as the situation of the European countries is 
concerned. In this connexion, it should be noted that, 
in Paraguay, the ECLA group met with opinions sup-
porting the adoption in trade with Argentina of pay-
ments formulae based on European foreign exchange 
of limited transferability. 
From this point of view, some of the South Amer-
ican countries on the Pacific seaboard are in a different 
position. As their extra-regional trade is mainly chan-
nelled towards the United States, they would be un-
likely to possess enough European foreign exchange 
for the settlement of negative balances in their inter-
Latin-American trade. 
The remarks made in connexion with the possibilities 
of resorting to The Hague Club mechanism as a 
means of transcending the rigid limits at present 
restricting transfers in intra-regional trade would be 
largely applicable to the prospects of utilizing the 
Paris Club for the same purpose. In this instance, 
however, a different feature is to be noted: the level 
of aggregate operations is higher (see table 4). There-
fore, the relative importance of the inter-Latin-Amer-
ican balances which might conceivably be liquidated 
within this Club would be less than in the case of The 
Hague Club. At all events, the survey revealed a 
consensus of opinion to the effect that a solution of 
this kind would hardly be feasible unless a greater and 
more stable degree of equilibrium payments within the 
area were first secured. For this purpose more con-
fidence is felt in the intra-regional arrangement to 
be described later,10 which in any case would serve 
as an initial or transitional system, paving the way 
either for subsequent accession to the Clubs mentioned 
or for the application of other solutions. 
Table 4 
ARGENTINA: TRADE W I T H CURRENCY AREAS OF 
WESTERN EUROPE AND W I T H SOUTHERN 
COUNTRIES OF LATIN AMERICA, 1954 





Sterling area 209.8 162.8 47.0 
Western Europe 
(Continent) 365.2 232.8 132.4 
TOTAL WITH CURRENCY AREAS 
OF WESTERN EUROPE 575.0 395.6 179.4 
89.0 120.0 —31.0 
83.8 58.8 25.0 
TOTAL WITH SOUTHERN COUNTRIES 
OF LATIN AMERICA 172.8 172.8 — 6.0 
TOTAL WITH THE WORLD 1,062.0 954.8 107.2 
Source: Official trade statistics. 
3 . REPERCUSSION OF T H E REFORMS 
(a) General effects 
In relation to the recent exchange reforms, some-
thing has already been said of the reasons why it 
seems advisable to maintain, at least for a time, some 
kind of system of payments on clearing accounts for 
specific sectors of intra-regional trade. In this context, 
in order to assemble background data from which to 
judge whether the existing bilateral system might still 
serve such an end or whether it would have to 
10 See "Official credits and balances", annex II. 
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be remodelled, the findings of the survey carried out 
in several Latin American countries must be analysed. 
Information and opinions were in fact collected in 
relation to the specific repercussions of the reforms 
as they affected trade liquidated through clearing ac-
counts, as well as to the consideration of certain 
procedures which might immediately remedy some of 
the unfavourable consequences of the reforms, and of 
others, more far-reaching in their scope, which might 
build up trade on bases designed to promote its ex-
pansion. 
Serious concern is clearly felt as to the limiting 
influence that may be exerted by the exchange reforms 
on the development of certain lines of intra-regional 
trade, if suitable measures are not adopted to counter-
act these effects. Within trade channels where values 
are liquidated on account, considerable changes in 
price levels are being recorded. Prices traditionally 
higher than quotations on the world market are giving 
way to others of a more or less competitive nature. 
In the last few months, trade in wheat, meat, pork 
fats and other foodstuffs, as well as in certain raw 
materials, has been displaying a trend towards the 
rapid elimination of overpricing.11 For most of these 
articles, the adjustment is facilitated by the fact that 
they are produced mainly for the world market, and 
the degree of specialization attained is therefore satis-
factory. On the other hand, the situation is different 
for intermediate and manufactured goods. Since these 
are produced by industries in which productivity is 
lower than in competing foreign activities, the new 
exchange treatment often fails to eliminate over-pric-
ing. Moreover, under the previous system, dependent 
as it was on administrative mechanisms now virtually 
discarded or restricted in their use, regional trade in 
goods of this kind often took the form of barter 
arrangements. Hence exporters enjoyed the advantages 
not only of discriminatory treatment with respect to 
facilities or sole right of access to the buyers' market, 
but also of an exchange rate higher than that now 
established by the reforms. 
Where inter-Latin-American exports of intermediate 
and manufactured goods are concerned, the principal 
doubt arises in connexion with the recently established 
freedom to purchase from any source those goods 
1 1 A comparison between quotations for given inter-Latin-
American exports before and after the exchange reforms re-
veals the following f.o.b. price differences per ton in agreement-
dollars : 
1955 1956 
Wheat 71.25 61.90 
Wheat flour 101.80 88 
Frozen meat 500 385 
Pork fat 360 228 
Coconut oil 1,000 400 
Coal 13 11 
Linen thread 5 3.2 
In some cases, when the reforms annulled the joint effect upon 
prices of factors such as the over-valuation of the export ex-
change rate, the lack of monetary parity or the system of equal-
izing certain exports and imports, the new prices differed very 
greatly from those registered under the former régime. An 
extreme case in point, in terms of units of account, occurs in 
trade between Argentina and Peru. Frozen meat from Argen-
tina was priced at 700 agreement-dollars per ton and cotton 
from Peru at 2,650. Later, in transactions between the two 
countries effected in 1956, meat was quoted at 381 agreement-
dollars and cotton at 1,100. 
whose importation is authorized. In contrast to the 
situation before the reforms, the purchaser or con-
sumer can now buy a given article at will either in 
Europe, in the United States or in another Latin Amer-
ican country.12 Naturally, he chooses the market in 
which price and quality are most attractive. Ceteris 
paribus, he will probably decide in favour of the sup-
plier whose prestige is greatest or whose contacts with 
his customers are most efficiently organized. Hence, 
as has become very apparent in recent months, pur-
chases are tending to shift towards the great traditional 
markets.13 
Hitherto, intra-regional trade had been conducted 
under the protection of agreements and of the import 
licence system, the result having sometimes been the 
establishment of what almost amounted to monopolies; 
witness the frequent cases in which import licences 
were granted for certain products from Latin Amer-
ican countries when similar imports from other sources 
were not authorized. The disappearance or weakening 
of the instruments which rendered this policy possible 
may be succeeded, as is thought in the countries visited 
during the survey, by a development somewhat similar 
to events in the early post-war period, when the renewal 
of trade with Europe led to a sharp drop in inter-
Latin-American exports of manufactured goods, which 
had increased considerably during the war years. Al-
though the technique of industrial production in Latin 
America has improved since then, it is feared that 
free competition on the regional markets may reduce 
the present volume of certain trade flows and hinder 
the expansion hoped for. The industrial sectors most 
seriously affected would of course be those whose in-
stalled capacity exceeds the requirements of the do-
mestic market. Obstacles to the diversification of 
exports would also be created, since the only outlet 
for surpluses would be their sale on the Latin Amer-
ican markets. 
In face of these prospects, two salient questions are 
being discussed in circles connected with inter-Latin-
American trade: (a) whether it will or will not 
prove practicable to bring prices down to or closer to 
competitive levels, and (b) whether special incentives 
can,or cannot be created with a view to replacing those 
instruments for the promotion of intra-regional trade 
12 In November 1955, in order to absorb part of the credit 
balance registered in the clearing account through which its 
trade with Brazil is transacted, Chile authorized—over and 
above the margins indicated in the foreign exchange estimate 
for that year—imports from the former country of various 
kinds of machinery, electric motors, tools and tyres, to a value 
of 4.03 million units of account, and then granted import li-
cences which represented practically the whole of this sum. 
Neverthless, soon after the promulgation of the reform, under 
the terms of which the same commodities could be freely im-
ported from any source, so many holders of the licences in 
question applied for their annulment that the values involved 
totalled rather more than 50 per cent of the sum mentioned, 
according to statistics supplied by the Consejo Nacional de Co-
mercio Exterior of Chile. 
13 When Chile began to apply the new exchange system, in 
April 1956, out of the aggregate operations authorized under the 
previous régime and at that date in the early stages of imple-
mentation, 61 per cent corresponded to imports from the United 
States. The import retainer deposits made during May and 
June show that in the two months subsequent to the reform the 
proportion of imports purchased from the United States rose to 
75 per cent of the total. 
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which until recently were provided by the system of 
direct control of foreign trade. 
As regards the first of these points, it is recognized 
that it is upon the internal expedients adopted by each 
country with the aim of exporting products of satis-
factory quality at competitive prices that the main-
tenance of the regional market and, above all, the 
expansion of the sales flow concerned would largely 
depend. But a widespread feeling exists that it would 
be difficult to attain this end if units of account are 
negotiated at a price lower than that resulting from 
parity with convertible currencies. Even when the 
position as regards productivity is much the same, 
Latin American exports are unlikely to be able to 
compete on the regional market with similar goods 
from the dollar area or from others where parity with 
this area is maintained. Hence, the problem of parity14 
is highly important for the future of inter-Latin-Amer-
ican trade based on clearing accounts. 
With respect to the second aspect of the problem, 
that is, the question of special measures for the main-
tenance and promotion of inter-Latin-American trade 
in intermediate and manufactured products, some 
authorized opinions advocate the adoption of such 
measures.15 
(b) Particular effects of the reform in Argentina 
The above general description of the main reper-
cussions of the reform of the exchange systems on 
inter-Latin-American trade must be supplemented by 
a separate indication of certain particular effects of 
the measures adopted by Argentina. In practice these 
have resulted in the establishment of differential export 
prices. Argentina has two markets for the negotiation 
of the foreign exchange accruing from movements 
of goods and services, one official, with a fixed rate 
of 18 pesos to the dollar, and the other a free market 
in which dollar quotations are considerably higher.16 
When this system was introduced, no machinery was 
set up in the latter market for the negotiation of 
units of account, so that goods and services scheduled 
in the free market must in reality be sold at the official 
market rate when they are exported to areas with which 
a payments agreements is in force.17 If Argentine 
exporters wish to obtain values in local currency equiv-
alent to those of their sales to the dollar area there 
is only one course open to them; they must raise the 
price of the product proportionally in terms of agree-
ment-dollars, so as to offset the fall in their receipts 
deriving from the exchange rate. 
14 See annex II, 2, for a special analysis of this problem. 
15 See annex II, 11. 
16 About 67 per cent in August 1956. 
17 The sale on the official market of units of account corre-
sponding to operations scheduled in the free market but effected 
with countries with which clearing agreements are in force, is 
authorized only in the case of countries "geographically adja-
cent" to Argentina. The term "geographically adjacent" was 
adopted by the Central Bank of Argentina to denote a new 
grouping, since the official interpretation of the expression 
"adjacent countries" had for many years and for a number of 
reasons included Peru and excluded Brazil. Provisions estab-
lished by the Central Bank in October 1955 assigned trade 
payments between Peru and Argentina to the United States 
dollar area. 
In practice this régime results in over-pricing of 
Argentine exports to treaty areas of commodities 
scheduled on the free market, such as manufactured 
goods of all kinds, and some intermediate industrial 
products, as well as pork meat and fats, fresh fruit and 
minerals. Two illustrative examples may usefully be 
given of the way in which it hampers the operation of 
Argentina's clearing agreements with Brazil and Para-
guay. The reforms especially affected the Argentine-
Brazilian trade in fresh fruit, the value of which 
amounted to more than 20 million dollars on each side 
and which virtually represented the barter of products 
similar in value and more or less equally essential. 
Exports of fruit were scheduled in Argentina in the 
free and imports in the official market. In the first 
case, the aim was apparently to encourage sales to 
convertible currency areas, and in the second, mainly 
to avoid further surcharges on the price paid by the 
Argentine consumer for bananas from Brazil.18 The 
consequent increase in the price of fruit sold by Ar-
gentina to Brazil gave rise to great uncertainty in the 
evolution of this trade. At one time the auctioning of 
exchange for importing Argentine fruit was suspended 
in Brazil.19 
It should be recalled that with respect to almost the 
whole of the transactions between Argentina and Brazil 
(not only the fruit trade), a similar problem has arisen 
in relation to freight tariffs. Most of the transport in 
both directions is undertaken by Argentine shipping, 
and in Buenos Aires the companies concerned convert 
the agreement-dollars received for their services at the 
18-peso and not at the free rate, just as they do when 
they carry products to or from countries with which 
Argentina trades on the basis of convertible currencies. 
In terms of real value, the system means that freight 
tariffs are higher than they would be if the exchange 
accruing to Argentine shipping, within clearing-agree-
ments sectors, could be sold in Buenos Aires on the 
free market, where other freights are scheduled. 
The repercussions of Argentina's over-all measures 
on its trade with Paraguay were even more severe. 
In terms of foreign exchange, the prices of certain 
Paraguayan exports, such as lumber, and coconut oil, 
had to be reduced to adapt them to the new compe-
titive conditions prevailing on the Argentine market. 
This was one of the objectives of Paraguay's exchange 
reform in March 1956. Again, timber, which consti-
tutes the bulk of Argentina's imports of Paraguayan 
products, is scheduled in the official market, and Argen-
tina credits the value to Paraguay on the appropriate 
payments account. 
18 Up to October 1955 the rate of exchange for Argentine 
imports of fruit from Brazil was 7.50 pesos to the dollar. It 
rose to 18 as from 28 October. 
19 In the first six months of 1956, Argentina's exports of 
fruit to Brazil amounted to only 1,277,000 crates, as against 
2,234,000 during the same period in the preceding year. How-
ever, it should be noted that this contraction in sales to Brazil 
was offset by an increase in exports to transferable currency 
areas, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Venezuela. According to recent statistics, Argentina's total ex-
ports in the first half of 1956 reached 4,066,000 crates (see The 
Review of the River Plate, Buenos Aires, 20 Tuly 1956, page 
41). In the first six months of 1955 they had totalled 3,538,000 
crates. 
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On the other hand, Paraguay's purchases are mainly 
composed of manufactured goods and other products 
scheduled in Argentina's free market, exports of which 
have to be paid for with transferable foreign exchange. 
It thus comes about that Paraguay has not sufficient 
outlet for the units of account obtained from the sale 
of timber, and at the same time unregistered com-
modity trade between the two countries is increasing. 
Some manufactured goods which it is no longer easy 
to purchase through the clearing account are apparently 
being smuggled into Paraguay. The severe pressure 
observed in recent months on quotations for foreign 
currencies in Paraguay's free market is probably 
linked to this situation. As usually happens in such 
cases, the volume of contraband is proportionate to 
the difficulties hampering the conduct of trade proper.20 
Chapter 11 
SEARCH FOR WAYS OF SOLVING CURRENT PROBLEMS 
1. E X C H A N G E RATES 
(a) Visible trade 
The exchange reforms have intensified a feature 
which for a long time past, and with only circumstan-
tial or very slight variations, has been of frequent 
occurrence in inter-Latin-American trade. This is the 
lack of a pre-determined relationship, parity, between 
quotations for units of account and for transferable 
currencies. In practice this results in different exchange 
rates for imports or exports of one and the same com-
modity, according to its market of origin or of destina-
tion. A summary follows of the situation brought about 
by existing exchange regimes in the three countries 
whose intra-regional trade on account represents the 
highest values, i.e., Argentina, Brazil and Chile.21 
Argentina. As regards imports, no problem is now 
created by differences in the price of exchange, since 
this is the same for goods from any source. The dif-
ficulty arises in connexion with exports, for which 
Argentina is paid in agreement-dollars, since real prices 
for these are far below quotations for the United 
States dollar and other transferable currencies. It is 
clear that up to a point these problems could be solved 
if the Central Bank of Argentina purchased the units 
of account accruing from free market exports at the 
prevailing free market rate. But the main reasons why 
this has hitherto been impossible are also clear. There 
would not be sufficient demand on the part of Argen-
tine buyers for the units of account which would be 
accumulated through such purchases, since the imports 
scheduled on the free market—for instance, power 
generators, lorries, spare parts—are not as a rule 
traded intra-regionally. Consequently, perhaps the 
easiest way to tackle the problem successfully might 
prove, as was suggested in the survey, to be the remo-
delling of Argentina's schedules of free market pro-
ducts (both exports and imports) to include goods 
which would involve the negotiation of fairly well-
balanced quantities of Latin American units of account. 
This would eliminate or reduce the risk of losses in 
local currency as a result of exchange differences. 
On the other hand, the retention of the present sche-
dules of free market products would mean that Argen-
20 In June 1956, the Paraguayan authorities calculated that 
unregistered trade with Argentina, which before the latter's 
exchange reforms had represented an approximate daily sum of 
350,000 Argentine pesos, currently amounted to as much as 
1 million pesos a day. 
21 In 1955, trade between these three countries represented 
74 per cent of total inter-Latin-American trade on account. 
tina was exposed to obvious risks. The difficulty 
in securing some degree of balance between sales and 
purchases of the corresponding units of account would 
be less, if the new schedules were drawn up not on 
bilateral bases alone, but with a view to trade with the 
several Latin American countries affected by the 
problem that it is desired to solve. Furthermore, if 
such schedules were effectively to promote trade, they 
would have to relate to products also incorporated in 
Argentina's free and not in its official market, in so 
far as its trade with other currency areas was concerned, 
or to articles of which imports from these areas were 
prohibited. From this standpoint, it should be noted 
that, in setting up the Paris Club, Argentina made 
reservations in favour of the special exchange measures 
it might later adopt in relation to its trade with adja-
cent countries. 
However far-reaching were the effects of a solution 
of this type, they would not cover certain problems 
characterized by special features, like those already 
described in connexion with the exchange of fruit 
between Argentina and Brazil and with trade between 
Argentina and Paraguay.22 In the former case, the 
difficulty arises from the fact that fruit is assigned to 
different schedules in Argentina's exchange markets, 
although in practice the system allows the vendor the 
official rate only when the product is exported to 
areas with which a clearing agreement is in force. 
If exported and imported fruit were included on the 
same schedule in Argentina's free market, prices would 
fall for the fruit purchased, and rise for that sold, 
by Brazil. But if the parties concerned desired to 
maintain the existing terms of trade for their fruit 
transactions, it would not be impossible, as was pointed 
out during the survey, to reach a special agreement 
on some such terms as the following: once all the 
fruit had been scheduled on Argentina's free market 
Brazil would not transfer to the consumer the value 
of the resulting rebate, but would use the sums thus 
obtained to subsidize its fruit exports to Argentina, 
so that their c.i.f. price would absorb the increase 
which the shift to the free market would otherwise 
imply for the Argentine consumer. 
Another formula has also been discussed. This would 
consist in bringing fruit under the free trade regime 
in both countries, but excluding it' from the present 
clearing system and from the usual exchange practices. 
To this end, accounts for exports and imports of fruit 
between the two countries would be kept by Argentina 
22 See part 1 of the present report, chapter I, section 3 (fc). 
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in Argentine pesos and by Brazil in cruzeiros. In both 
cases, conversions from one currency to the other would 
be calculated in relation to the United States dollar. 
Every three or six months the differences between 
exports and imports computed on each country's ac-
count could be liquidated between the two republics 
at the free market rate. 
An examination must now be made of the mal-
adjustments observable in the system of payments on 
clearing accounts in trade between Argentina and Para-
guay. It has already been explained that this trade 
channel was more severely affected by the reform in 
Argentina than other sectors of inter-Latin-American 
commerce, since Paraguay's exports, especially where 
timber is concerned, mainly comprise articles scheduled 
on Argentina's official market, while its imports are 
made up of free market products. Consequently, Para-
guay cannot pay for these latter with units of account 
accruing from its exports. The idea that such units 
of account might be converted into transferable cur-
rency at a rate of exchange midway between the 
official and the free rates, so that Argentina and Para-
guay would each absorb part of the consequent discount, 
was considered not long ago in authorized circles in 
both countries, but did not meet with a favourable 
reception in Asunción. Nor did it seem easy, from 
another point of view, to reach a solution by clas-
sifying all Argentina's timber imports, whatever their 
origin, on the free market, because of the rise in 
prices that this would involve for Argentine consumers. 
The suggestion was made during the survey that 
from Paraguay's point of view a possible expedient 
would be the utilization of some form of transferable 
foreign exchange, other than the United States dollar, 
for payments between the two countries, since it was 
felt in Asunción that, unless Argentina unified its 
official and free exchange rates, there was little prospect 
of a practicable formula being devised whereby re-
sources accruing from Paraguayan exports scheduled 
on the official market could be used to buy free market 
products from Argentina. 
It is of interest to note that in trade on account 
between Argentina and Bolivia a similar situation is 
beginning to take shape. The export possibilities of 
Bolivia's petroleum products now exceed the capacity 
of existent facilities for their transport to Argentine 
centres of consumption. Once this obstacle has been 
removed, as it will be when the oil-pipe between 
Campo Durán and Embarcación is completed, the real 
growth of such exports will give rise to an imbalance 
in the corresponding clearing account between Bolivia's 
availabilities of official market currency and the free 
market currency it requires for the purchase of manu-
factured goods and other commodities which Argentina 
exports only against transferable foreign exchange. 
Brazil. Under this country's existing foreign trade 
system, differing exchange rates are in force. On the 
exports side, a 4.06 per cent discount is applied to 
the foreign exchange accruing from sales against non-
transferable currency. Where imports are concerned, 
the difference arises from the regulations for the 
auctioning of foreign exchange in force since the end 
of 1953; in practice these determine varying prices, 
deriving in each case from the bidding procedure, for 
the foreign exchange allocated to importers. In Rio 
de Janeiro the survey showed this auction system to 
be flexible enough for it to be operated in such a 
way that the price of foreign exchange would be the 
same for more than one country in the region. To this 
end, it would in theory be necessary for at least two 
or more Latin American countries engaging in reci-
procal trade with Brazil to reach an agreement with 
this latter on the establishment of a common exchange 
certificate for bidding purposes, and for the appro-
priate foreign exchange to be allocated through the 
auction system with a view to its indiscriminate use 
for payments to any of the contracting parties to the 
relevant agreement. 
Chile. The treatment accorded to units of account 
under the Chilean exchange system, whether for ex-
porting or importing, bears as a rule no predetermined 
relation to the price of transferable currency. The only 
exception is the Argentine-Chilean agreement-dollar, 
since the parties have agreed to maintain parity between 
this currency and the United States dollar. Otherwise, 
with few exceptions, quotations for units of account 
on Chile's bank market are invariably lower than those 
recorded for transferable currencies. The incentive that 
should be provided for imports from clearing account 
areas when the corresponding currency is undervalued 
in relation to the price of convertible foreign exchange 
has been little in evidence on the Chilean market dur-
ing the last few months.23 The growth of the balances 
in Chile's favour existing in certain bilateral channels 
is proportionate to the increasing interest shown by 
importers in purchasing from the large world markets, 
as a result of the freer régime established by the ex-
change reform in April 1956. The problem of the 
accumulation of balances and of the consequences for 
trade on clearing accounts is well illustrated in the 
case of the payments agreement between Argentina and 
Chile. On 31 July 1956 a real balance of 7.1 million 
dollars was registered in favour of Chile in the account 
in question. Furthermore, credits had been opened for 
Argentine importers to make purchases from Chile to 
a value of 14.5 million agreement-dollars. Credits for 
Chilean purchases from Argentina amounted to only 
2.1 million.24 The balance in Chile's favour thereby 
rises to 19.4 million dollars. As the reciprocal credit 
provided for in the agreement is only 15 million, 
Chilean exporters to Argentina are concerned lest 
their sales be reduced if the real balance attains or 
exceeds the credit margin, and the Central Bank's inter-
vention in the market may therefore possibly be con-
fined to the purchase of foreign exchange—at the parity 
price—only up to a sum equivalent to the credit in 
question. Competent opinion holds that handicaps of 
this kind might be eliminated if in such circumstances 
the creditor country could transfer to third parties 
that proportion of the balance which is in excess of 
the credit stipulated. 
23 Many Chilean holders of exchange deriving from exports 
to treaty areas seem to have gradually liquidated it during the 
last few months, to avoid further depreciation. 
24 This sum does not include the value of purchases of wheat 
and meat for approximately 6 million dollars, already agreed 
upon, but for which the corresponding credits had not yet been 
opened. 
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in every case be subject to special negotiation as to 
the rate of exchange to be used. 
(b) Invisible and frontier trade 
Because of the new conditions set up by the existence 
of free markets for the sale of foreign exchange, 
most of the countries which conduct their reciprocal 
trade through clearing accounts display a wish to 
exclude invisible items, exempting them from controls 
in the shape of licences or selection of the currencies 
to be utilized. This would mean that operations on 
account would cover only the f.o.b. value of the com-
modities traded.25 
2 . M U L T I L A T E R A L N E G O T I A T I O N S 
For some months—and in certain cases for almost 
a year—the Latin American countries conducting their 
intra-regional trade on clearing accounts have been 
seeking devices whereby the functioning of this system 
can be reconciled with the new exchange régimes. 
Despite the interest displayed, at the date of completion 
of the present report no progress which can properly 
be termed substantial can as yet be observed. To 
overcome certain bilateral difficulties it is expected 
that some agreements will be concluded within a short 
space of time, but there is widespread scepticism in 
Latin America as to the value of the results that can 
be obtained through isolated bilateral negotiations alone. 
As was previously pointed out, such action—in relation, 
moreover, with the problems of the lack of parity— 
25 See annex II, (5). 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: INTRA-REGIONAL TRADE TOTALS AND BALANCES, 
1954 AND 1955 















Argentina 186.8 197.8 — 11 .0 195.7 211.4 — 15. 
Bolivia 3.2 10.9 — 7.7 4.5 12.1 — 7. 
Brazil 145.3 215.1 — 69.8 146.1 240.6 — 94. 
Chile 59.8 100.9 — 41.1 61.1 91.9 — 30. 
Paraguay 17.9 14.6 + 3.3 17.0 16.3 + O. 
Peru 46.1 20.8 + 25.3 57.1 24.0 + 33. 
Uruguay 39.9 60.2 — 20.3 31.7 55.0 — 23. 
Colombia 8.7 19.1 — 10.4 5.9 14.0 — 8. 
Ecuador 12.7 4.8 - f 7.9 11.2 7.3 + 3. 
Venezuela 132.6 14.5 +118.1 160.3 14.3 +146. 
Costa Rica 2.2 1.3 + 0.9 2.4 3.3 — 0 . 
Cuba 13.1 15.2 — 2.1 12.0 20.4 — 8. 
Dominican Republic . 0.6 1.0 — 0.4 1.2 1.7 — 0 . 
El Salvador 2.4 6.5 — 4.1 3.8 7.0 — 3. 
Guatemala 0.4 4.7 — 4.3 0.4 7.0 — 6. 
Haiti 0.1 0.8 — 0.7 0.1 0.8 — 0 . 
Honduras 6.9 1.5 + 5.4 8.5 2.7 + 5. 
Mexico 14.2 3.4 + 10.8 14.2 2.5 + 11. 
Nicaragua 2.9 1.1 + 1.8 3.4 0.9 + 2. 
Panama 0.9 2.5 — 1.6 0.6 4.0 — 3. 
TOTAL LATIN AMERICA 696.7 696.7 0 737.2 737.2 0 . 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
Before closing these remarks on the problems created 
for Latin American trade by the lack of parity between 
units of account and transferable currencies, it is 
worthwhile to stress the three instances in which solu-
tions would be facilitated if they could be put into 
practice by means of simultaneous agreement among 
several countries. 
The first of these, linked to the peculiar conforma-
tion of Argentina's free market, concerns the drawing-
up of schedules of the products to be negotiated on 
that market with a view to promoting relative equi-
librium between the values of exports and imports. 
The ultimate adoption of this formula, which seems 
feasible on multilateral bases, could not be easily secured 
through isolated bilateral negotiation, since a pre-
requisite for its application would be the co-ordination 
of specific rulings in the exchange régimes of the 
various countries interested in finding a solution to 
the problem. 
The second instance, inherent in the Brazilian system 
of auctioning foreign exchange for imports, is the 
establishment of a system whereby auctioned exchange 
could be used indiscriminately by the importer for 
purchases from more than one Latin American country. 
On a broader plane, the third point relates to the 
introduction of a system of predetermined parities. 
Such an aim might be partly attained through bilateral 
agreements. But if these were concerted between only 
some of the countries that maintain clearing accounts 
and not between the majority, the resultant differences 
in the purchasing power of the agreement-dollar would 
hinder multilateral transfers of balances, which would 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA: INTRA-REGIONAL 





Argentina Bolivia Brasil Colombia Chile Ecuador Paraguay Peru Uruguay 
1954 
X 2 . 7 9 6 . 7 0 . 6 5 1 . 5 * 0 . 1 11 .6 15 .2 2 . 4 
1 . 3 X 0 . 9 1 . 0 
1 0 0 . 0 0 . 5 X 0 . 4 11 .9 Ó. I 0 . 2 3 0 . 8 
Chile ; 3 6 . 4 1 . 2 8 . 5 0 . 8 X 1 . 1 0 . 1 2 . 2 7 . 1 
. . . . . . . . . 1 . 6 X 0 . 1 0 . 5 0 . 9 0 . 4 
1 . 6 .. 7 . 8 2 . 1 X 0 . 1 0 . 1 0 . 3 
1 4 . 7 X 
X 
3 . 2 
Peru 6 . 0 4 . 8 0 . 6 3 . 0 2 6 . 2 2 . 3 1 . 7 
Uruguay 0 . 5 3 4 . 3 1 . 4 0 . 2 2 . 6 0 . 3 X 












TOTAL 1 9 7 . 8 10 .9 2 1 5 . 1 
1 . 6 
0.8 
0 . 1 
0.6 
0 . 1 
0 . 3 
19 .1 
6 . 7 
0 . 4 
100 .9 
0 . 5 
ó. i 
4 . 8 1 4 . 6 
0 . 3 
cu 








Argentina X 3 . 7 124 .6 0 . 4 2 8 . 6 ... 1 5 . 6 1 4 . 8 1 . 3 
Bolivia 1 .8 X 2 . 0 0 . 5 0 . 2 
Brazil 9 9 . 8 0 . 4 X 0 . 1 1 1 . 4 0 . 9 0 . 1 3 2 . 8 
Chile 4 4 . 6 1 , 0 8 . 5 0 . 4 X 0 . 9 ,., 2 . 9 0 . 6 
Colombia 0 . 3 X 0 . 1 1 . 3 0 . 3 0 . 5 
Ecuador 1 . 6 0 . 2 ,,, 5 . 6 1 . 3 X 0 . 1 ... 
Paraguay 1 6 . 0 ... ... X 1 . 0 
Peru 4 . 8 6 . 3 0 . 6 3 . 1 3 6 . 3 3 . 9 0 . 2 X 1 . 0 
Uruguay 0 . 5 2 6 . 2 0 . 8 0 . 2 ... 0 . 5 3 . 3 X 
Venezuela 4 2 . 4 7 7 . 6 0 . 4 8 . 7 0 . 8 1 6 . 4 
Costa Rica 1 . 4 
Cuba 0 . 2 0 . 1 1 . 0 4 . 3 0 . 1 0 . 2 0 . 9 
Dominican Republic . ... . . . 0 . 1 
El Salvador ... ... 0 . 2 ... 
Guatemala . . . . . 
Haiti 0 . 1 
Honduras 
Mexico 0 . 2 0 . 7 0 . 3 0 . 5 ... 0 . 1 
Nicaragua 0 . 1 .. ... 1 . 2 
Panama . . . 0 . 3 . . . ... . . . . . . 
TOTAL 2 1 1 . 4 1 2 . 1 2 4 0 . 6 1 4 . 0 9 1 . 9 7 . 3 1 6 . 3 2 4 . 0 5 5 . 0 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
would be simplified if in each case the agreements 
concerned were signed by more than two countries. 
This would permit a more rapid approach to multi-
lateralism in inter-South-American trade. On this plane 
very clearly defined ideas exist, which are reinforced 
by the failure, up to now, of efforts to discover a 
bilateral solution for the problems created by the 
reforms. The necessary reconstruction of the system 
of payments agreements would be more practicable 
if it were founded on collective negotiations. The 
examples provided by the constitution of The Hague 
and Paris Clubs are also encouraging. But at the same 
time it is emphasized that the success of any attempt 
to build up inter-Latin-American trade on bases per-
mitting the multilateral transferability of balances would 
call for previous co-ordination of the relevant clauses 
in the various bilateral agreements, and, as far as 
possible, the establishment of a standard type of 
agreement for payments on account.26 In this con-
26 As has been seen, The Hague Club is constituted by a num-
ber of bilateral agreements of identical wording. 
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d 
TRADE TOTALS, 1954 AND 1955 
in millions of dollars) 
Total 
Dominican Latin 
Venezuela Costa Rica Cuba El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Republic America 
4.3 0.8 
0.4 ... 0.9 
0.5 0.1 0.8 
3.8 0.3 0.2 
0.3 . . . 0.1 
L0 0.2 Ó:Í 
0.2 ... 0.3 
X 0.1 6.4 
X 0.1 
2.4 • . . X 
0.3 ... • . . 
. . . 0.1 . . . 
0.5 o!i L3 
0.4 0.3 3.9 
... ... 0.3 
0.4 0.1 . . . 
14.5 1.3 15.2 
4.9 0.6 
,0.4 0.1 
0.3 ó.i 1.1 
1.9 0.4 0.2 
0.1 1.0 0.1 
0.6 
• • • 
0.1 
0.2 • • * • • • 
X 0.1 11.1 
0.1 X 0.1 
2.4 0.1 X 
0.7 . . . 0.2 
0.2 0.2 . . . 
1.2 0.3 i! 9 
0.6 0.3 5.0 
0.6 0.1 0.5 
0.1 0.1 . . . 
14.3 3.3 20.4 
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nexion, annex II of the present study contains a brief 
summary of concrete ideas, gathered in responsible 
Latin American circles, as to the principal points that 
it would be useful to bear in mind in grappling with 
such a task. If the Latin American countries resolve 
to undertake it, the material in question would supply 
the information required for preparing a draft standard 
agreement and for facilitating certain aspects of the 
practice of multilateral negotiations. As the annex itself 
will show, the most important points are those relating 
to parity between units of account and transferable 
currencies, to the invisible trade and re-export system, 
to private credits and to the concerting of special 
measures for maintaining and expanding inter-Latin-
American trade patterns. 
3 . S E T T L E M E N T OF BALANCES 
An attempt to establish multilateral practices within 
the clearing account systems would meet with little 
or no success if the aggregate balances of these accounts 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA: INTRA-REGIONAL 
(Millions 
Argentina Bolivia Brasil Colombia Chile Ecuador Paraguay Peru 
1954 
X — 1.4 + 3.3 + 1.0 - 1 5 . 1 + l.S + 3.1 — 9.2 
Bolivia + 1.4 X — 0.4 + 0.2 + 4.8 
Brazil — 3.3 + 0.4 X — 0.4 — 3.4 — 0.1 — 0.2 + 0.6 
Chile +15.1 — 0.2 + 3.4 — 0.7 X + 1.0 — 1.0 +24.0 
Colombia — 1.0 .. + 0.4 X + 0.7 + 7.3 + 2.1 
Ecuador — 1.5 .. + 0.1 — 7.3 — 1.0 X — O.i + 2.2 
Paraguay — 3.1 + 0.2 + 0.1 + 0.1 X 
Peru + 9.2 — 4.8 — 0.6 — 2.1 —24.0 — 2.2 .. . X 
Uruguay + 2.4 — 0.5 — 3.5 — 1.0 + 6.9 + 0.3 + 0.6 + 1-4 
Venezuela —31.9 . . . —72.1 + 2.2 — 0.3 + 0.3 . . . + 0.6 
— 1.3 + 0.1 . . . + 0.2 
Cuba — 0.8 + Ó.9 — 0.6 — 5.9 + 0 . 1 — 0.2 
Dominican Republic . ... ... • • . 
El Salvador ... + 0.3 — 0.1 — 0.1 
Guatemala + 0.1 
Haiti ... ... ... 
Honduras ... ... 
Mexico + 0.7 — 1.2 — 1.5 — Ó.5 + 0.1 — 0.5 ... — 0.2 
Nicaragua ... — 0.1 — 1.0 
Panama — 0.2 . . . + 0.4 + 0.1 + 0.2 . . . + 0.1 
NET BALANCES — 1 1 . 0 — 7.7 —69.8 —10.4 - 4 1 . 1 + 7.9 + 3.3 +25.3 
1955 
X — 1.9 —24.8 — 0.4 +16.0 + 1.6 + 0.4 —10.0 
Bolivia — 1.9 X — 1.6 + 0.5 + 0.2 + 6.1 
Brazil +24.8 + 1.6 X + 0.2 — 2.9 — 0.9 + 0.5 
Chile —16.0 — 0.5 + 2.9 — 0.3 X + 0.4 +33.4 
Colombia + 0.4 ... — 0.2 X + 0.3 + 4.3 + 2.8 
Ecuador — 1.6 — 0.2 + 0.9 — 4.3 — 0.4 X + 3.8 
Paraguay — 0.4 ... X + 0.2 
Peru +10.0 — 6.1 — 0.5 — 2.8 —33.4 — 3.8 — 0.2 X 
Uruguay + 1.3 — 0.5 + 6.6 + 0.1 + 0.4 + 0.5 — 2.3 
Venezuela —37.5 . . . —77.2 + 1.5 — 8.4 + 0.1 . . . — 0.2 
Costa Rica + 0.6 . . . — 1.0 + 0.1 + 1.0 
Cuba — 0.2 ... — 0.8 — 3.2 — Ó.1 
Dominican Republic . ... ... ... + 0.1 
El Salvador ... ... + 0.2 + 0.3 ... 
Guatemala + 0.2 
Haiti ... ... — 0.1 ... ... ... ... 
Honduras ... ... ... ... ... 
Mexico + 0.7 . >. — 0.6 — 0.2 — 0.3 .. * ... — 0.1 
Nicaragua ... ... — 0.1 + 0.1 ... — 1.2 
Panama + 0.3 . . . . . . + 0.1 + Ó.3 + 0.4 . . . + 0.1 
NET BALANCES —15.7 — 7.6 —94.5 — 8.1 —30.8 + 3.9 + 0.7 +33.1 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
did not offer a wide margin for reciprocal compensa-
tion, or, at least, prospects of securing it within a 
reasonable space of time. Latin America's position 
must therefore be examined from this point of view. 
The theoretical possibilities for the settlement of in-
tra-regional balances have already been investigated in 
the Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade,27 in the light 
of statistics for the two decades ending in 1953—to 
which the figures for 1954 and 1955, shown in tables 
5, 6 and 7, have now been added. In the most favourable 
years, that is, when there was least disequilibrium 
between bilateral export and import values according 
to official foreign trade statistics, the twenty Latin 
American countries had at their disposal a hypothetical 
margin for mutual compensation which did not 
represent as much as 80 per cent of inter-Latin-
American trade. It should be remembered that in 
estimates of this kind, given the possibility of errors 
or defects in statistical valuations, allowance must be 
27 Chapter V. 
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7 
TRADE BALANCES, 1954 AND 1955 
of dollars) 
Dominican 
Uruguay Venezuela Costa Rica Cuba El Salvador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Republic 
— 2.4 +31.9 — 0.8 
+ 0.5 
+ 3.5 +72.1 — 0.9 
— 6.9 + 0.3 — 0.1 + 5.9 
+ 1.0 — 2.2 + 1.3 + 0.6 
— 0.3 — 0.3 ... — 0.1 
— 0.6 • • • 
— 1.4 — 0.6 — 0.2 + 0.2 
X +13.1 ... + 0.3 
—13.1 X — 0.1 — 4.0 
+ 0.1 X — 0.1 
— 0,3 + 4.0 + 0.1 X 
— 0.3 + 0.1 + 0.1 ,,, + 0.5 + 0.2 + 0.1 
... + 0.2 
... ... + Q.2 
— 0.5 — 0.1 — 1.0 
— 0.4 — 0.3 — 2.2 
... ... — 0.3 
. . . — 0.2 — 0.1 + 0.1 
—20.3 +118.1 + 0.9 — 2.1 
— 1.3 +37.5 — 0.6 + 0.2 
+ 0.5 ... 
— 6.6 +77.2 • • . 
— 0.4 + 8.4 — 0.1 + 3.2 
— 0.1 — 1.5 + 1.0 + 0.8 
— 0.1 — 1.0 ,,, 
— 0.5 ... ... ... 
+ 2.3 + 0.2 + 0.1 
X +16.2 + 0.9 
—16.2 X . . . — 8.7 
— 0.9 + 8.7 
. . . 
X 
— 0.1 + 0.2 ... + 0.1 
... ... — 0.1 + 0.1 
.. + 0.5 + 0.1 + 0.1 
.. + 0.2 + 0.2 + 0.1 
— 1.2 — 0.3 — 1.5 
... — 0.6 — 0.3 — 3.8 
— 0.4 — 0.1 — 0.4 
. . . + 0.7 + 0.3 + 0.4 
—23.3 +146.0 + 0.9 — 8.4 
— 0.3 — 0Ü 
. . . ... 
+ QA . . . . . . 
+ o!i . . . ... ... 
— o.'s — Q.2 . . . + 0.5 
— 0.2 



















— 4.1 — 4.3 — 0.7 + 5.4 
— 0.2 
— 0.3 — Q.2 
+ Ó:Í 
... 





























— 3.2 — 6.6 — 0.7 + 5.8 
— 0.7 ... — 0.2 ... 
+ L2 ... 
+ 1.5 
— 0.1 ... — 0.1 
+ 0.5 + 0.1 — 0.4 
+ 0.5 . . . — 0.2 . . . . 
+ 0.2 + lio — L0 ... . . • ... + 0.3 
+ 0.4 + 0.2 — 0.1 
+ 0.3 + 0.1 
+ 2.2 + 0.3 + 0.1 + Ó:Í 
+ Ó.5 ... .. . X 
+ 0.3 + 0.5 — 0.1 
+ 2.4 
+ 0.4 
+ 0.4 . . . . . . ... 
X — 0.5 — 0.3 — 0.5 
+ 0.5 X — 0.4 
+ 0.3 + 0.4 X ... 
+10.8 + 1.8 — 1.6 — 0.4 
- 0.7 — 0.3 
+ 0.6 
+ 0.3 — Ó.3 ... 
+ 0.2 + oil — 0.1 ... 
. . . — 0.1 — 0.4 . . . 
+ o*i + i'.2 — Ó: i — Ó: i ... + 0.1 
+ 0.6 + 0.4 — 0.7 — 0.2 
+ 0.3 + 0.1 — 0.3 
+ 3.8 + 0.4 — 0.4 — o.i 
+ 0.4 ... ... X 
+ 0.6 + 0.4 ,,, ... 
+ 4.5 ... ... + 0.1 
+ 0.2 ... ... ... 
+ 0.3 — 0.3 + 0.1 
X — 0.2 — 0.3 — 0.4 
+ 0.2 X — 0.2 
+ 0.3 + 0.2 X ... 
+11.7 + 2 . 5 — 3.4 - 0 . 5 
made for annual differences in each direction amount-
ing to rather more than 10 per cent of effective com-
modity trade payments. 
With this reservation, the situation may be viewed 
from the following two standpoints: (a) taking into 
account reciprocal trade statistics for the ten countries 
of South America, but excluding petroleum values, 
because of the special features characterizing payments 
for this product;28 and (b) considering in particular 
the figures for the intra-regional trade on clearing 
28 Ibid. 
accounts conducted by the eight republics employing 
this system, i.e., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
In the first case—that of South America as a whole— 
an approximate idea of the situation can be formed 
from table 8, which reveals a certain trend towards 
extending the limits of possible compensation. Up 
to 1952 the maximum annual figure reached had been 
76 per cent of the total value of the commodities 
traded. In 1954 and 1955 the proportion compensatable 
rose to about 90 per cent. 
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Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: POSSIBILITIES FOR COMPENSATION IN 
INTER-SOUTH-AMERICAN TRADE* 
(percentages) 
1934-38b 1946-51b 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Bilaterally compensated 57 71 58 61 80 76 
Multilaterally compensatable 17 7 18 10 9 14 
Net non-compensatable balances . . . 26 22 24 29 11 10 
TOTAL TRADE 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total trade (millions of dollars) . . 192 861 789 1,041 991 1,013 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
Note: This table, like tables 9 and 10, is based on the figures for visible foreign trade at 
f.o.b. export values. To extend the study of possibilities for compensation to invisible trade, 
it would first be necessary to assemble statistics—up to the present only fragmentary—based 
on balance-of-payments situations. 
a Excluding petroleum products. Including the inter-South-American trade of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
*> Average. 
An examination of table 9 will clarify the situation 
from the standpoint of the eight countries taking 
part in the system of inter-Latin-American trade on 
clearing accounts. Up to 1954, the peak figure for 
possible compensation had been attained during the 
period 1946-51, when it seems to have represented 
84 per cent of trade in both directions. During 1954 
and 1955 the proportion compensatable rose to 93 
per cent. This means that, if in those two years the 
fifteen bilateral payments mechanisms existing in Latin 
America had had a common regional clearing-house 
at their disposal, a margin equivalent to 7 per cent 
of the value of the commodities traded would have had 
to be covered with foreign exchange from other sources 
or absorbed by reciprocal credits between the Central 
Banks concerned. In 1955 this 7 per cent meant about 
60 million dollars in both directions. In the same 
year the Central Bank credits for which the payments 
agreements provided, also in both directions, reached 
as much as 170 million dollars (see again table 1). 
Table 9 
LATIN AMERICA: POSSIBILITIES FOR COMPENSATION IN T H E INTER-




Net non-compensatable balances 
TOTAL TRADE 
Total trade (millions of dollars) 
1934-38b 1946-51b 1952 1953 1954 1955 
62 84 67 67 89 85 
15 4 6 6 4 8 
23 12 27 27 7 7 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
163 668 584 870 850 861 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
a Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
t> Average. 
The improvement in compensatory capacity recorded 
in 1954 and 1955 was weakened by the decline, slight 
thought it was, in the total trade values negotiated dur-
ing those same years in units of account. In 1955 
the decrease totalled 9 million dollars. In the same 
year the non-compensatable sum, which had been 233 
million dollars in 1953, dropped to 62 million. Hence 
there seem to be signs of a relative increase in the 
proportion compensatable, though this is partly due 
to import controls.29 
On the other hand, the tendency towards equilibrium 
noted in the last two. years relates to a period too 
short for any conclusions to be drawn. But a develop-
ment which has been manifesting itself in recent years 
may well be recalled here; countries which are tradi-
29 In practice the result might be slightly different, because of 
the usual margin of error in annual foreign trade statistics. 
tionally importers of foodstuffs, and which often 
show a deficit in their accounts with Latin America, 
increased their capacity to reduce their unfavourable 
balances by expanding their exports to the supplier 
country. This was true of Brazil and Chile with respect 
to Argentina, and the same thing is beginning to 
happen in Bolivia in relation to the other three coun-
tries. 
As Argentina, Brazil and Chile play the chief role 
in intra-regional trade based on payments agreements, 
the situation of each of these countries with respect 
to limits of compensatability may usefully be defined 
(see table 10). It should be recalled that the movement 
of trade among these three nations represents three-
quarters of total inter-Latin-American trade on account. 
Hence, their reciprocal position exerts a decisive in-
fluence on the level and evolution of the possibilities 
for compensation within such trade. 
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Table 10 
LATIN AMERICA : LIMIT OF COMPENSATABILITY IN TRADE AMONG 
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CHILE 
(percentages) 
. 1934-38* 1946-5J4 1952 1953 1954 1955 
Bilaterally compensated 64 93 65 69 93 86 
Triangularly compensatable 1 3 1 2 1 7 
Net non-compensatable balances 35 4 34 29 6 7 
TOTAL TRADE 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total trade (millions of dollars) 102 500 434 723 610 635 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics. 
a Average. 
In 1954 and 1955 the proportion of the reciprocal 
trade of Argentina, Brazil and Chile susceptible of 
bilateral or triangular compensation was practically 
the same as that recorded for the fifteen inter-Latin-
American clearing account mechanisms as a whole 
during the same years—about 93 per cent. The re-
mainder could be covered either with exchange from 
other sources or by the granting of credits. It was 
this latter that took place among the three countries 
mentioned. Moreover, it is important to emphasize that 
for six years now their reciprocal trade has involved 
no disbursements in convertible currency for the settle-
ment of balances. Consequently, from this point of 
view, there would have been no obstacle to a triangular 
agreement among the countries in question. 
Stress must be laid on some of the points emerging 
from table 10. In 1952-53, the proportion of compensa-
table trade among Argentina, Brazil and Chile dropped 
to less than 70 per cent, mainly because of the fall 
in Argentina's exports of wheat in the former year. 
This decrease brought about a corresponding though 
smaller decline in Brazil's sales to Argentina. While 
wheat exports were resumed in the following year, the 
sale of Brazilian products to Argentina did not recover 
so quickly. Commodity trade movements in 1953 there-
fore left a substantial balance in favour of Argentina. 
In these years, as before, trade between Argentina 
and Brazil, despite the very sharp short-term fluctua-
tions, revealed a trend towards equilibrium when 
periods of not less than three years are taken into 
account. 
Much the same was true of Argentina's trade with 
Chile in 1954 and 1955, since the former country's 
1954 credit balance switched over to Chile's favour 
in the following year. At the close of 1955, however, 
symptoms of a persistence of Argentina's deficit began 
to appear. Although they became serious in the first 
half of 1956, since at one time the balance on account, 
according to statistics, exceeded the credit provided 
for in the payments agreements, in August the heavy 
purchases which Chile was planning to make from 
Argentina gave grounds for anticipating a considerable 
reduction of this disequilibrium. 
To return to the possibilities for the compensation 
of balances in the Latin American clearing accounts 
as a whole, attention must also be drawn to some 
developments favourable to the achievement of greater 
equilibrium at increasingly high levels, provided that 
no serious setbacks occur to affect the principal com-
modities traded. Such developments apparently mark 
the incorporation of new goods into the traditional 
trade flows. Iron ore and manganese from Brazil, as 
well as Chilean iron, will be imported to supply the 
new steel works at San Nicolas in Argentina, and 
Bolivia is beginning to export petroleum products to 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Mention may also be 
made, inter alia, of pulp and newsprint, which in a 
short time, thanks to the development of this industry 
in Chile, will be sold to Argentina, and of the steel 
plate surplus that will result from the forthcoming 
installation of a second blast furnace by the Compañía 
de Acero del Pacífico in Chile, All these would be 
exports from countries that usually have deficit balances 
with the region, and in some cases might bring about 
a reversal of traditional balance positions. Apart from 
this—as has already been pointed out elsewhere30— 
trade in manufactured goods could undoubtedly make 
an important contribution to the stabilization of bal-
ances, if existing obstacles in the sphere of payments 
and trade policy were successfully removed. 
4 . C O N C L U S I O N S 
The conclusions to be deduced from the foregoing 
considerations will now be reviewed. 
1. The new conditions created by recent exchange 
reforms in some of the Latin American countries have 
considerably reduced the efficacy of the clearing ac-
counts system as an instrument of trade policy. But 
as at the moment it does not seem that the purpose 
of safeguarding and expanding intra-regional trade 
for which this system is used can be equally well served 
by the customs tariff in Latin America, the intention 
is to retain it—at least for a time—but to remodel the 
structure of the accounts. 
2. The simultaneous negotiation of agreements by 
more than two countries would seem to be the most 
suitable means of reconciling trade and payments agree-
ments with the trends towards the adoption of multi-
lateral trade practices that are now becoming apparent. 
3. Certain specific difficulties in trade on clearing 
accounts for which the reforms are responsible have 
not yet been successfully overcome by means of isolated 
bilateral agreements. In view of the nature of these 
30 See Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade, op. cit., chap-
ter III. 
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problems—as in the case of the reconciliation of 
the clearing accounts with multilateral t rends—it would 
seem that their solution would be less difficult if it 
were attempted through collective negotiations among 
the group of countries affected. 
T h e matters which could be sat isfactori ly dealt with 
only if they were jointly considered by several countries 
include some of such importance as the sett ing-up 
of machinery on the exchange markets f o r the negotia-
t ion—on bases of some degree of equilibrium between 
supply and demand—of inter-Lat in-American units of 
account at parit ies which will not discourage exports . 
Stress must also be laid, in connexion with multilateral 
agreements, on the question of the exclusion of invisible 
items f r o m the clearing accounts system, as well as 
on the adoption of un i fo rm rulings as to re-exports . 
4. T h e evolution of the balances in in ter-Lat in-
American t rade on clearing accounts dur ing the last 
few years shows trends which, if st imulated by the 
reciprocal co-ordination of national trade policies, would 
create conditions favourable to the progressive exten-
sion of multilateral practices in intra-regional trade. 
In this context it must be emphasized that the non-
compensatable annual balances in the t rade on account 
conducted by eight countries have in the last two years 
only represented about one-third of the aggregate 
credits granted by the appropria te Central Banks f o r 
such t rade operations in each financial year . Again , 
among three countries whose t rade on account covers 
75 per cent of total t rade of this type in Lat in America, 
no disbursements in t ransferable currencies fo r the 
settlement of balances have been registered since 1950. 
5. T h e conclusion of multilateral agreements designed 
to impar t some degree of t ransferabi l i ty to inter-Lat in-
American units of account, in order to encourage the 
expansion of the market which the region can offer 
to its own countries ' trade, does not seem impossible 
in present circumstances given the adoption of a t rade 
and payments policy designed to stabilize balances at 
increasingly higher levels. 
ANNEXES 
I . NEW INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE RULINGS 
1. Argentina 
When the reform was decreed in October 1955, the Govern-
ment declared that the "unifying of official market rates and the 
creation of the free market should be regarded as a transitional 
phase preparing the way for the establishment of a single ex-
change market, where one conversion value only will be assigned 
to the national currency, and foreign transactions will not be 
subject to the issue of licences, certificates or other restrictive 
expedients".81 
Before the reform there were two exchange markets operat-
ing in Argentina. One of these was official, with rates of 5, 7.50 
and 13.98 Argentine pesos to the dollar, plus the several variants 
due to the existence of the regulation that proportions of the 
exchange accruing from certain exports should be liquidated at 
different rates; for example, 50 per cent had to be negotiated 
at 5 and 50 per cent at 7.50 pesos to the dollar, giving an aver-
age rate of 6.25. In addition there was the so-called "free" 
market, which was not so in reality, as the operations for which 
it was used—specific exports and imports of a marginal nature, 
freight payments and other invisible items—were transacted at 
the fixed rate of 13.98 pesos to the dollar. 
Under the reform two markets were set up, one official and 
one free. The former was subject to the fixed rate of 18 pesos 
to the dollar, intended for the liquidation of foreign exchange 
corresponding to exports and imports of those goods whose 
economic significance for the country is greatest, and to official 
services, a licence being required for every operation. At the 
same time, to simplify the method of controlling exports on the 
official market, a system of official base values was instituted. 
Its purpose is to determine the minimum value in foreign cur-
rency which the exporter must negotiate at the rate of 18 pesos 
to the dollar. This aspect of the régime has a special feature 
designed to promote sales to convertible currency areas; exports 
on the basis of units of account are subject to a surcharge of 
up to 4 per cent on the official base value in force. Furthermore, 
in pursuit of what was already traditional Argentine exchange 
control policy, the reform reaffirmed the regulations under 
which freight charges on official market imports from countries 
with which an agreement is. extant, i.e., those with which Argen-
81 Press release issued by the Ministry of Finance of the 
Republic of Argentina, 28 October 1955. 
tina conducts trade on clearing accounts, can be defrayed only 
in the currency used to pay for the commodity purchased. 
On the new free market transactions can be negotiated with-
out licences, at the rate resulting from the inter-action of supply 
and demand—about 30 pesos to the dollar in August 1956— 
provided that such operations, whether relating to visible or 
invisible trade, are not among those scheduled on the official 
market.32 But a feature of the free market bound to hamper 
certain sectors of inter-Latin-American trade is that units of 
account are not negotiated; transactions are confined to actual 
national currencies susceptible of reciprocal arbitration. 
Such a procedure means in effect that the clearing accounts 
in force between Argentina and other countries are restricted 
to official market operations. Although there are no adminis-
trative difficulties to prevent Argentine exporters from accept-
ing units of account in payment for products scheduled on the 
free market, when this occurs the Buenos Aires price which 
they receive for each agreement-dollar is only that of the offi-
cial market (18 pesos), not that of the free market, which is 
much higher.33 In the case of imports scheduled on the free 
market and purchased from countries with which an agreement 
is in force, the Argentine importer is not at liberty to cover 
their value in units of account. For this purpose he must buy 
foreign exchange negotiable on the free market. Hence sales 
of free market commodities effected against units of account 
are much less lucrative for the exporter than those to trans-
ferable currency areas, unless a surcharge is imposed on the 
foreign purchaser, who thus bears the burden of the difference. 
On the other hand, imports of free market products from coun-
tries with which an agreement has been concluded, in terms of 
the exchange rate, imply for the Argentine purchaser a disburse-
ment equivalent to that required for a similar purchase from 
convertible currency areas. 
There are other aspects of the reform in Argentina. Under 
its new policy, Argentina concluded an agreement (the Paris 
Club) with countries members of the European Payments 
32 To protect domestic industry, a surtax of 20 or 40 pesos 
to the dollar is in force for imports of spare parts, which are 
scheduled on the free market. 
33 On 18 July 1956, the Central Bank of Argentina author-
ized arbitrage between units of account with adjacent countries 
and transferable foreign exchange for the negotiation of dif-
ferences in the official base values, at the rate fixed by the Bank 
itself. Thus the parity problem was eliminated as far as such 
differences were concerned. 
1. The payments system and the regional market 41 
Union, so as to set up a multilateral trade system, which came 
into force on 2 July 1956. Contracting parties to this agreement 
were Austria, Denmark, the Economic Union of Belgium and 
Luxembourg, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Once certain pending 
questions relating to trade debts have been settled, it is hoped 
that Germany will also participate in this régime. 
The area of the Club is one of limited transferability. Within 
it, payments between Argentina and the other members can be 
effected in the currency of any of the European contracting 
parties, whatever the market of origin or destination of the 
commodities traded.34 Moreover, Argentina's balances in the 
currencies of the other contracting parties are reciprocally trans-
ferable in the arbitrage markets of any of the European coun-
tries mentioned. Arbitration of foreign exchange corresponding 
to balances resulting from operations on Argentina's official 
market is effected through its Central Bank. The currencies 
used in free market operations can be arbitrated among them-
selves directly by the Argentine commercial banks. 
This system represents the repudiation of the strictly bilateral 
agreements which were in force between Argentina and each 
of the member countries of the new multilateral zone. Where 
imports are concerned, as the system excludes any kind of dis-
crimination as to prices or rates of exchange, it will be the 
Argentine purchaser who will select, on competitive bases of 
price and quality, the market from which he buys. This means 
that exchange control has ceased to be a means of channelling 
trade towards one or other of the European contracting parties. 
In turn, Argentina's products will circulate freely among the 
other members of the Club, which are not entitled to adopt 
exchange measures that will alter parities between their cur-
rencies when this implies modification of the structure of prices 
of Argentine goods. Exports to the territory of contracting par-
ties of the Paris Club of any product which is sold to other 
areas by a member country of the Club cannot be prohibited. 
Lastly, it should be noted that in principle the granting of 
reciprocal credits between Argentina and the European partici-
pants is not envisaged. Apparently it is anticipated that the 
operation of so wide an area of limited transferability will 
facilitate the intervention of private banking institutions in the 
role proper to them. This would at least partly counteract the 
effects of the abolition of the inter-Central-Bank credit system, 
which formerly played an important part in relations between 
Argentina and Europe. 
2. Bolivia 
There has been no extensive reform of this country's ex-
change régime, but in April 1956 some fairly important meas-
ures were adopted to simplify the import system. Certain 
variable duties on foreign goods existed in Bolivia under the 
title of "reversionaries". These were determined, after the goods 
had become Bolivian property, by local authorities in the con-
sumer centres. Rates were not fixed, but were established in 
each case in accordance with the real sale price paid for the 
article concerned by the public. The measures mentioned above 
replaced such duties by the so-called "c.i.f. surcharge". The 
scale of this duty, which is highest for the least essential goods, 
rises to as much as 2,000 per cent of the c.i.f. value of imports, 
for which the official basic rate of 191.90 bolivianos to the dol-
lar is still maintained. 
In addition, an official market still exists in Bolivia with dif-
ferent rates for the liquidation of exchange accruing from 
exports and its sale to importers. The rate at which the Cen-
tral Bank purchases the foreign exchange obtained for exports 
from the large tin mines administered by the Corporación Minera 
is 1,200 bolivianos to the dollar. The rate assigned to exports 
from the medium and small mines, effected through the Banco 
Minero, is 1,500 bolivianos. 
34 See circular No. 2530, dated 29 June 1956, of the Central 
Bank of the Republic of Argentina. 
Besides the official market there is also a free market for 
invisible trade operations. 
3. Brasil 
The trends towards multilateralism in this country's foreign 
trade assumed concrete shape with the establishment of The 
Hague Club in August 1955. This originally comprised agree-
ments for the settlement of debts deriving from imports pre-
viously effected by Brazil. In order to facilitate the multilateral 
use of a certain number of European currencies, The Hague 
Club is based on a common statute, which takes the form of 
a group of identically-worded bilateral agreements concluded be-
tween Brazil and each of the other contracting parties, i.e., 
Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands (including Netherlands New Guinea), the United King-
dom and certain territories in the sterling area, plus the Eco-
nomic Union of Belgium and Luxembourg, together with the 
Belgian Congo and the African territories of Ruanda-Urundi. 
Every European contracting party opens a credit account in 
Brazil's favour. Payments made by Brazil to the Club zone can 
be effected indiscriminately in any of the currencies stipulated 
in the relevant bilateral agreements: Austrian schillings, florins, 
Belgian francs, lire, marks and pounds sterling. For this pur-
pose the authorized Brazilian banks open accounts in Europe 
and arbitrate the currencies in question. Furthermore, Brazilian 
exporters to countries in the Club zone are exempt from the 
4.06 per cent discount in force in Brazil for the conversion into 
cruzeiros of foreign exchange accruing from sales against non-
convertible currencies. 
As regards imports, Brazil's general provisions had to be 
reconciled with The Hague Club system. The existing regime 
is of course based on the auctioning of foreign exchange to be 
utilized for payments in a specific country, the sum auctioned 
depending on current availabilities of the exchange concerned. 
For similar goods from different sources, the price of foreign 
exchange varies in every case. To prevent discrimination at 
the time of auction, the foreign exchange to be used for financ-
ing purchases from The Hague Club countries is now offered 
in a single group under the generic name of "dólares A.C.L." 
(limited-convertibility-area dollars). Once the exchange has 
been auctioned, the appropriate licences are issued in terms of 
some of the currencies mentioned above, according to the Bra-
zilian importer's decision in each case. Purchases from Brazil 
made by the other contracting parties must be covered with 
the foreign exchange stipulated for such payments in the bi-
lateral agreement concerned, that is, with the currency of the 
purchasing country or of any of the other European members 
of the Club. 
From another point of view, the agreements on which the 
Club is based establish that its European members shall not 
adopt internal measures resulting in the abandonment of parity 
between their currencies and, consequently, in modifications of 
the structure of prices of Brazilian goods. Although these 
agreements do not prevent Brazil from utilizing the foreign ex-
change received from the other contracting parties for pay-
ments to the United States dollar area, on signing the instru-
ments in question Brazil stated its intention of avoiding such 
transfers. 
Shortly after the constitution of The Hague Club, and espe-
cially in the early months of 1956, the establishment of an 
integral exchange reform seemed to be imminent in Brazil. 
Although it has not yet been put into effect, the intention to 
carry it out does not seem to have been relinquished. Only a 
partial measure has been adopted. Through an increase in exist-
ing bonuses for exports of certain industrial products, the rate 
of exchange assigned to some of these was raised to 67 cruzei-
ros to the dollar, instead of 56.06.35 
35 Instruction 131 (19 June 1956) issued by the Superinten-
dencia da Moneda e Crédito (SUMOC) raised the bonus in 
favour of certain exports, and improved the existing exchange 
rate for industrial products by 34 per cent. 
42 Pari II. Main background documents 
4. Chile 
The new exchange régime came into force in April 1956. It 
largely abolishes direct controls on foreign trade, replacing them 
by others of a more indirect nature deriving from monetary 
and fiscal policy. Before the reforms were adopted, measures 
were applied in relation to credit, the expansion of the money 
supply and the rate of readjustment of prices and wages. Next, 
the new exchange system froze excessively large resources in 
local currency by means of prior deposits on imports.36 
All fixed exchange rates were annulled, as well as those re-
sulting from the barter system, which up to that time had 
taken the form of equalizing, with official approval, the values 
of export and import operations, often on the basis of a sub-
sidy in favour of exports at the expense of imports. The re-
form abolished this régime, and for both visible and invisible 
foreign trade operations instituted a free bank market, on 
which exchange is negotiated at the price determined by supply 
and demand.37 
The available means of avoiding abrupt short-term variations 
in the price of foreign exchange derive from two factors. The 
first of these is the existence of an exchange control fund, 
amounting to 75 million dollars,38 and the second and more im-
portant, the powers assigned to the Central Bank for this pur-
pose under the reform. The Central Bank operates on the bank 
market as buyer and seller of the foreign exchange declared 
to be automatically convertible, i.e., United States dollars, 
pounds sterling and Swiss francs. It buys from the Government 
the exchange accruing from taxation of the large copper min-
ing companies, and from these latter the exchange they sell in 
Chile to cover their production costs. As Chile's exchange 
earnings from copper represent a high proportion of total in-
come from exports,30 the intervention of the Bank in the ex-
change market is in effect a factor which exerts a decisive 
influence on the price of foreign exchange. The reason is clear. 
When demand exceeds supply in any commercial bank, this 
does not result in a rise in the price of foreign exchange if 
the bank concerned can purchase the difference from the 
Central Bank. 
Chile's free market, unlike Argentina's, can also handle units 
of account, but when they are bought to pay for imports or 
invisible trade services they can be used only within the bilateral 
channcl concerned. This is because the provisions on which the 
reform is based embody different regulations for the negotiation 
of exchange, according to whether it is convertible or not. Con-
vertible foreign exchange, whatever its origin, can be purchased 
by the commercial banks, provided that the supply accumulated 
in each does not exceed proportions predetermined by the Cen-
tral Bank. This exchange can only be sold to the public for 
purposes of covering the price of authorized imports or serv-
ices. The commercial banks are at full liberty to arbitrate 
reciprocally convertible currencies. They can also translate non-
convertible currencies—generally units of account—into convert-
36 For purposes of the deposit, imports are classified in five 
categories, to which the following percentages of the Chilean 
port c.i.f. value are applied, converted into local currency on 
the basis of the most recent quotation registered for the foreign 
exchange to be used for payment: A—5 per cent; B—50 per 
cent; C—100 per cent; D—150 per cent; and E—200 per cent. 
37 Dollar quotations on the bank market fluctuate around 500 
pesos, while before the reform the rate in force for the bulk 
of foreign trade was 300 pesos to the dollar. 
38 To establish the regulating fund, of which no use had 
been made up to the date of completion of the present report 
(beginning of August 1956), Chile negotiated credits for 35 
million dollars with the International Monetary Fund, for 
10 million with the United States Treasury and for 30 million 
with various United States private banks. 
39 The "Foreign Exchange Estimate" approved by the Con-
sejo Nacional de Comercio Exterior on 16 February 1956 en-
visages a total export income of 389.8 million dollars for the 
year in question. Out of this sum, 218 million correspond to the 
legal costs of copper production and to the taxation established 
by Act No. 11828. 
ible foreign exchange, but in practice it is difficult to carry out 
such operations because of the magnitude of the discount they 
would involve for the holder of the exchange in question. Fur-
thermore, the system sets up no machinery for the arbitrage or 
transferability of units of account. 
In these circumstances the price of such units will not neces-
sarily correspond to the quotation in force on the same date for 
the negotiation of convertible currencies,40 unless the Chilean 
authorities were to decide to intervene in the market with the 
aim of maintaining certain price levels for the units of account 
used in trade between Chile and those countries with which it 
had concluded some agreement on the reciprocal observance of 
parity.41 
Another characteristic of the reform is the abolition of the 
direct instrument which Chile had been using to channel pur-
chases of goods from abroad towards the market which balance-
of-payments considerations rendered desirable. This instrument 
was the import licence. By eliminating the means of selection 
thus provided, the new rulings allow authorized commodities to 
be freely imported from any source whatever. Clearing agree-
ments have thereby largely lost their capacity to direct trade 
flows into specific channels. 
Besides the bank market, for operations which this does not 
cover (remittances of capital, profits, interest, tourist expendi-
ture, etc.) there is a stock exchange or brokers' market, in 
which the rate is also that resulting from supply and demand.42 
Foreign exchange negotiated in this market can be used for 
payments proper to the bank market, when bought for this 
purpose by the commercial banks. 
5. Paraguay 
This country has radically altered its exchange system. De-
crees issued in March 1956 unified the system of multiple rates, 
which ranged from 15 to 73.70 guaraníes to the dollar, replac-
ing them by a single quotation—60 guaraníes to the dollar—on 
the official market. 
This rate is in force for all exports and imports of essential 
goods, as well as for official transactions and for the payment 
of freight charges, insurance and commissions on essential com-
modities. To a second group of imports a temporary surcharge 
of 25 guaraníes to the dollar is applied. 
The Central Bank draws up a list of authorized imports; it 
then issues individual permits, taking into account the prices, 
quality and other conditions offered by the applicants, as well 
as existing availabilities of the various currencies. To give effect 
to the permits and to the opening of documentary credits, the 
importers make prior deposits in the proportion determined 
by the bank itself.43 
The reform abolished the existing system of official base 
values for the negotiation of export exchange earnings. The 
whole of the value obtained by their sale must now be liquidated 
on the official market. On the other hand, the new system 
exempts the free market from controls, leaving it outside the 
sphere of intervention of the Central Bank. Payments unrelated 
to the official market, like movements of capital, are effected 
40 While the United States dollar was quoted at 498 pesos on 
1 August 1956, on the same day the following prices in Chilean 
pesos were registered for units of account: Chile-Brazil, 390; 
Chile-Argentina, 483; Chile-Spain, 430; Chile-France, 477. 
41 The Central Bank of Chile, by virtue of clause No. 24 in 
the Trade and Financial Agreement signed on 19 February 1954 
between Argentina and Chile, intervenes in the market to main-
tain quotations for the unit of account concerned at a level 
close to that of the United States dollar. 
42 Dollar quotations on the stock exchange market are usually 
higher than the price on the bank market. On the same day 
—1 August 1956—when the latter stood at 498 pesos, the former 
was as much as 516 pesos. 
43 These deposits range from 30 to 70 per cent of the value 
of the imports concerned, according to the degree in which the 
goods are essential. 
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on the free market, where prices are determined by the inter-
action of supply and demand. 
6. Uruguay 
Uruguay also remodelled its exchange system at the beginning 
of August 1956, adopting a mixed régime of fixed and fluctuat-
ing rates. The reform established an official or controlled mar-
ket for both United States dollars and units of account. On 
this market a certain proportion of the foreign exchange ac-
cruing from exports, varying according to the products,44 will 
be negotiated at the rate of 1.519 Uruguayan pesos to the dollar. 
Exchange for the most essential imports will also be purchased 
on the official market, at a rate of 2.10 pesos to the dollar, 
whether the goods come from transferable currency areas or 
not. These imports are subject to the requisite of a prior 
deposit, the amount of which varies between 30 and 75 per 
cent of their value. A sworn declaration replaces the licence 
previously required. 
Alongside the official market the free commercial market 
will function. In this exporters will sell, through a system of 
certificates46 and at the price agreed upon with the purchaser, 
the freely negotiable proportion of any foreign exchange that 
they obtain from their sales abroad. Foreign exchange bought 
in this market can be used by the importer to pay for goods 
scheduled therein, subject on occasion to individual quotas 
established by the exchange authorities. A sworn declaration 
is also required, and a prior deposit must be made amounting 
to 30 per cent of the c.i.f. value of the product imported. In 
some cases the deposit is larger. As the units of account nego-
tiated on the official free market can be utilized only for pay-
ments to the country concerned, it seems that in this market 
parities will probably not be officially maintained between the 
price of United States dollars and units of account. 
Up to the present the schedules of export and import products 
to be included in each market have not yet been issued. How-
ever, the authorities have declared their intention of placing 
bans on less essential goods. 
Apart from the two markets mentioned, the free financial 
market will continue to operate for transactions unconnected 
with foreign trade. 
I I . INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE AND PAYMENTS AGREEMENTS. 
POINTS TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN NEGOTIATIONS 
To complete this account of the findings of the ECLA survey 
carried out in various countries of the region on the charac-
teristics of inter-Latin-American trade, its problems and their 
solutions, a summary follows of the replies given in competent 
circles to a questionnaire on possible bases for an organized 
system of trade and payments agreements. The opinions and 
suggestions gathered may be useful for the bilateral revision 
of the instruments in question, as well as for facilitating the 
application of the decisions which some countries may adopt 
to conclude certain multilateral agreements. 
1. Most-favoured-nation clause 
The idea that the special exchange treatments stipulated in 
bilateral agreements might be extended to other Latin American 
countries by the introduction of a most-favoured-nation clause 
into trade and payments agreements does not seem to be ac-
ceptable. It is thought, however, that this might be done on 
reciprocal bases, or in order to readjust clearing accounts on 
multilateral lines. 
44 Eleven categories of products were established, in accord-
ance with the different proportions fixed for negotiation on the 
official and on the free commercial markets. 
45 Certificates can be utilized for imports effected by the 
exporter himself, or they can be sold to other importers. If 
this has not been done within eight days, they are bought by 
the Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay at the price in 
force on the preceding day for the currency in question. 
Although the most-favoured-nation clause was referred to 
in the survey in connexion not with tariffs but with the ex-
change and payments régime, some of the observations received 
may usefully be noted. As has been pointed out, among some 
Latin American countries there are no extant agreements estab-
lishing most-favoured-nation treatment for commodity trade. 
In some cases this situation arises between adjacent countries 
and, where it exists, products from the region itself are actually 
likely to receive more severe tariff treatment on certain fron-
tiers than is applied to similar goods from extra-regional 
sources. There is, however, a want of reasonably exact data 
on the real importance of this fact for the inter-Latin-American 
trade flows. Hence attention was drawn in the survey to the 
usefulness of determining its significance through a study of 
the principal products affected by this situation. Such a study 
would have to be carried far enough to define what contractual 
margins are available for modifying the present state of affairs 
by means of fresh negotiations with suppliers of the same prod-
ucts in other regions. Furthermore, the suggestions collected 
seem to indicate that general aspirations towards the establish-
ment of an inter-Latin-American minimum tariff treatment to 
facilitate the circulation of goods are hardly likely to gain 
much practical ground without a previous elucidation of the 
real bases of the problem from the economic and contractual 
points of view. 
2. Parities 
Should a constant relationship be established between units 
of account in intra-regional trade and the United States dol-
lar? A brief outline of the replies received is given below. 
(a) From a general standpoint, most opinions coincide as 
to the theoretical desirability of maintaining such a parity, 
although with the application of some sanction or discount be-
cause of the smaller extent of the area in which units of 
account can be used. Nevertheless, it is pointed out that to 
this end the corresponding trade would have to be conducted 
at competitive prices, since the observance of parity would not 
be justified if there were over-pricing of the commodities 
traded. In such an event the maintenance of parity might mean 
that the economy of the importing country absorbed the sur-
charge deriving from the exporter's lower productivity. Even 
were there over-pricing on both sides, to recognize parity 
between the unit of account and the dollar would imply the 
attribution to the former of a purchasing power greater than 
it really possesses. In this context there is a tendency, especially 
in countries which are attempting to extend the application of 
free market methods in their foreign trade, to recommend that 
units of account should seek their own level on the market. 
This of course largely depends, setting aside the effect of 
seasonal demand and supply, on the competitive capacity of the 
exports in question. 
(b) Nevertheless, in view of the peculiar structure of inter-
Latin-American trade, most experts recognize that its expan-
sion may not be best promoted by the free negotiation of units 
of account. The fall in quotations for such units in the creditor 
country during periods when balances accumulate, in combina-
tion with the over-pricing of goods to which lower productivity 
often gives rise, is apt to interrupt the continuity of exports 
and to prevent specialization in the supply of certain markets. 
Although a decline of this nature should encourage imports 
and contribute to the restoration of equilibrium, various factors, 
including the seasonal nature of the movement of staple com-
modities in Latin America, slow up and often counteract its 
influence in this direction. Latin American trade offers many 
examples of the interruption of certain supply flows for this 
reason. 
(c) The maintenance of parity with the United States dollar 
in the operation of the accounts safeguards the purchasing 
power of trade balances, a circumstance which may favourably 
affect the granting of higher and longer-term credits. On ac-
count of these and other considerations, and even though the 
result might be the application of a special regime to inter-
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Latin-American trade, in the same countries which put forward 
the arguments summarized under point (a) some opinions were 
expressed in favour of the maintenance of a system of pre-
determined parities in intra-regional trade, through the inter-
vention in the market of the appropriate Central Bank, and 
on the basis of the acceptance of a margin of fluctuation, also 
agreed upon beforehand, in the price of the currencies used. 
Furthermore, as the effect of the recent exchange reforms in 
certain countries tends to do away with the practice of over-
pricing, the importance of the objections which might on prin-
ciple be raised to this position is weakened. 
(d) It is useful to clarify the relationship that would exist 
between those clauses in trade treaties or payments agreements 
which establish parities and those which relate to the granting 
of reciprocal trade. Are these clauses interdependent ? The 
answer is usually given in the affirmative. When the demand 
for imports is so small as to bring down the price of the 
unit of account, the contractual commitment to maintain it by 
Central Bank purchases should in any event cover a sum not 
less than that of the credit stipulated in the agreement. 
3. Inclusion or exclusion of certain highly essential products 
The regulations contained in the agreements are not uniform 
in their scope, since not all of them embrace the whole of the 
transactions conducted between the contracting parties. While 
in some of these instruments it is specified that all operations 
be included, others expressly exclude certain commodities from 
the clearing account, either because they are so essential that 
they can be sold on the open market or because, in addition, 
they are produced in consequence of special contracts with 
foreign enterprises. Lastly, in a number of agreements no 
attempt is made to define whether all the transactions between 
the parties are covered by the clearing account. Practical expe-
rience indicates that this omission exposes the trade concerned 
to the risk of interruption when one or other of the parties 
decides to exact payment for specific goods in dollar cash. 
To facilitate the regular extension of the clearing system to 
goods of the kind described, it has more than once been sug-
gested, and on some occasions agreed, that values on account 
shall be computed in two groups, one comprising first-category 
or essential goods and the other commodities of secondary im-
portance. As far as possible, in the case of products in the 
first category, equally essential commodities to an equivalent 
value, quoted at world prices, would be delivered to the ex-
porter country. In some countries it is thought that the device 
of dividing the accounts into two circuits of compensation 
would assist in the liquidation of final balances, as is already 
the case in certain channels. 
It must be emphasized that the opinions gathered in the course 
of the survey, especially in those countries where there is an 
interest in purchasing from Latin American sources mining 
products generally quoted in the world market on a United-
States-dollar basis, tend to advocate the inclusion of primary 
goods and their by-products in the agreements. It is pointed 
out that, as a rule, clearing-account balances in Latin America 
have been traditionally unfavourable for those countries which 
habitually need to import foodstuffs, and that such countries 
apparently find in mining products and by-products a means 
of stabilizing their balance of payments and increasing the 
volume of their trade. Trade between Argentina and Chile pro-
vides a good example. 
In the countries that export mining products and their deriv-
atives the views expressed on this point are cautious. Although 
it is admitted that the decision to include such products in the 
clearing accounts automatically strengthens their contractual 
capacity, these countries feel that if such a system is to prove 
acceptable there must be some possibility of obtaining equally 
essential products on reciprocal terms from the other contract-
ing party, as in the case of the agreements of this kind already 
in existence. Stress is also laid on another aspect of the ques-
tion, linked to a problem that is not always easy to solve. When 
goods of this same type are produced under special contracts 
with foreign enterprises, if the exporter country wishes to 
negotiate them through clearing accounts it must be willing to 
accept from the companies concerned the agreement-dollars re-
ceived by these latter in payment for their exports, and to use 
them for covering in United States dollars the enterprises' 
liabilities to the State for production costs or taxation. If the 
agreement-dollars are not negotiated on the exchange market on 
a basis of parity with the United States dollar, the above pro-
cedure means that the State loses money. Hence it would seem 
that general rulings on this point cannot be introduced into 
the trade and payments agreements. For the same reasons, the 
most-favoured-nation exchange clause could not be extended 
to include an obligation to sell certain goods to third countries 
in Latin America itself against units of account, although the 
fact that sales are being thus effected under specific agreements 
with a given country might be adduced in favour of such a 
practice. 
4. Official base values 
In the sphere of foreign exchange, the so-called "official base 
values" procedure serves two important purposes in Latin 
America, i.e., (a) the regulation of the maximum sums per 
unit to be assigned for import licences, when the authorities 
see in this expedient a means of maintaining at a certain level 
the price paid by consumers for specific supplies, or of prevent-
ing exchange manoeuvres based on the alteration of commer-
cial invoices;46 (fo) the determination of the minimum sum 
in foreign currency, also per unit, which the exporter must 
hand over to the appropriate Central Bank at a given rate 
of exchange. 
As regards the first of these purposes, continued action on 
the basis of isolated national decisions is not felt to be desir-
able, since over and over again the maximum prices fixed by 
the buyer country for the sale of an imported commodity 
to the public have been lower than its real cost for the im-
porter. When this is the case, the importer must either sacrifice 
quality or meet the difference by means of the free market. 
Sometimes the importer receives the difference through an-
other channel; it is paid by those exporters in his own country 
that have effected sales within the same bilateral sector with-
out finding a purchaser for the accruing foreign exchange. In 
order to sell this, they sacrifice part of its price in favour of 
the importer who buys it, so that he will thus be enabled to 
import goods which in the consumer country are subject to an 
official base value lower than the c.i.f. price. The distortion of 
trade through such procedures can be prevented by a system 
of prior consultation between the contracting parties on the 
establishment and modification of official base values. 
The repercussions of the other use of the official base value 
—the fixing of the minimum sum which the exporter must 
liquidate at the pre-determined rate of exchange—have only 
recently made themselves felt. As has been shown, in order to 
increase sales against convertible currencies, some of the most 
recent exchange reforms allow that proportion of export ex-
change earnings which exceeds the official base value to be 
negotiated at the free market rate. Since the free market oper-
ates only with hard currencies, units of account cannot take 
advantage of this privilege, as there is no demand for them at 
46 Under the cloak of the system of multiple exchange rates, 
in some channels a surcharge is entered on the invoices, and 
the exporter in one country returns part of this extra sum to 
the importer in another, through the free market. In some 
cases, the importer receives, for every dollar bought in his own 
country's official market, the equivalent in local currency of 
almost double the price he paid for the dollar. In practice, such 
a curious "exchange profit" seems to be equally distributed 
between buyer and seller. With a view to eliminating incentives 
of this kind, some countries are considering the application of 
a system of official base values under which the Central Bank 
of the importer country would authorize the negotiation on its 
official market of only a part of the value of the invoice, so 
that the difference would have to be liquidated on the free 
market. 
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the free rate. To remedy the resulting situation, arbitrage 
machinery has been set up in Argentina to permit the exten-
sion of the benefit described to units of account with adjacent 
countries.47 
5. Exclusion of invisible items 
Is it considered advisable that clearing accounts include all 
visible and invisible items in movements of payments, or is it 
felt to be more useful for such accounts to be limited to the 
registration of items of visible trade on an f.o.b. basis, leaving 
the remainder to be liquidated through the free market? 
On this point there was virtually a consensus of opinion, to 
the effect that invisible items should be excluded from the 
clearing accounts régime, and that the corresponding transfers 
should be authorized without licences or specification of the 
kind of currency in which payment must be made. This would 
be in line with current trends towards liberalization. 
Two additional comments were made, however. These were 
as follows: (a) in some channels invisible items are larger 
than is commonly supposed, so that if they appear in the clear-
ing account concerned they may at a given moment constitute 
factors of disequilibrium; and (b) any measure eliminating 
maritime freight charges from the accounts would have to 
be universally adopted by countries engaging in inter-Latin-
American trade under the clearing system, not by some of 
them only, as otherwise the development of Latin America's 
shipping enterprises would be even more seriously handicapped 
than at present by the varying exchange treatment which dif-
ferent countries accord to the foreign exchange earmarked for 
or accruing from maritime transport. The validity of the first 
of these remarks can to some extent be measured by a study 
of table 11, which clearly shows the importance of the invisible 
items within total operations liquidated through clearing ac-
counts in certain bilateral channels. 
Table 11 
ARGENTINA: OPERATIONS ON ACCOUNT W I T H 
SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1955 
Total movements on Percentage of total trade 
account represented by invisible 
Country (agreement-dollars) items 
Bolivia 6.0 7.9 
Brazil 248.0 12.2 
Chile 89.0 10.1 
Paraguay 37.5 15.5 
Uruguay 4.0 45.9 
Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina. 
6. Barter arrangements 
The value of those products, often more or less equally essen-
tial, which are traded, usually under short-term contracts, on 
a basis of quantitative barter arrangements, is liquidated as a 
rule through the clearing accounts. The survey indicated a 
clearly defined attitude to this subject which can be summed 
up as follows. 
In the first place, it is not felt to be advisable that the re-
modelling of existing treaties should involve the discontinuance 
of the barter system, which is regarded as an instrument in the 
conclusion of agreements of a kind considered useful for the 
encouragement of given lines of production, since the avail-
ability of a buyer market among other Latin American coun-
tries provides them with an incentive. Practical experience 
bears witness to this in the case of agreements relating to cer-
tain cereals and to fresh and dried fruit. It is thought, how-
47 See the circular issued by the Banco Central de la Repú-
blica Argentina on 18 July 1956. 
ever, that such arrangements ought to cover periods of at least 
three years, and that when the price adjustments are stipulated 
a procedure should be adopted for this purpose which need not 
interrupt the continuity of the trade flows concerned. This 
last remark recurred with particular frequency in sectors linked 
to the clearing-account trade in fresh fruit, the annual figures 
for which amount to more than 20 million dollars in each direc-
tion in the southern zone. Short-term agreements in this line 
of trade, and the interruptions of the trade flow caused by the 
interval between the expiry of the agreement in force and the 
application of the new one, are a source of anxiety for the 
producers concerned. In such conditions the farmer cannot plan 
his work on stable bases, nor can he accept the financial com-
mitments involved in meeting disinfection and fertilization 
requirements. 
In the industrial sectors of certain countries it is also thought 
that reciprocal agreements for trade in certain intermediate 
products and manufactured goods, though not the most desir-
able expedient from the standpoints of developing a regional 
market on competitive bases and of encouraging productivity, 
might sometimes be justifiable on the grounds that they stimu-
late trade. 
Apart from these opinions in favour of limiting the barter 
system to specific cases, the majority of those consulted ad-
vocated trade based on the unrestricted circulation among the 
contracting parties of the products covered by the relevant 
agreement, especially when prices are competitive. 
7. Re-exports 
Trade and payments agreements reflect a variety of attitudes 
towards the possibility of re-exporting natural products of the 
countries concerned or intermediate products and manufactured 
goods obtained wholly or partly from imported raw material. 
Some instruments do not even mention re-exports. Most of them 
seem to imply disapproval of the practice, since they establish 
that the goods traded shall be exchanged only for the satis-
faction of the domestic consumer or industrial requirements of 
the parties. Among the agreements in force, only one recognizes 
the possibility of re-exporting, inasmuch as it stipulates that 
applications to this effect shall not be granted without prior con-
sultation. Some countries consider that, if the agreement in 
question says nothing of re-exports, the domestic consumption 
clause should be regarded as implicit. It must be noted that in 
practice, when the agreements do not contain specific provi-
sions as to the ultimate destination of the goods negotiated, 
certain countries deem it legitimate to authorize re-exports pro-
vided that the applicant first pays the import duty, thus making 
the commodity in question national property. Again, the omis-
sion of the means of securing equilibrium which re-exports in 
some cases represent, since they facilitate the utilization of 
idle balances, fosters the clandestine transaction of certain 
triangular operations. 
There is a widespread feeling that re-exports without previ-
ous consultation with the country of origin of the goods are 
incompatible with the system of trade on clearing accounts when 
this is carried on at non-competitive prices. Those who express 
such an opinion recall that exports for which over-pricing is 
authorized under the clearing accounts have frequently not 
been used for consumption in the country for which they were 
purchased, but have been diverted to transferable currency areas 
where they could be sold at low prices, through the non-
observance of parity in the clearing accounts regime, and in 
some cases even'in competition with the direct sales effected 
by the producer country itself. Consequently, unless proceedings 
are based on competitive prices and predetermined monetary 
parities, re-exports should in any case be subject to prior con-
sultation, even when the goods have become the national prop-
erty of the original buyer. 
Other points of view were also put forward on this ques-
tion. It is thought in some countries that re-exports are in-
admissible in the case of goods sold by the producer country, 
whether or not at competitive prices, and re-exported by the 
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first purchaser to areas where the country of origin habitually 
sells the same article. Again, in contrast with the opinions 
already stated, it was also emphasized in the survey that if a 
product is exported at soft currency prices—that is, with a 
surcharge—and is re-exported from the market of destination 
to a hard currency area, the operation is admissible, since profit 
will have accrued both to the producer country and to the first 
buyer, the former having received the surcharge and the latter 
convertible foreign exchange, provided that such re-exports do 
not compete with the producer country's direct sales against 
hard currencies. 
Broadly speaking, despite the variety of opinions on the best 
way of controlling re-exports under the terms of the agree-
ments, there is a general sense of the need for a system of 
prior consultation, with contractual pre-determination of the 
time limit for replies. 
8. Temporary exports and imports 
There are cases in Latin America of republics whose econ-
omies find it in their interest to contract for the transformation 
of domestic raw materials for their own consumption with 
other countries in the region itself. Problems of idle installed 
capacity also exist in relation to industrial equipment; so that 
better returns for the capital invested and lower prices for 
consumers would be ensured, if it were possible to arrange con-
tracts for the transformation of raw material received from 
third countries. In the course of the survey various specific 
situations of this type were adduced to illustrate the advantages 
of taking them into due account in the system of agreements. 
According to the data collected, the flow of trade and services 
to which contracts of the above type might give rise is in prac-
tice obstructed by the lack of clauses exempting from the cur-
rent payments mechanism those movements of goods which 
derive from such arrangements, and at the same time estab-
lishing a special financial system to cover the value of trans-
formation. Attention was also called to the absence of regula-
tions promoting the prompt circulation of matrices (industrial 
moulds) for the metallurgical, mechanical, plastic and other 
industries. Of course, the measures to be adopted in this sphere 
would not affect payments alone; they would also encourage the 
more widespread application in Latin America of the tariff 
procedure for temporary admission and the system of waiving 
duties, already instituted by some countries. 
9. Unregistered trade 
As the official payments systems obstruct the movements of 
goods resulting from the national complementarity of adjacent 
regions, or from certain vital subsistence requirements of neigh-
bouring townships belonging to different countries, contraband 
commodity trade assumes exceptional proportions. This was the 
comment made during the survey in connexion with the diffi-
culties created by the recent exchange reforms in various bi-
lateral channels in South America. In addition to legal un-
registered trade, such as is permitted under the terms of special 
frontier agreements and by administrative provisions author-
izing each individual to take with him goods up to a certain 
value, and the already chronic smuggling carried on in some 
districts, a clandestine trade has recently grown up whose value 
in some cases is apparently far greater than that of the legiti-
mate trade registered in official statistics.48 Although these move-
ments of goods up to a point represent actual barter of com-
modities, there are grounds for the belief that at the present 
time substantial use is made of the United States dollar for 
the liquidation of the values concerned. 
There is widespread agreement on the need for introducing 
into the agreements realistic clauses on questions of frontier 
trade and adjacent and complementary areas, to define which 
48 According to authorized sources, the number of cattle on 
the hoof at present smuggled between Argentina, Bolivia, Bra-
zil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay can be estimated at 
about 120,000 head yearly. 
products could be traded freely, without licences and without 
registration on the clearing account, but subject to payment 
of the appropriate customs duty in the case of every operation 
above a certain value. In some republics there is a tendency 
to adopt this system even when the products which it covers 
are not consumed in the frontier district proper of the importer 
country. 
10. Private credit 
Some of the comments made to the ECLA group underline 
the necessity for encouraging private credit within the clearing 
accounts mechanism, since the present structure of some na-
tional exchange régimes in effect precludes all possibility of 
operating on the basis of external financing other than the 
reciprocal credits agreed upon between the Central Banks. As 
a rule, with certain variations from one country to another, 
it is stressed that the value of exchange to be used for imports 
must now be deposited within inflexible time-limits, which 
makes it impossible to take advantage of the payment facilities 
granted by the foreign supplier. Certain countries will accept 
private credits granted abroad in the form of consignations or 
deferred payments only when they relate to essential goods. 
Nor is the importer usually permitted to finance his suppliers 
through the whole or partial transfer of the value of the prod-
uct when he places the order in question, without waiting for 
notice of embarkation. In some bilateral channels the general 
rules in force have almost entirely prevented the utilization of 
credits granted to customers in other Latin American countries 
by certain producers of essential goods, especially fertilizers. 
The situation is similar for exports, as the usual practice is 
to authorize them against irrevocable documentary credit, that 
is, in effect, against the immediate receipt of the foreign ex-
change involved. Since inter-Latin-American trade lacks the 
support of any such private financial organization as. gives 
backing to the firms engaged in trade between Latin America 
and other regions, it is intra-regional commerce that is most 
severely affected by restrictions on private foreign credit. 
Hence, in some countries, a certain number of those consulted 
definitely advocated the establishment of special regulations 
which, within inter-Latin-American trade, would allow and 
encourage the granting of private credit in favour of imports 
and exports. One of these regulations would provide for the 
acceptance of deferred payment operations, within certain time 
limits and in conformity with the clauses relating to the main-
tenance of parity. It would be useful if the Central Banks set 
up a service for the exchange of information on the solvency 
of persons interested in utilizing private credit of this kind. 
It was also suggested that it would be well to establish special 
insurance to cover the risks inherent in deferred payment for 
exports of intermediate and manufactured products, goods for 
immediate consumption being excluded from this system. 
11. Special measures 
The recent exchange reforms have confronted inter-Latin-
American trade in certain bilateral channels with the inescap-
able alternative of either reducing its levels or resorting to 
special devices capable of safeguarding both its present volume 
and its possibilities of development. Although theoretically the 
best instruments for the latter purpose are customs measures, 
the fact is that the breadth of the táriff agreements between a 
large number of Latin American republics and States in other 
regions does not leave enough margin for the use of the cus-
toms tariff as a means of encouraging certain lines of intra-
regional trade. Several countries are therefore considering the 
possibility of adopting special measures of another kind, at all 
events provisionally, in order to achieve the ends desired. There 
seems to be no doubt that the influence of payments agreements 
on the stability and expansion of trade will be seriously 
weakened unless ad hoc expedients are adopted. 
What form might these measures take? Some, of course, 
are among those formerly agreed upon by certain Latin Amer-
ican countries in favour of other republics in the same region, 
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although as an exception to the usual rules of their exchange 
régime. Such measures have several features in common, as 
follows: (a) they assign to particular exports or imports an 
exchange rate more favourable than that generally in force; 
(b) they exempt specific goods from the effect of import bans 
or quantitative restrictions, or from the need for an individual 
licence in every case in countries where this régime still pre-
vails; (c) they provide for Central Bank intervention in the 
bank market so that parity can be maintained between the price 
of the units of account concerned and the United States dollar, 
up to the sum stipulated as a credit margin in the relevant 
payments agreement; (d) they free imports from Latin Amer-
ica from the requirement of prior deposits in national cur-
rency; and (e) they grant certain domestic credit facilities. 
With respect to the first feature—differential exchange 
rates—divergent opinions were gathered in the course of the 
survey. But, in countries whose inter-Latin-American commod-
ity trade is among the heaviest, authorized circles declared 
themselves openly in favour of this procedure, especially when 
treaties with third countries hamper the use of the customs 
tariff for similar purposes. It is pointed out, however, that the 
utilization of the exchange rate with the aim of channelling 
trade in a given direction would call for certain contractual 
precautions, especially to ensure that the goods thus benefited 
were used for consumption by the contracting parties, as other-
wise this system might encourage surreptitious re-exports. 
On the second point—exemption from specific prohibitions or 
quantitative restrictions and from the compulsory licence for 
every operation—the general view supports this practice, which 
up to the present time has more than once been employed within 
inter-Latin-American trade relations, because of the need, 
among other reasons, to supply incentives for the utilization of 
units of account which otherwise would remain inactive. 
The scope of the third aspect—the intervention of the Cen-
tral Banks to maintain the price of units of account—has 
already been analysed with sufficient thoroughness elsewhere.49 
As for the fourth—exemption from the requisite of prior 
deposits for imports from Latin America—almost universal 
confidence is felt in the stimulating influence which such a 
measure would exert on the utilization of Latin American 
units of account. Because of the high rate of interest in force 
for internal credit, it is calculated in some countries that such 
exemptions would mean a difference of up to 10 per cent in 
the price paid by the importer for the goods purchased. 
As regards the fifth and last of the devices mentioned—the 
granting of certain domestic credit facilities—it should be 
pointed out that, as part of the system of selective control of 
imports, some Latin American republics authorize domestic 
bank credit to importers only for the purchase of foreign ex-
change to pay for essential goods. Under this system, the im-
porter finds himself compelled to cover wholly or partially, 
without assistance from the banks, the value of the foreign 
exchange he requires to purchase products of secondary im-
portance or non-essential goods. In the case of inter-Latin-
American trade, some experts consider it advisable to adopt 
more flexible measures in favour of domestic bank credit for 
intra-regional trade purposes, with the additional aim of off-
setting in some degree, by this expedient and the others pre-
viously mentioned, the disadvantage at which some trade lines 
are placed as regards competitive prices, trademark prestige and 
other factors. 
12. Official credits and balances 
The trend towards imparting as much flexibility as possible 
to the mechanism of reciprocal Central Bank credits is patent 
both in the establishment of maximum levels, and in the waiv-
ing of the right to claim payment of the balance in convertible 
currencies. While in some channels a virtually unlimited margin 
of credit is granted,50 most countries refrain from exercising 
40 See the present annex, 2. Paritiest (d). 00 In practice it sometimes exceeds 50 per cent of the value 
of trade in each direction. 
their contractual right to request that once the critical level 
has been reached the surplus be covered in dollars. At the time 
of the survey at least two republics in South America were 
following this course in connexion with substantial assets 
accumulated in bilateral accounts, which represented sums higher 
than the credit limit agreed upon. The well-known depressive 
effects on trade of insistence on claiming the balance in con-
vertible currencies are among the considerations on which such 
conduct is based. Another, in the same connexion, is bred of the 
fact that certain bilateral disequilibria, very marked if they are 
assessed within the short term of one year, tend to right them-
selves spontaneously over the medium or long term. The policy 
governing the granting of official credits thus displays adapta-
bility to the real situation of trade. 
Another important contributory factor is the chronic short-
age of convertible currencies in almost all the South American 
countries. It is for this reason that the attitude described is 
largely determined by the aim of preventing resources needed 
for the development of foreign trade with other regions from 
being deflected towards inter-Latin-American payments. Herein 
also lies the explanation of why the South American republics 
included in the transferable sterling area only on rare occa-
sions make use of this currency to settle their reciprocal bal-
ances. Neither is the United States dollar generally utilized 
for this purpose. Fundamentally, the motives are the same as 
those that impel the Latin American countries of the southern 
zone to carry on their reciprocal trade in units of account. 
From another point of view it can be seen that the inter-
Latin-American accounts usually register frozen balances for 
considerable periods. Their existence has an adverse effect on 
both the regularity and the expansion of trade within the bi-
lateral channel concerned, since it often happens that the debtor 
country reduces its purchases so as not to increase its liabilities. 
The replies received during the survey as to the system which 
would seem advisable for the liquidation of balances approach 
the question from the two following points of view: (a) that 
of the purely bilateral agreements and (b) that of arrange-
ments for transfers among more than two countries. 
In the first instance, some agreements already existing in 
Latin America give grounds for the idea that payments agree-
ments should contain a formula providing for an extra credit, 
over and above the credit normally stipulated, which would 
enter into effect as soon as the predetermined limit had been 
attained. In this case the ordinary credit would be converted 
into á long-term debt to be paid off by instalments. In addition, 
as long as this last debt still registered balances outstanding, 
sums whereby the extra credit was exceeded would have to be 
liquidated in convertible currency, at the request of the creditor. 
Moreover,51 it was emphasized in some countries that the grant-
ing of credits should be understood not solely as an official 
engagement to permit the export of goods whose equivalent 
value in commodities will be received after a long period, but 
also as a commitment to buy the corresponding units of account 
from the exporters in good time, especially when the agreement 
concerned contains the clause providing for the maintenance of 
parity between the unit of account and the United States dol-
lar. Although it seems difficult to adopt any other feasible 
means of effectively observing parity in periods when there is 
a decline in the demand for imports, it is recognized that the 
application of principles such as these would expose the Central 
Banks to certain risks of loss through exchange differences, 
which would, however, be lessened if that part of the bal-
ances which exceeded the ordinary credit level could be trans-
ferred to third countries. 
In the second case—the liquidation of balances by means of 
agreements among more than two countries—quite a number of 
foreign trade authorities in Latin America consider that, in 
view of the present shortage of convertible currencies, the 
best solution of the problem would be to establish some co-
ordinated system of payments which was really regional and 
51 See Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade, chapter V. 
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calculated to promote the building-up of an integrated regional 
market, as well as to facilitate financial movements between 
member countries and those monetary groups in other regions 
by means of which an attempt is being made to impart flexibil-
ity to trade relations among the countries that compose them. 
The expression of this desire is accompanied by the recogni-
tion that the existing disequilibrium in some bilateral trade 
channels, together with other circumstances arising from the 
separation between economic and monetary policy in the Latin 
American countries, would militate against the success of any 
proposal for the establishment of a regional clearing mechanism, 
unless the first steps were taken with the greatest possible cau-
tion.52 It would therefore be necessary in the initial phase to 
envisage objectives which were not too ambitious, and the pur-
suit of which would prepare the way for more far-reaching 
solutions. 
Nor is it felt that there would be serious difficulties in the 
way of a short-term approach, should the countries concerned 
definitely desire it, to co-operation in attaining the targets estab-
lished for this opening phase. The aim would be twofold: 
(a) to supply the Latin American Central Banks and the other 
appropriate authorities with periodical and regular information 
on the balance situation in each bilateral channel; and (&) to set 
up a simple system of voluntary proposals and counter-proposals 
for the transfer of balances above a certain level among more 
than two countries, through operations to be effected in each 
case at the exchange rate agreed upon between the parties. 
Although in principle this idea emerged only in relation to 
payments within Latin America, it became clear during the 
survey that in some countries consideration was being given 
to the possible usefulness of extending this mechanism to pay-
ments with other regions. 
, Apart from the fact that one of the most important benefits 
aimed at in the first stage is the opportune supply of basic 
data, the lack of which at present constitutes a regettable 
lacuna, it is felt that this procedure might in addition open 
up the way to closer collaboration among the institutes con-
cerned with inter-Latin-American payments. The method would 
also have to be adopted on bases that would not interfere with 
the special monetary arrangements which any individual con-
tracting party in isolation, or several in a body, might concert 
in future, either reciprocally or with countries in other 
regions.53 
I I I . TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION CREATING THE TRADE COMMITTEE 
Resolution 101 (VI), adopted on 15 September 1955 
(E/CNJ2/410) 
The Economic Commission for Latin America, 
Mindful of resolutions 20 (IV) and 69 (V), 
Considering that the report of the secretariat (E/CN.12/369) 
constitutes a very considerable advance in the sphere of re-
search into the problems of inter-Latin-American trade, and, 
by representing such clear progress in the field of information 
and analysis, enables an examination of specific solutions aimed 
at intensifying such trade to be undertaken, and 
92 See Study of Inter-Latin-American Trade, chapter V. 
53 See document E/CN.12/C.1/4, in part II of this volume, 
for a recapitulation of the ideas and suggestions gathered dur-
ing the survey, as elements that might be taken into account 
in the drawing-up of a programme of work for the Trade 
Committee. 
Aware that the countries of Latin America are engaged in 
a broad and increasingly intensive campaign for economic de-
velopment, essential to a higher standard of living for their 
peoples, and that the pursuit of this campaign may require in 
certain circumstances adequate tariff protection as well as the 
broadening and complementing of the markets for specific 
products, 
Resolves: 
1. To set up within the Economic Commission for Latin 
America a Trade Committee formed by member countries for 
the purpose of intensifying inter-Latin-American trade—without 
prejudice to the expansion of trade with other regions and 
mindful of the fundamental necessity of increasing over-all 
world trade—through a solution of the practical problems 
which hamper or delay such trade and the preparation of bases 
to facilitate trade negotiations; 
2. To this end, the Trade Committee shall concern itself 
with the preparation of specific proposals, in harmony with the 
present and future bilateral and multilateral commitments of 
member governments, and the modifications they may make to 
them, and taking into consideration national or regional eco-
nomic conditions. In carrying out its functions the Committee 
shall bear in mind the topics covered in the secretariat's report 
(E/CN.12/369), such as the problems of inter-Latin-American 
payments; trade policy; specific questions of maritime trans-
port and the trade in given products; and, similarly, the other 
studies and subjects the analysis of which may lead to the 
achievement of the objectives which caused its establishment, 
and the comments and information of member governments on 
all such studies and subjects; 
3. In addition, as soon as possible, the Committee shall pro-
pose solutions to the specific inter-Latin-American trade prob-
lems of the land-locked countries of the region, to which 
item 4 of resolution 69 (V) refers; 
4. The Committee, after each of its sessions, shall submit a 
report on its work to the Commission. The Executive Secretary 
shall transmit the report of the Committee to member govern-
ments as soon as possible; 
5. In discharging its functions, the Trade Committee shall 
consider in detail and make full use of the studies, on the 
subjects recommended by the present resolution, carried out by 
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and other 
international organizations; 
6. The sessions of the Trade Committee shall be held at 
ECLA headquarters, or wherever circumstances and the object 
of the meeting demand, at the discretion of the Executive 
Secretary of the Commission and after prior consultation with 
the government of the country acting as host to the session; 
7. The secretariat shall convene the sessions of this Com-
mittee and shall provide governments with the agenda and back-
ground documentation for the meeting not less than 30 days 
previously. The first meeting shall be convened as soon as posr 
sible and the secretariat shall prepare the provisional agenda 
on the basis of the contents of this resolution; 
8. The Committee shall be governed by the existing Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission in so far as they apply, without 
prejudice to its subsequent adoption of special rules for its 
operation; and 
9. For the purposes of the meetings, the Committee shall 
consist of the representatives of the governments participating 
in each session. 
2. INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN COMMODITY TRADE IN 1954 AND 1955: 
SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN 1956 (E/CN.12/C.1/5) 
Chapier I 
INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN COMMODITY TRADE: SITUATION AND PROBLEMS 
1. M A I N CHANGES I N 1 9 5 4 AND 1 9 5 5 
The total value of inter-Latin-American trade, which 
was more than 720 million dollars (f.o.b. export 
values) in 1953, fell to 697 million in 1954 but rose 
again in 1955 to a little over 737 million, the highest 
level it has reached so far (see table 33 below, and 
also, for purposes of comparison, table 34). Within 
this movement, however, there have been unequal and 
marked fluctuations in the exports of some countries 
and in the trade in certain commodities. 
The most noteworthy change in trade by countries 
occurred in the exports of Argentina, the value of 
which fell from 261 million dollars in 1953 to only 
196 million in 1955. This was due mainly to a reduc-
tion by 56 million dollars of its sales to Brazil and 
by 14 million of its sales to Chile, the result, in the 
former case, of the decline in value of exports of wheat,1 
edible fats, fruit and other commodities, and, in the 
latter instance, of the contraction in the exports of 
edible oils, butter, cattle, etc. In general, Argentine 
exports were affected mainly by the decline in the 
price at which wheat had to be sold to neighbouring 
countries, but also, to a smaller extent, by the shortage 
of exportable surpluses of certain commodities, chiefly 
edible fats and oils, and by some problems arising out 
of the changes introduced in the Argentine exchange 
regulations in October 1955. 
Between 1953 and 1955 Chile and Cuba too suffered 
fairly large reductions (12 and 10 million dollars 
respectively) in the value of their exports to other 
Latin American countries. This was due, in the case 
of Chile, to reduced sales of iron and steel and to 
the suspension of crude oil exports to Uruguay. In 
the case of Cuba, there was a reduction, and in some 
instances an interruption, of sales of sugar to Central 
America, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
On the other hand, the reductions referred to above, 
and some others of a smaller amount, were counter-
balanced by considerable increases in the exports of 
Brazil and Venezuela between 1953 and 1955, and, to 
a smaller extent, in those of Uruguay, Peru, Paraguay 
and other countries. During this period Brazilian ex-
ports increased by 54 million dollars, mainly owing 
to larger sales of timber (the value of which doubled), 
1 As is mentioned briefly below, and in more detail in chap-
ter II, section 4 of this report the volume of Argentine wheat 
exports (including flour) increased by 10 per cent between 1953 
and 1955, but the heavy fall in their price caused a 25 per cent 
reduction in value. 
fruit and maté to Argentina and of cotton and sugar 
to Uruguay. Venezuela's sales of crude oil to Brazil 
expanded greatly; so, to a smaller extent, did its sales 
of crude oil to Argentina, Chile and Uruguay and of 
petroleum products to Argentina and Cuba. As a 
result, its total exports to the rest of Latin America 
rose from 132 million dollars in 1953 and 1954 to 
160 million in 1955. Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay 
increased their exports to other Latin American coun-
tries between 1953 and 1955 by 11, 14 and 15 million 
dollars respectively, reflecting increased Uruguayan 
exports of wheat to Brazil, larger Peruvian exports 
of sugar and cotton and expanded sales by Paraguay 
of timber and maté to Argentina. 
With regard to trade by commodities, there was, 
first and foremost, a decline, both absolute and by 
percentage, in the trade in foodstuffs, which accounted 
for 51.7 per cent of all trade within the group of 
sample commodities in 1953 and 50.1 per cent in 
1954, but only 44.8 per cent in 1955. In absolute 
terms, the fall in value of trade in foodstuffs between 
1953 and 1955 was about 43 million dollars. The 20-
million-dollar reduction over that period in the value 
of trade in wheat and wheat-flour, due to the lower 
prices Argentina and Uruguay obtained for these com-
modities in their sales to neighbouring countries, was 
undoubtedly mainly responsible for this fall. In addi-
tion, there were reductions of 14 million dollars in the 
value of trade in fats and oils (largely caused by the 
shortage of exportable surpluses in Argentina), of 
7 million dollars in trade in cattle (owing to reduced 
exports from Argentina to Chile) and of the same 
amount in trade in coffee, the value of which fell from 
1954 to 1955 even more markedly than it had risen 
from 1953 to 1954. On the other hand, there were 
increments in the value of trade in various foodstuffs, 
in particular in maté, which rose by some 6 million 
dollars, owing mainly to increased Brazilian exports 
to Argentina, and in malted barley, the value of Argen-
tina's exports of this commodity to Brazil being over 
5 million dollars higher than in 1 9 5 3 . 2 
Regional trade in the raw materials group fell off 
by some 10 million dollars from 1953 to 1954 and 
2 In addition to the changes mentioned, there were marked 
fluctuations in the value of trade in other foodstuffs, which 
were for the most part cancelled out because their direction 
from 1954 to 1955 was opposite to that from 1953 to 1954. This 
was the case with meats, butter and particularly cacao, the value 
of the trade in which rose from 1953 to 1954 but then fell from 
1954 to 1955, and with fruits, sugar, etc., which moved in the 
opposite direction. 
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then increased by more than 33 million from 1954 
to 1955, so that there was a net increment of more 
than 23 million over the two years. This was primarily 
due to the remarkable increase in value of the timber 
trade, which rose by some 33 million dollars from 1953 
to 1955 as a result of the larger quantity and higher 
price of Paraguayan and Chilean timber exported to 
Argentina in 1954 and of Brazilian timber exported 
to the same market in 1955. 
There were also increases, far smaller than in the 
case of timber but still considerable, in the trade in 
cotton, raw hides and copper in primary and semi-
finished forms (by 5 million, 3.2 million and 2.8 million 
dollars respectively). The increase was due, in the 
case of cotton, to larger exports from Peru to Chile 
and Argentina, and, in the other two instances, to an 
expansion of trade between Argentina and Chile under 
the stimulus of the trading facilities provided in the 
agreement of February 1954. On the other hand, the 
value of Chilean sales of iron and steel to other Latin 
American countries fell by some 12 million dollars 
because smaller quantities were available for export. 
Other raw materials in which trade suffered a decline 
were sulphur and wool. Chilean exports of sulphur to 
Argentina, after reaching almost 3.6 million dollars in 
1953, fell off to low levels in the following two years. 
The value of wool sales decreased by about 1.5 million 
dollars, mainly as a result of reduced Argentine exports 
to Chile. 
In the case of fuels, their tendency, noticeable for 
several years, to become increasingly important, both 
absolutely and relatively, in inter-Latin-American trade 
was maintained in 1954 and 1955. This tendency was 
very marked in 1955, during which year the value of 
the trade in fuels amounted to over 182 million dollars, 
or almost a quarter of all inter-Latin-American trade. 
The greater part of the 30 million dollar increase in 
this group from 1953 to 1955 was due to crude oil, 
the volume and value of which increased by about 
50 per cent during the last two years, whereas there 
was a distinct drop in the volume and value of the 
petrol trade over the same period. It may be noted that 
side by side with the increase in inter-Latin-American 
trade in fuels there is a shift within the group in 
favour of crude oil and heavy derivatives, no doubt 
as a result of the increase in refining capacity (in 
which cracking plants are becoming of increasing im-
portance) in the importing countries. The sharp rise 
of the trade in crude oil in 1955 was mainly due to 
the considerably increased refining capacity of Brazil 
and, to a smaller extent, to that of Argentina, Colombia 
and Chile. Brazil raised its imports of crude oil from 
30,400 tons in 1953 to 3,513,000 tons in 1955 (of which 
1,846,000 tons were from Venezuela). 
The increased fuel exports were attributable almost 
entirely to Venezuela. Peruvian exports to the rest 
of Latin America have risen slightly in value in the 
last two years, there has been no change in Ecuadorian 
exports, Colombian exports are apparently tending* 
to fall, and Chilean exports, after doubling from 1953 
to 1954, ceased in 1955. With regard to oil exports 
from Bolivia, Bolivian statistics show only some small 
shipments to Argentina. Argentine statistics, however, 
show larger imports of Bolivian oil, the volume of 
which increased sixfold from 1954 to 1955, reaching 
a value of about 1.5 million dollars in the latter year. 
Finally, the trade in manufactured goods has changed 
very little over the last two years, either in absolute 
value or relative importance, and it still remains small 
in comparison with trade as a whole. Apart from copper 
wire, which accounts for the bulk of trade in manu-
factured goods3 and which rose very markedly in 
volume and in value from 1954 to 1955 on account 
of increased sales by Chile to Argentina, there was a 
fairly large increment from 1953 to 1954 in exports 
of wool yarn from Argentina and in pharmaceutical 
products from Mexico and Ecuador. 
To sum up, the increase of 17 million dollars in 
the value of inter-Latin-American trade from 1953 
to 1955 was due primarily to the increments of 33 
million dollars in the value of trade in timber and 
30 million in the value of trade in oil and its deriva-
tives ; the value of the trade in maté, copper, malted 
barley, cotton, raw hides and other commodities also 
rose considerably. These improvements were offset, at 
least partly, by falls in the value of trade in wheat 
and wheat-flour, edible oils and fats, iron and steel, 
cattle, coffee, etc. 
2 . SOME OF T H E PROBLEMS W H I C H AFFECTED INTER-
L A T I N - A M E R I C A N TRADE IN 1 9 5 4 AND 1 9 5 5 
The changes just mentioned in the positions of coun-
tries or specific commodities in inter-Latin-American 
trade in 1954 and 1955 are not really the result of 
new problems, nor do they represent fundamental 
modifications in the structure of trade. Most of them 
were due to circumstantial causes, such as price varia-
tions, or arose from the intensification of trends and 
problems which had been apparent for several years. 
It may be mentioned in this connexion that exportable 
surpluses of certain Argentine and Uruguayan com-
modities (especially animal fats and edible oils from 
Argentina and meat from Uruguay) continued to 
decline as a result of a falling-off in production. A 
similar shortage of exportable surpluses affected iron 
and steel exports from Chile in 1954 and 1955 (al-
though the reason in this case was not a decline in 
production but a considerable expansion of demand 
in the domestic market), and the same situation has 
arisen again in 1956 in the case of Argentine wheat. 
Another problem which became acute in the last 
two years was that of prices, which continued to show 
the effects of inflationary processes, of the maintenance 
of overvalued exchange rates and, in some cases, of 
transactions under the barter system and trade in 
units of account. Over-pricing of certain commodities 
resulted and trade in these was adversely affected, 
especially in some instances where the same commo-
dities could be obtained from other sources of supply. 
This happened, for instance, in the cases of Brazilian 
cotton in the Chilean market and, for a certain time, 
of Brazilian timber in the Argentine market. The 
problem has, however, tended to disappear or to be-
3 The item "copper wire" is accounted for almost wholly by 
wire rod, so that it should come under semi-finished products 
(classified in the raw materials group) rather than manu-
factured goods. 
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come less serious as a result of general or partial 
devaluations in the exporting countries and of a 
growing tendency to carry on regional trade on the 
basis of international prices, or at any rate at prices 
close to the world market levels. This was particularly 
evident in the case of Argentine and Uruguayan wheat, 
the price of which fell considerably in intra-regional 
trade, but not as a result of international price fluc-
tuations. 
A problem which also cropped up again was the 
slowing-down and even stoppage of trade in some com-
modities, transactions in which are based on annual 
bilateral contracts or schedules or on sales operations 
concerted between State agencies, when delays occurred 
in the annual renewal of such contracts or schedules 
or in the negotiation of such operations. This was 
the case, for example, with Brazilian timber exports 
to Argentina, Argentine fruit exports to Brazil and 
Argentine cattle exports to Chile. Needless to say, 
this situation creates conditions of uncertainty for 
producers in the exporting country and for consumers 
in the importing country. 
The intervention of State agencies in the marketing 
of certain commodities does not appear to have been 
altogether satisfactory in some cases, especially as 
regards the timing of purchase, which affects the 
regularity of supplies, or with respect to appropriate 
selection of the kinds, qualities, etc. in demand on the 
domestic market. In some instances, intervention by 
State agencies caused artificial inflation of the prices 
of certain commodities, especially in barter transac-
tions, to which attention has already been drawn. In 
other cases, however, the centralization of selling or 
buying operations in the hands of official agencies 
helped to regularize trade or to facilitate the application 
of arrangements aimed at reconciling conflicting na-
tional interests. Perhaps the clearest example of this 
was the export of Chilean copper to Argentina. 
Regional trade was also adversely affected by in-
creased production of certain kinds of goods in coun-
tries which were normally importers, owing to a policy 
of self-sufficiency or to other causes. The increased cot-
ton production in Colombia meant a direct drop in its 
imports of Peruvian cotton. In other cases, the re-
gistered trade in some commodities (particularly cattle) 
underwent further contraction in consequence of an 
expansion in unregistered trade which was encouraged 
by the widening of the margin of difference between 
the return the exporter received on the official market 
and the return he received on the free market. 
Trade agreements and treaties of economic union 
proved to be effective means of expanding trade when 
they provided for specific concessions, obligations or 
facilities. A clear example of this is the trade and 
payments agreements between Argentina and Chile 
of February 1954, which freed certain commodities 
from the requirement of prior exchange or import 
licensing. On the other hand, agreements which were 
limited to 'a mere statement by both parties that they 
would undertake to facilitate trade, without providing 
specific measures for doing so, appeared to be of far 
less practical value. Finally, it may be mentioned that 
trade in manufactured goods continued to be affected 
by the traditional obstacles and that its expansion was 
restricted by administrative difficulties and by the 
absence of stable trade régimes,4 
3 . T H E SITUATION CREATED BY T H E RECENT 
EXCHANGE REFORMS5 
The Argentine exchange reforms of October 1955, 
followed by similar reforms in Paraguay, Chile and 
Uruguay, together with the change which occurred 
in the basic principles of the trade policies of almost 
all the southern countries of Latin America, created 
a new situation to which many of the formulae pre-
viously adopted for facilitating and promoting regional 
trade were not suited. Indeed, in some cases these 
formulae seriously hindered trade itself, as is obvious 
from the new problems which have arisen. 
Outstanding among these problems is that created 
by the new Argentine exchange regulations as they 
affect exports from that country to its neighbours, 
which, under the agreements in force, must be paid 
for in units of account. These so-called dollar-units 
of account, or "agreement-dollars", are negotiable in 
Argentina only through the official market, even in 
the case of such exports as fruit, lard, etc., transactions 
in which may be carried out on the free market under 
the new exchange arrangements in Argentina. This 
situation, which for some months6 also affected those 
commodities the foreign currency for which can be 
negotiated on the free market only in the amount 
exceeding the official base value, obliges the Argentine 
exporter to ask a considerably higher price in agree-
ment-dollars for those commodities which he may 
export through the free market than he would ask 
in other foreign currencies, in order to reimburse 
himself for the difference between the return he receives 
on the agreement-dollars (at the official rate of ex-
change) and the return he receives on other currencies 
at the free rate. The result is that Argentine products 
which are classified as free market commodities are 
over-priced when exported to agreement areas; this 
has seriously limited, and even in some instances pre-
vented, their disposal in neighbouring markets. Such 
has been the case, for example, with fruit exports to 
Brazil and lard and wool exports to Brazil and Chile, 
as also with the greater part of the Argentine sales to 
Paraguay. 
A similar situation exists in Chite, under the new 
exchange regulations in the case of exports to those 
countries with which trade is carried on in agreement-
dollars. These currencies (except the agreement-dollar 
applicable under agreements with Argentina and Ecua-
dor) are quoted at much lower rates, on the Chilean 
foreign exchange market than the United States dollar, 
with the result that Chilean commodities exported to 
4 See the annex to this chapter, in which the implementation 
of the agreement between Argentine and Chilean metallurgical 
industries is discussed. 
5 For a more complete analysis of this problem, see document 
E/CN.12/C.1/3, in part I of this volume, especially chapter I, 
section 2 (a) and the whole of section 3. 
e Until July 1956. 
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Table 
LATIN AMERICA: ANALYSIS BY COMMODITIES AND BY COUNTRIES OF AGREEMENTS 
(Title I of United States Law 
Date of agreement Country of destination 
Value in millions of dollars 
Wheat Feed grains Cotton Tobacco 
Dairy 
products Fats and oils Frozen meat 
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Source: Agreements, United States official reports and pub-
lications, and estimates and calculations by ECLA. 
a Includes only sea freight financed by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation. 
agreements areas (other than Argentina and Ecuador) 
suffer a price increase.7 
Furthermore, the devaluation which accompanied 
these exchange reforms in Argentina and Chile has 
made it difficult, and in some cases impossible, for 
those countries to import certain commodities from 
other Latin American republics. In some instances, this 
situation has been remedied by a partial or general 
devaluation on the part of the exporting country, 
specifically in the case of timber exports from Brazil, 
Chile and Paraguay to Argentina, but in other cases 
the problem remains unsolved. Furthermore, the aboli-
tion, in Chile, or liberalization, in Argentina and Uru-
guay, of the import licence system means that con-
siderations of price, quality, prestige, etc., play a 
greater part than before in the choice of the source 
of imports. This sharpens the competition encountered 
by commodities of Latin American origin in those 
markets and aggravates the problem of over-pricing, 
especially in the case of manufactured and semi-finished 
goods. 
Added to these new problems is the uncertain situa-
tion that the exchange reforms and the changed trend 
of the trade policies of the southern countries of South 
America have brought about with regard to the trade 
and payments agreements in force between them. 
There is even more uncertainty with regard to the 
7 In addition, Chilean sales against agreement-dollars seem 
to be hindered by the imbalance in Chile's favour in its trade 
with other Latin American countries. This imbalance is the 
result of a shift in its imports in favour of non-Latin-American 
countries, due to its new exchange regulations, the over-pricing 
of regional commodities, the shortage of exportable surpluses in 
Argentina, etc. 
arrangements or practices that had been established 
for the purpose of permitting, facilitating or controlling 
bilateral trade in some commodities, since, in the 
changed conditions prevailing in regional trade, their 
application is being seriously impeded, and in some 
cases prevented. Thus, the new features of trade, 
especially the abolition in some cases of the interven-
tion of official bodies in the export or import of certain 
commodities, and the removal or restriction of the 
control that used to be provided by the licensing 
requirements, have made it difficult to negotiate the 
renewal of some sales contracts and to apply arrange-
ments based on the barter system established to deal 
with specific problems, such as that of the export of 
Chilean copper to Argentina. 
Although it has no connexion with the problems men-
tioned above and their causes, we may in conclusion 
draw attention to a further factor in inter-Latin-Amer-
ican trade, namely, the possible effect of sales of 
United States agricultural surpluses.8 As may be seen 
from table 12, the value and volume of the commodities 
covered by agreements between the United States and 
8 During the financial year July 1954 to June 1955 the United 
States Government initiated a programme for the disposal of 
farm surpluses under the Agricultural Trade Development and 
Assistance Act of 1954, better know as Law 480. Title I of 
this Act provides for sales of surplus agricultural commodities 
to foreign countries, under agreements with their Governments, 
against the local currencies of those countries, and with pay-
ment facilities; title II deals with the granting of assistance in 
the form of free shipments, and title III with donations of 
farm surpluses through private charitable institutions or in 
exchange for strategic materials. Tables 12 and 13 show in 
detail the agreements signed with Latin American countries 
under title I and the quantities or values authorized for dif-
ferent countries under titles II and III. 
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12 
FOR THE PURCHASE OF AGRICULTURAL SURPLUSES FROM T H E UNITED STATES 
480 — Sales for foreign currency) 
Approximate quantity in tons 
Total value 
of goods 






Cost to CCCb 
including 
sea freight 
Wheat Feed grains Cotton Tobacco 
Dairy 
products Fats and oils Frozen meat 
financial year July 1954/June 1955 
5.7 0.1 5.8 8.7 — — — 19,780 — 
4.6 0.4 5.0 7.7 32,714 — — — — 7,860 — 
4.9 0.4 5.3 7.1 22,320 — 1,860 — 1,500 2,880 — 
6.6 0.8 7.4 12.5 97,161 — — — 282 — — 
21.8 1.7 23.5 36.0 152,195 — 1,860 — 1,782 30,520 — 
financial year July 1955/June 1956 
24.7 0.6 25.3 25.3 — — — 80,000 — 
37.1 4.7 41.8 78.0 517,000 50,000 — 45 — 5,000 — 
32.5 2.1 34.6 42.0 100,000 2,500 6,800 136 4,500 40,000 6,000 
10.9 0.7 11.6 14.8 48,780 — 7,780 — — 3,530 — 
3.7 0.3 4.0 4.8 15,250 — 1,130 147 — 4,540 — 
5.5 0.5 6.0 8.8 40,000 — — — — 10,000 — 
2.6 0.4 3.0 5.2 27,000 — — — 1,400 1,400 — 
117.0 9.3 126.3 178.9 748,030 52,500 15,710 328 5,900 144,470 6,000 
b Commodity Credit Corporation. 
c Extended in June and September 1955. 
certain Lat in American countries increased very 
markedly dur ing the financial year 1955/56 as com-
pared with 1954/55. T h e total market value attributed 
to these commodities rose f r o m 22 to 117 million 
dollars, and comprises fo r the most pa r t commodities 
which are tradit ional in in ter-Lat in-American trade, 
such as wheat, cotton, fa t s and oils, f rozen meat, etc. 
In the case of the cotton trade, it is clear that these 
sales might have repercussions on the levels of expor ts 
of Peruvian and Brazilian fibres to other Lat in A m e r -
ican countr ies ; in the case of other commodities, such 
as wheat, fa ts and oils, they are not of such importance 
so long as the shortage of exportable surpluses in 
Argent ina persists. I t may also be assumed that it 
was precisely because they foresaw this shortage that 
several countries of the southern par t of Latin Amer -
ica decided to include those commodities, or larger 
quantities of them, in the agreements made at the end 
of 1955 and the beginning of 1956 to purchase Uni ted 
States agricultural surpluses9 (see also table 13). 
.ANNEX 
A case in regional trade in manufactured goods; the agree-
ment between representatives of the metallurgical indus-
tries of Argentina and Chile 
An event which set a noteworthy precedent in regard to trade 
in metal products between Argentina and Chile and which may 
d It is understood that sales of United States wheat sur-
pluses to Latin American countries were effected only after 
United States officials had informally consulted with the Argen-
tine authorities as to these sales in conformity with the United 
States Government's intention to ensure as far as possible that 
such transactions shall not affect the normal pattern of trade 
d Hayseed and feed grains. 
e Also includes the extension of the agreement concluded in 
February 1955 concerted in September of the same year. 
be regarded as a valuable experiment in inter-Latin-American 
trade in manufactured goods was the signing of the agreement 
concluded on 19 July 1954 by representatives of the Chilean 
Association of Metal Industries (Asociación de Industriales 
Metalúrgicos de Chile) (ASIMET) and the Argentine Metal 
Industry Federation (Federación Argentina de la Industria 
Metalúrgica) on behalf of the metal industries of the two 
countries. The agreement was the outcome of the direct con-
tacts established between the two bodies for the purpose of 
reaching a joint decision on the metal products which each 
country might export to the other; and it was submitted to 
the commissions representing the two countries in the Argen-
tine-Chilean Economic Union with the request that it should 
be taken into consideration in the preparation of the new 
schedules appended to the current Commercial and Financial 
Agreement. Moreover, the institutions which subscribed to the 
metal agreement decided "to state as a basic objective that the 
Governments of the two countries should adopt measures to 
expedite their import and export licence procedure, and to 
endeavour to reduce to a minimum the operation of State or-
ganizations in this field with a view to achieving direct trade 
between industrialists and merchants". Under the provisions of 
the agreement, these measures aim at the expansion of trade 
"because some means must be found to complement the iron 
and steel industry in the two countries". 
The lists of items produced by the metal industry in the two 
countries which the industrialists recommend as possible addi-
tions to the Argentine-Chilean trade lists were prepared taking 
into account which industries were in a position to export and 
to meet the minimum standards of quality, care being taken 
at the same time, where possible, not to include goods from one 
country which are also produced in the other, so as not to inter-
fere with local industries. The Argentine metal industry is more 
developed in some branches10 and the Chilean industry in 
10 Machine-tools, motors and generators, refrigeration equip-
ment, sewing-machines, spare parts for motor vehicles, etc. 
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Table 13 
LATIN AMERICA: ANALYSIS BY COUNTRIES AND BY COMMODITIES OF UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL 
SURPLUSES SHIPPED TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES UNDER TITLES II AND III OF LAW 480, AND 
UNDER SECTION 402 (LOANS) OF THE MUTUAL SECURITY ACT 
Countries 
Milk and 
Wheat milk Coarse Cotton-






Butter (in thousands 
fat Cheese of dollars) 
A. Title II: Grants during the period July 1954-J une 1956 
(authorized quantities in thousands of dollars at CCC cost prices) 
Bolivia 9,432 391 — 
Costa Rica — — 
Guatemala — — 
Haiti 169 34 
Honduras — — 
Peru 3,500 1,000 
 1,137 1,100 2,500 — 14,590 
39 80 63 — 58 — — — — 240 
3,348 — — — — — — — — 3,348 
125 180 1,100 — 1,049 198 — — — 2,660 
60 — 87 — 70 — — — — 211 
2,500 7,000 
TOTAL 13,101 1,425 6,072 1,397 2,350 2,500 1,177 198 
B. Title III: Donations through private charitable institutions, July 1954-March 1956 
(in tonsty 
Bolivia — 2,887 — — 454 — — — — 160 
Peru — 470 73 — 36 — 36 — 27 — 
Honduras — 710 — — — — — — — — 
Ecuador — 45 — — — — — — 27 — 
Brazil — 1,450 500 — 544 — — — 132 — 
Chile — 54 — — — — — — 9 — 
Colombia — 2,720 — — — — — — — — 
Haiti — 181 82 27 36 — — — — 91 
Mexico — 145 145 — 45 — 73 — 41 14 
Panamae — 

















TOTAL — 8,662 800 27 1,115 — 110 — 236 265 1,548 6,115.7 





Mexico . . 
Costa Rica 
Guatemala 
Panama . . 
10,600 — — — _ — _ 652.0 
21,477 — — — — _ — — _ 1,479.0 
453 — — — _ — — _ — — — 24.0 
67,910 453 — — — — — — — — — 9,616.0 
„ — 45 — — — — — — — — 17.0 
— — 2,120 — — _ — 141.0 
__ — 400 — — — — — — — — 25.0 
TOTAL 100,440 453 2,520 — — — — — — — — 11,964.0 
D. Mutual Security Act, Section 402. Supplied against foreign currencies (loans) to be used to finance Mutual Defence and Economic 
Development Programmes. Fiscal years 1954/55 and 1955/56 
(value in thousands of dollars at current United States export prices^) 
Bolivia 7,559 720 — 2,700 826 2,000 — — — — — 13,806 
Guatemala 2,000 — 1,768 — — _ 62 — — — — 3,830 
To ta l 9,559 720 1,768 2,700 826 2,000 62 — — — — 17,636 
Source: As for table 1. 
a Almost all skimmed milk. 
b The commodities supplied to Latin American countries un-
der title III of Law 480 belong for the most part to the finan-
cial year 1955/56. The only countries to receive goods during 
the period July 1954-June 1955 under this title were Bolivia 
(1,566,000 dollars), Honduras (380,000 dollars) and Peru (63,000 
dollars). These figures were accounted for almost entirely by 
milk products, chiefly skimmed milk. The remaining goods re-
ceived by Bolivia and Peru and all the goods received by the 
other countries belong to 1955/56. The total values transferred 
under the programme for each country (given in the last col-
umn) cover the financial years 1955 and 1956, i.e., the period 
July 1954-June 1956, and represent the cost to the Commodity 
Credit Corporation plus sea freight. 
c Only four Latin American countries participated in the pro-
gramme during the year 1954/55; Colombia (600,000 dollars), 
Mexico (100,000 dollars), Peru (900,000 dollars) and Venezuela 
(20,000 dollars). All other transactions belong to 1955/56. The 
total values transferred under the programme for each country 
(given in the last column) are the values in the export market. 
d The figures given are for the financial year 1955/56, with 
the exception of 505,000 dollars for wheat and 1,186,000 dol-
lars for oils and fats delivered to Bolivia during the financial 
year 1954/55. The figure given for Bolivia under cotton-seed 
oil (2,700,000 dollars) belongs to oils and fats in general and the 
figure under skimmed milk (720,000 dollars) to milk products. 
There may be errors in the sources used for these data. Accord-
ing to them, the total value of supplies to Bolivia and Guate-
mala under the programme during the two years would amount 
to 17,636,000 dollars, whereas other information, though also 
unconfirmed, would make this total value 5 million. It should 
also be mentioned that, according to the information available, 
Bolivia received wheat to the value of 8 million dollars (at CCC 
cost prices) under Law 216 during the financial year 1953/54. 
e For Panama, only the total value is given. 
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others.11 It was felt that trade in these branches should be 
established before production was begun in the importing 
country, since this would mean adopting protective tariffs later 
on and would prove anti-economic and inefficient in the long 
run owing to the limitations of the market. For want of a 
sufficiently brisk and free trade, the iron and steel industry in the 
two countries has tended to develop along parallel lines instead 
of being complementary; as a result, the national economy in 
both countries has suffered.12 
Most of the goods suggested in the agreement reached by the 
industrialists were included in the schedules for the second year 
of the Argentine-Chilean Agreement when they were prepared 
in the middle of 1955. While some of these goods had already 
been included in the schedules prepared for the first year of 
agreement, they were, with few exceptions, placed in sched-
ules A-2 and C-2 of Argentine and Chilean goods respectively, 
trade in which is to be promoted while remaining subject to 
prior import or exchange permits. 
The metal agreement had little real effect, owing chiefly to 
administrative obstacles and, more specifically, to the fact that 
a permit for the commodities had to be obtained beforehand. 
The procedure for obtaining permits in order to import or 
export machinery, in itself complicated and unwieldy under the 
regulations then in force,13 proved to be a much more serious 
obstacle when an effort was made to establish new channels of 
trade, as these involved goods of little known brands or types 
and, moreover, the very novelty of such channels gave rise to 
difficulty. In practice it was apparently virtually impossible in 
many cases to obtain permits in Argentina to export or import 
equipment and machinery to or from Chile.14 
There are other obstacles, less apparent but perhaps more 
serious in the long run, affecting again not only the trade in 
metal products but trade in manufactured goods in general. One 
of these is lack of trading experience in such products. This is 
particularly true of exporting but it is also true of importing 
from other Latin American countries. The organization needed 
to reach potential buyers and to advertise the products is 
lacking. Before orders are forthcoming an advertising cam-
paign must be launched in order to open up the market. This 
means considerable expense, particularly if it involves compe-
tition, as it usually does, with the industrialized countries, 
whose goods are already known and have the advantage of a 
well-established trade organization. On the other hand, indus-
trialists are as a rule reluctant to go to the expense of adver-
tising their products when the trade régime is unstable, as is 
frequently the case with manufactured goods. 
In the particular case of metal exports from Chile to Argen-
tina, there is a further problem which also affects other com-
modities and other countries, namely, the fact that the require-
ments of the Argentine market exceed those of the Chilean 
market. This means that if the Chilean metal industry aims 
at satisfying the requirements of both markets, it must con-
centrate mainly on the export trade in order to meet the needs 
of a market which at any moment may become inaccessible 
if the trade régime is modified. That is why some Chilean in-
dustrialists are inclined rather towards the Bolivian, Ecuadorian 
and Peruvian markets, which are more in line with Chile's 
export potential. 
However, in spite of the difficulties referred to above, the 
impression prevails among representatives of the Chilean metal 
industry that the direct contacts established among the indus-
trialists who negotiated the agreement referred to earlier is a 
promising step, provided that trade relations between the two 
countries remain more or less stable and administrative obstacles 
are either removed altogether or substantially reduced. The 
metal industry apparently intends to use this method again 
when the treaty between Chile and Argentina is re-negotiated 
and possibly if another trade agreement is negotiated with 
Brazil also. 
Chapter Ii 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS OF TRADE IN SPECIFIC PRODUCTS 
1. F R U I T 
In 1954 and 1955 no substantial changes occurred 
in the principal aspects of the in ter-Lat in-American 
f ru i t trade, practically all of which was confined to 
the South American republics, and particularly the 
southern countries of the zone. T h e distinctive pat tern 
of the main t rade currents was maintained, as was the 
very preponderant position held by the f r u i t t rade 
between Argent ina and Brazil. A s in previous years, 
this represented some 90 per cent of total in ter-Lat in-
American f ru i t t rade (see tables 14 and 15) . However , 
11 Copper tubing, electric conductors and cables, railway 
material and equipment, etc. The list of Argentine goods is 
much longer than the corresponding list of Chilean goods. 
12 For a more detailed analysis of the regional market and 
the integration or co-ordination of -industrial development 
among Latin American countries, see document E/CN. 12/C. 1/4, 
chapter II, in part I of this- volume. 
13 This is particularly true of Argentina. Every permit was 
subjected to close scrutiny in the Central Bank, the Ministry of 
Industry and other government bodies to make sure that the 
proposed imports would not be prejudicial to home industry 
or that the exports would not deplete domestic stocks. 
14 It should be noted that the basic objective of the metal 
agreement was the adoption by Governments of measures to 
expedite the procedure in respect of import and export licences 
in the two countries. This has been achieved largely through 
the new trade regulations, under which this requirement has 
been either abolished or considerably simplified. 
reference should be made to other currents which, 
while less important than the foregoing, are neverthe-
less traditional, and of m a j o r significance in some bi-
lateral t rade areas. These include, in order of im-
portance, Ecuador ' s exports of f resh f ru i t to Chile, 
Brazil 's f ru i t exports to Uruguay, the f ru i t t rade 
between Argent ina and Paraguay, and Argent ina ' s f ru i t 
exports to Venezuela, these last having again reached 
significant proport ions in the past two years a f t e r a 
period of decline. Mention might also be made of 
Chile's exports of dried f r u i t to Brazil and, to a lesser 
extent, to Argen t ina ; these a re now increasing again 
a f t e r a sharp decline. 
The f ru i t trade between Argent ina and Brazil in 
recent years has continued to operate under special 
regulations designed to facilitate a more or less balanced 
flow of trade in both directions (i.e., the values involved 
are approximately the same), in accordance with the 
basic annual p rogramme estimated in the lists appended 
to the Argent ine-Brazi l ian t rade agreement of March 
1953 at 380 million cruzeiros, or over 20 million 
dollars, in either direction. A t the t ime when the 
agreement was signed, notes were exchanged provid-
ing, with respect to f resh, dried and dehydrated f ru i t , 
f o r "a f ree t rade system within the f r amework of 
mutual compensation of the export and import ac-
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Table 14 
SOUTH AMERICA: EXPORTS OF FRESH FRUIT FROM SELECTED 
COUNTRIES* 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 
Countries of origin 
and destination Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Argentina, exports to: 
Brazil 67,171 19,919 47,207 13,398 64,720 16,805 
Latin American countriesb 67,378 19,978 47,780 13,579 67,692 17,594 
All countries 87,007 23,791 71,221 17,967 97,015 22,780 
Brazil, exports to: 
Argentina 153,373 11,277 215,059 14,458 202,899 15,453 
Latin American countries* 167,048 12,274 231,325 15,471 222,125 16,657 
All countries 209,286 16,945 280,856 18,414 276,191 19,942 
Chile, exports to: 
Peru 1,145 167 926 147 954 121 
Latin American countries^ 2,239 390 2,085 298 1,716 267 
All countries 29,147 4,053 15,554 1,969 14,621 1,944 
Ecuador, exports to: 
Chile 22,983 1,383 24,174 1,848 18,345 1,049 
Latin American countries^ 24,275 1,429 26,244 1,915 21,499 1,158 
All countries 405,946 24,600 482,926 28,082 611,174 36,760 
Peru, exports to: 
Chile 256 14 254 13 507 26 
Latin American countries' 317 15 254 13 532 29 
All countries 317 15 254 13 809 36 
Paraguay, exports to: 
Argentina 4,374 123 — — 2,660 554 
Latin American countries 4,374 123 — — 2,660 554 
All countries 4,778 277 4,770 619 3,034 565 
Uruguay, exports to: 
Brazil 11,064 1,029 — — 86 63 
Latin American countries 11,064 1,029 — — 86 63 
All countries 11,064 1,029 — — _ __ 
TOTAL EXPORTS TO 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES* 276,695 35,238 307,688 31,276 316,310 36,322 
Sources: Statistics and other official data. 
a Includes only those countries with a sizable volume of fruit exports to other Latin 
American countries. 
b Other Latin American markets for Argentine fruit are Venezuela and Paraguay, usually 
in that order. 
c Next tOi Argentina, Uruguay constitutes the only other Latin American market. d In addition to Peru, the other main Latin American markets for Chilean fruit are Vene-
zuela and Ecuador, 
e Chile and Peru. 
* Chile and Ecuador, 
ff Excluding Paraguay's 1954 exports. 
counts". The understanding is that trade is balanced 
if the disequilibrium does not exceed 50 million cru-
zeiros (about 2.8 million dollars) in any one year. 
Provided that the imbalance does not reach or exceed 
that figure, import licences are granted automatically, 
subject to the control regulations in force in both 
countries. If the difference specified is attained, the 
country adversely affected may control its imports 
during the following year in order to restore the balance 
in the fruit accounts. 
Moreover, the agreement specifies that in respect 
of this particular trade each country will grant the 
other most-favoured-nation treatment in tax, customs, 
exchange and administrative matters. With respect to 
tinned fruit, pulses and vegetables, each country has 
undertaken to grant import licences to the other up 
to an amount specified for each item. 
The agreement—which continues the fruit trade 
agreement signed by the two countries in June 1950 
and maintains its chief provisions—runs from 1 Jan-
uary 1953 to 31 December 1956, and is considered part 
of the trade agreement signed on the same date. 
The fruit trade, particularly in the case of Argen-
tina's exports to Brazil in 1954, has nevertheless been 
hampered by difficulties which have arisen from time 
to time. Brazilian imports of fresh and dried fruit 
from Argentina were considerably restricted at the 
beginning of 1954 by certain exchange regulations then 
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Table 15 
SOUTH AMERICA: EXPORTS OF DRIED FRUIT FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 
Countries of origin 
and destination Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Argentina, exports to: 
Brazil 3,768 4,571 1,260 820 2,842 2,009 
Latin American countries» 3,950 4,768 1,309 852 2,893 2,039 
All countries 4,595 5,327 1,509 1,000 . 3,611 2,444 
Brazil, exports to; 
Argentina — — 1,057 389 819 298 
Latin American countries1* 158 53 1,057 389 824 305 
All countries 4,918 5,322 5,471 5,744 25,084 9,471 
Bolivia, exports to: 
Brazil 53 22 — — — — 
Latin American countries 53 22 — — — — 
All countries 335 134 1,102 492 — — 
Chile, exports to: 
Argentina 428 628 578 538 195 112 
Brazil 23 14 193 98 744 390 
Peru 304 87 660 134 233 156 
Latin American countries 907 800 1,550 831 1,208 671 
All countries 5,051 1,801 3,681 1,872 4,741 1,496 
TOTAL EXPORTS TO 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES41 5 ,068 5,643 3,916 2,072 4,925 3,015 
Sources: Official statistics. 
a After Brazil, Uruguay was the second important market for Argentine dried fruit until 
1953, being supplanted by Paraguay in 1954 and 1955. 
b Exports to Latin American countries in 1953 consisted only of exports to Chile, 
c Excluding Bolivia's 1954 and 1955 exports. 
in force in Brazil and by the fact that the sales contract 
was delayed and was not signed until the month of 
March (see again tables 14 and 15). Subsequently, an 
exchange of notes took place in June 1954 in which 
Brazil, taking its exchange regulations into account, 
agreed to the auctioning, under the minimum premium 
of category I, of sufficient foreign exchange for 
imports of fresh, dried, dehydrated and processed 
fruit to ensure the fulfilment of a minimum non-
limitative annual programme of 20 million agreement-
dollars.15 Argentina in turn pledged itself to grant 
import licences automatically for Brazilian fruit, in 
accordance with the provisions referred to earlier. 
Once the difficulties in 1954 were settled, an expan-
sion of trade followed, though Argentina's exports to 
Brazil did not reach the level attained in 1953. The 
extent to which the balance of trade has been main-
tained within the proposed limit cannot be readily 
determined. To judge from the export figures, during 
the three years in question Argentina enjoyed a favour-
able trade balance which, in 1953 and again in 1955, 
exceeded the limit prescribed in the agreement (see 
again tables 14 and 15). The import figures, on the 
15 For the purposes of auctioning of foreign exchange, Bra-
zil at present classifies Argentine fruit in category II (with a 
minimum premium of approximately 25 cruzeiros). Fruit from 
other countries is classified in category IV, with a minimum 
premium of 40 cruzeiros to the dollar. In practice, both premiums 
are much higher than the stated minima, particularly for cate-
gory IV. The treatment which Brazil grants to Argentine fruit 
has not been extended to any other country since it is a con-
cession to an adjacent country from which Brazil receives most 
of its supplies of foreign fruit. 
other hand, show the balance to have been highly 
favourable to Argentina in 1953 (about 10 million 
dollars) and to Brazil in 1954 and 1955 (about 14 mil-
lion dollars and 6 million dollars respectively). 
It might be useful at this point to consider the 
present situation and future prospects of the fruit 
trade. So far, the fruit trade between Argentina 
and Brazil in 1956 has been seriously affected 
by the changes made in Argentina's foreign ex-
change regulations. When the new regulations came 
into force, fruit was included among- the com-
modities for which the foreign exchange accruing 
from exports had to be negotiated in the official market. 
However, on 6 December 1955 it was transferred to 
the free market, in which fruit exporters may conduct 
their transactions at whatever rate of exchange and 
in whatever currency they and the buyers agree upon. 
While stimulating Argentina's fruit exports by provid-
ing a more favourable rate of exchange, this measure 
nevertheless adversely affected sales in Brazil, since 
transactions with that country may be effected solely 
in agreement-dollars negotiable in Argentina only on 
the official market. Argentine exporters are thus com-
pelled to raise their prices when selling to Brazil in 
order to obtain the same amount—in terms of domestic 
currency—as they do for their exports to other areas.16 
16 The exchange rate for foreign exchange negotiated on the 
official market in Argentina is 18 pesos to the dollar. On the 
other hand, the exchange rate on the free market has at times 
exceeded 40 pesos to the dollar. The present rate is slightly 
over 30 pesos to the dollar. 
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Moreover, in February 1956 the Brazilian Government 
suspended auctioning foreign exchange for fruit im-
ports from Argentina and also stopped issuing the 
necessary licences.17 This virtually paralysed Argen-
tina's fruit exports to Brazil, which had already declined 
in January and February in comparison with the same 
period in 1955. Out of a total of 61,700 tons of fruit 
exported from Argentina between January and April 
1956, only 18,300 tons, or 30 per cent, were exported 
to Brazil, as compared with 65 per cent in 1955. On 
the other hand, Argentina's improved competitive posi-
tion resulted in substantially increased fruit exports 
to the European countries and the United States. The 
diverting of exports to the European markets was 
facilitated, moreover, by the reduction in Europe's 
fruit crops as a result of bad weather. In Latin 
America itself, there was an increase in exports to 
countries like Venezuela which pay for their purchases 
in dollars. 
Brazilian fruit exports to Argentina were greatly 
affected by devaluation in that country and by the 
changes in the marketing of bananas,18 as well as by 
the want of a price agreement. Subsequently, after 
exports to Argentina were resumed on the basis of 
an f.o.b. price of 1.50 dollars per bunch, the Central 
Bank of Argentina occasionally withheld import per-
mits. Moreover, the importers were reluctant to use 
any but Argentine and Brazilian ships to carry the 
bananas.19 An additional difficulty was the relatively 
low price ceiling in Argentina for the sale of bananas 
to the public.20 
17 It is not unlikely that, unless an agreement is reached 
which will end the present situation, Brazil will abolish the 
preferential treatment granted to Argentine fruit in its foreign 
exchange classification. 
18 The bulk of Brazil's fruit exports to Argentina consists of 
bananas. In this country they were imported exclusively through 
the Argentine Institute for the Promotion of Trade (Insti-
tuto Argentino para la Promoción del Intercambio) ( IAPI) 
which effected purchases on the basis of annual contracts un-
der a consignment agreement. Since January 1956 bananas have 
once again been marketed exclusively through private channels, 
and the consignment agreement has not been renewed. 
19 Argentine and Brazilian ships can handle only 30 per cent 
of the bananas exported from Brazil to Argentina. Ships from 
other countries must therefore be used, but the freight (35 U.S. 
cents per bunch) must be paid by the Argentine importer with 
exchange obtained on the free market, whereas exchange for 
freight payments can be obtained on the official market when 
Argentine or Brazilian ships are used. 
20 In 1956, in an effort to stimulate fruit exports and to 
counteract the adverse effects of the Argentine devaluation, the 
Brazilian Government has considerably improved exchange 
treatment for such exports, particularly with respect to ba-
nanas. For the purpose of auctioning the foreign exchange ac-
cruing from banana sales abroad, bananas have been classified 
in category II, in which, over and above the basic rate of 
18.36 cruzeiros to the dollar, the exporter receives a bonus of 
18.70 cruzeiros to the dollar for exports to areas having a 
fully or partially convertible currency, and 17.19 cruzeiros to 
the dollar for exports to areas covered by agreements, includ-
ing Argentina. At the beginning of April 1956 bananas were 
transferred once more to category III, the corresponding 
bonuses being thereby increased to 24.70 and 22.95 cruzeiros to 
the dollar respectively. Towards the end of that month, ba-
nanas were yet again transferred, this time to category IV 
(along with all other fruit), in which the respective bonuses 
were 31.70 and 29.67 cruzeiros to the dollar. Finally, under 
the revised exchange regulations of 19 May 1956, category IV 
became category III, and the bonuses were increased to 36.64 
and 34.41 cruzeiros to the dollar respectively. In other words, 
the bonuses for banana exports were doubled within a few 
In addition to the immediate difficulties referred to 
earlier, the fruit trade between Argentina and Brazil 
is affected by other problems of a more lasting nature, 
including the system of short-term agreements (which 
prevents the grower from planning his production on 
stable bases and creates an element of uncertainty in 
the market), and the system of irrevocable credit 
applied to importers in Argentina. The latter particu-
larly affects the banana trade, since the importer is 
required to make payment for the whole shipment as 
if it had arrived in good condition. The exporter has 
subsequently to make restitution to the importer, out-
side the compensation account, in respect of that part 
of the shipment which arrived in poor condition. 
Both countries appear to have considered the pos-
sibility of paying for fruit imports and exports in 
their respective domestic currencies as a short-term 
solution for some of the existing difficulties.21 Another 
step considered is the conclusion of a fruit agreement 
based on compensation and extending over an approxi-
mately three-year period, with prices to be fixed in 
advance by the two Governments at regular intervals. 
With regard to trade between Argentina and Para-
guay, this has been adversely affected by the absence 
of medium- and long-term agreements and by the 
prevalence of plant diseases which reduced the output 
of oranges in Paraguay and hence the volume of 
exports to Argentina. Moreover, Paraguayan exporters 
of citrus fruit were unable to compete on the Argentine 
market owing to price considerations. As a means of 
solving the problem, Paraguay decided in April 1956 
to allow the foreign exchange accruing from fruit 
exports to be negotiated on the free market at a rate 
of about 105 guaraníes to the dollar instead of at the 
official rate in force for exports of other commodities, 
which is 60 guaraníes to the dollar. 
2 . CATTLE AND MEAT 
The downward trend of trade in cattle on the hoof 
over the past few years among the southern countries 
of South America continued in 1954 and 1955. The 
volume of Argentine exports, amounting to only 3 0 , 5 0 0 
tons in 1 9 5 3 as compared with nearly 7 1 , 5 0 0 tons in 
1950, was reduced further in 1954 and again in 1955 
to a little over 1 9 , 0 0 0 tons and 1 0 , 0 0 0 tons respectively. 
The increase in Uruguayan exports to Brazil was not 
sufficient to make up the loss (see table 16). 
As in previous years, the bulk of the trade was 
represented by Argentine exports of cattle on the hoof 
to Chile, and it was precisely these exports which 
declined most sharply, dropping from 2 5 , 0 0 0 tons 
in 1 9 5 3 to a mere 6 , 5 0 0 tons in 1 9 5 5 . Argentine cattle 
exports to Bolivia, next in order of importance, also 
months as a result of these various changes, the total number 
of cruzeiros which the exporter receives for each dollar being 
increased from 37.06 and 35.55 to 55.00 and 52.77, depending 
upon whether the fruit is exported to areas having fully or 
partly convertible currency or to those with which agreement-
dollars are used. With respect to exports of fruit other than 
bananas—formerly classified in category IV—their bonuses 
were increased when that category became category III under 
the new regulations. 
21 For further details of this and other devices for the pos-
sible solution of the fruit problem, see document E/CN.12/ 
C.l/3, chapter II, section 1 (a), in part I of this volume. 
2 . C o m m o d i t y t rade i n 1 9 5 4 / 5 5 ; s i tuat ion a n d prospects i n 1 9 5 6 5 9 
Table 16 
ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY: EXPORTS OF CATTLE ON T H E HOOF 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
" 1953 7954 1955 
Countries of origin 
and destination Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value. 
Argentina, exports to: 
Bolivia 4,095 
Chile 25,349 
Latin American countries3 30,469 
All countries 30,475 
Uruguay, exports to: 
Brazil 526 
Paraguay — 
Latin American countries 526 
All countries 526 
TOTAL EXPORTS TO 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 30,995 
1,520 1,899 1,025 3,316 1,545 
8,854 17,041 6,561 6,515 1,903 
11,055 19,222 7,838 10,185 3,902 
11,056 19,225 7,844 10,185 3,902 
550 3,586 1,691 1,049 632 
— 45 33 146 81 
550 3,631 1,724 1,195 713 
550 3,631 1,724 1,195 713 
11,605 22,853 9,562 11,380 4,615 
Sources: Annual statistics and other official data. 
Note: Bolivia's registered exports of cattle to Brazil, relatively substantial until 1953, 
were practically nil in 1954 and 1955. Brazilian statistics (and Bolivian data for certain years 
only) disclose imports of Paraguayan cattle, often in substantial amounts; however, the export 
of these cattle is not indicated in Paraguayan statistics. 
a Other destinations within Latin America are Brazil, Paraguay and Peru. Exports to 
Peru were on a very minor scale in 1954 and 1955 and much lower than in previous years. 
decreased by more than 50 per cent f r o m 1953 to to Brazil (which constitute the bulk of the sheep t rade 
1954, and despite an increase in 1955 failed to regain among the southern countries of South Amer ica) , bu t 
their previous level. Argent ine exports to other neigh- declined sharply in 1955. The chief reason fo r the 
bouring countries were also lower. decline was the reduction in Argent ine exports to 
The sheep t rade increased in 1954 compared with Chile and, to a lesser extent, in Uruguayan exports to 
1953, thanks to an expansion of U r u g u a y a n exports Brazil (see table 17). 
Table 17 
ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY: EXPORTS OF LIVE SHEEP 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 " 
Countries of origin 
and destination Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Argentina, exports to: 
Chile 4,070 639 4,011 760 957 206 
Latin American countries 4,085 683 4,012 795 1,035 262 
All countries 4,095 687 4,022 801 1,035 264 
Chile* exports to: 
Peru 87 108 35 56 37 56 
Latin American countries 87 108 36 68 37 56 
All countries 87 108 36 68 37 56 
Uruguay, exports to: 
Brazil 1,296 492 4,185 1,850 2,322 962 
Latin American countries 1,297 495 4,185 1,850 2,340 965 
All countries 1,297 495 4,185 1,850 2,340 965 
TOTAL EXPORTS TO 
LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES 5,469 1,286 8,233 2,713 3,412 1,283 
Source: Yearbooks of Statistics. 
a Chilean exports to Peru consisted of sheep for breeding. 
Wi th regard to the t rade in chilled and f rozen meat, 
Argent ine exports in 1954 and 1955 followed a d i f -
ferent t rend f r o m trade in cattle on the hoof, being 
higher than in the preceding years, part icularly 1953. 
The reason for this was the substantial rise in exports 
to Chile, which were practically non-existent until 
1952 and only 277 tons in 1953, but amounted to 
more than 6,500 tons in 1954 and 1955. Chile thus 
became the main Lat in American outlet fo r Argent ine 
beef, taking the place of Pe ru . E x p o r t s to Pe ru de-
creased f r o m 1952 to 1953 and again f r o m 1953 to 
1954, but rose slightly in 1955 (see table 18). 
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Table 18 
ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY: EXPORTS OF CHILLED AND FROZEN MEAT* 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 
Countries of origin 
and destination Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Argentina, exports to: 
Chile 277 204 6,757 3,979 6,574 4,780 
Peru 6,022 3,170 3,700 1,878 3,776 2,331 
Latin American countries** 6,395 3,586 10,468 5,885 10,340 7,111 
All countries . . 196,079 94,194 197,660 93,150 194,151 108,711 
Uruguay, exports to: 
Brazil 3,123 1,652 6,200 3,091 — — 
Latin American countries0 4,285 2,268 6,363 3,276 — — 
All countries 50,371 22,309 51,991 24,206 4,093 2,322 
TOTAL exports to: 
Latin American countries 10,680 5,854 16,831 9,161 10,340 7,111 
All countries . . 246,450 116,503 249,651 117,356 198,244 111,033 
Source: Official statistics. 
a Including beef, mutton, pork, and poultry and game, 
b Including exports to Brazil in 1953 and 1954. 
c Including exports to Peru in 1953 and to Bolivia in 1954. 
On the other hand, Uruguayan exports of chilled 
and frozen meat to the rest of Latin America, which 
began in 1952 with a shipment to Brazil, continued 
only until 1954; there were none in 1955, chiefly 
because no surplus was available for export. Faced with 
a shortage of cattle, the Uruguayan frozen meat in-
dustry was compelled to restrict its exports, which were 
subjected to strict quotas that reduced them by more 
than 90 per cent in relation to previous years. 
The decline which has taken place in recent years 
in registered Argentine exports of cattle on the hoof 
to Chile continued in 1954 and 1955, despite the fact 
that cattle and sheep are included in schedule A-l, 
comprising those Argentine commodities which under 
the agreement now in force may be exported to Chile 
without a foreign exchange permit. Although the 
schedule fixes quotas for the Chilean cattle imports 
which can be effected under this franchise, the quotas do 
not constitute any real obstacle, since they are higher 
than the actual volume traded. The probable reasons 
for the decline are, first, the growing volume of 
unregistered exports, which appear to have reached 
substantial proportions in the past three years,22 and, 
secondly, the fact that part of Chile's 1954 and 1955 
beef, imports consisted of frozen meat in place of 
cattle on the hoof.23 A third reason is the sharp de-
crease which has occurred in the past few years in 
Chile's per capita consumption of meat as a result 
of the rise in prices. Other factors in 1955 also had 
an effect on the trade in cattle on the hoof between 
the two countries and brought it down to the low 
level already mentioned. Among these were the delay 
in preparing the schedules for the second year of the 
22 A good deal of smuggling of cattle, particularly beef 
cattle goes on in Latin America, especially in the southern 
countries, owing, inter alia, to the discrepancy, often substan-
tial, between the official exchange rates and the rates on the 
unofficial or free market. 
23 A ton of meat may be estimated as approximately equi-
valent to four steers. 
agreement; the problem of price adjustments,24 which 
was not settled until April 1956, after purchases had 
been suspended for several months; the shortage of 
railway rolling stock for the transportation of cattle; 
and the fact that more domestic cattle were available 
for slaughter owing to the winter drought. 
These problems also affected the trade in chilled 
and frozen meat. During the first year of the agreement, 
the Argentine export quota to Chile of 6,000 tons 
of beef and 1,000 tons of pork was virtually filled. 
For the second year of the agreement, the beef quota 
was raised to 12,000 tons and the pork quota reduced 
to 600 tons. However, because of the difficulties already 
mentioned, only a little over 50 per cent of this quota 
was filled. 
. Both prices and future price modifications, as well 
as the conditions of delivery for cattle and meat ex-
ported from Chile to Argentina, were fixed in notes 
appended to the agreement signedi by the two countries 
in February 1954. It was also agreed that, in view of 
the desire to replace shipments of cattle on the hoof 
with frozen meat, the Chilean Government would allow 
Argentine meat to be imported on a scale rising each 
year and would apply to it the same tariff and exchange 
regulations as for cattle on the hoof. 
Argentina's cattle exports to Bolivia, another im-
portant market, are also governed by agreements cover-
ing quotas, conditions of delivery, prices, etc., which 
form part of a régime set up when the Economic Union 
Agreement between Argentina and Bolivia was signed 
in September 1954—a regime which is based on the 
barter of Argentine cattle for Bolivian oil. For the 
first year of the agreement it was estimated that 5 mil-
lion dollars' worth of cattle would be bartered for an 
24 These adjustments were proposed by INACO pursuant 
to the provisions of the notes appended to the agreement of 
February 1954, whereby cattle prices were to be reviewed on 
the basis of the agreed prices for the first half of that year 
and in accordance with meat price fluctuations on the world 
market. 
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equivalent amount of oil. A monthly quota of Argentine 
cattle was established of 800 head of Santa Fe and 
1,500 head of Formosa cattle at 270 dollars and 130 
dollars per head respectively. In May 1955 the monthly 
quotas were raised to 1,500 head of Santa Fe and 
500 head of Formosa cattle, and the rates reduced to 
240 dollars and 110 dollars respectively from 1 April 
to 31 December 1955. However, statistics show that 
Argentina's cattle deliveries to Bolivia in 1955 were 
in fact lower than the agreed quotas, although consi-
derably higher than in 1954. 
Argentina's exports of cattle and frozen meat to 
Chile were resumed, though on a reduced scale, follow-
ing the settlement of the problem of price adjustments 
early in 1956 when prices were reduced by about 
20 per cent. Imports of sheep and cattle under the 
agreement were seriously affected by the increase in 
unregistered trade, estimated at about 25,000 head for 
the first four months of 1956.25 At the same time the 
increase in the value of the agreement-dollar on the 
free bank market as a result of the revision of the 
Chilean exchange regulations in April 1956 raised the 
price of Argentine cattle on the hoof above the Chilean 
price. Other factors are the lack of funds available 
to official organizations for the financing of cattle 
purchases and the fact that domestic cattle are plenti-
ful on the market as a result of credit restrictions and 
the unfavourable weather conditions referred to earlier. 
Hence, only the northern countries' imports of Argen-
tine cattle are normal, the area having virtually no 
other source of supply. As long as these factors 
prevail, imports by the central zone will be seriously 
affected. 
Frozen meat imports were suspended in Chile with 
the termination of the customs duty exemption pre-
viously granted. Since frozen meat is now subject 
to the same regulations as cattle on the hoof and the 
franchise in question is no longer granted, prices on 
the Chilean market are too high. However, the Chilean 
Government has decided to make these exemptions 
available again for one year as from 1 August 1956. 
In that connexion, the Chilean National Trade Insti-
tute (Instituto Nacional de Comercio) (INACO) 
had already placed contracts in Argentina for the 
purchase of 6,000 tons of frozen meat, and it is 
expected in official quarters that this organization will 
purchase another 6,000 tons to fill the quota prescribed 
under the agreement, since, at the same rate of ex-
change, frozen meat works out cheaper than fresh meat 
from imported cattle. On the other hand, because of 
the price factor, INACO is unlikely to purchase frozen 
meat from the United States as provided for in the 
25 Under the exchange regulations at present in force in 
Argentina, proceeds from exports of cattle and sheep are 
negociated on the official market, subject to a deduction of 
25 per cent and a provisional differential of 60 centavos per 
kilogramme on the hoof for slaughter animals. This means that 
the exporter receives only 13.50 Argentine pesos to the dollar 
(less the differential mentioned above) if he exports his cattle 
through the regular channels, whereas from unregistered trade 
he receives much more—at times over 40 pesos to the dollar. 
Moreover, under these conditions the Argentine exporter can 
then offer his cattle at a price below the official base value and 
thus compete favourably on the Chilean market, at the same 
time avoiding the difficulties created for the sale of cattle by the 
relatively high official base values for such exports. 
agreement on agricultural surpluses signed with the 
United States early in 1956, and involving 3.7 million 
dollars, the equivalent of 6,000 tons. 
With respect to Argentina's cattle and meat exports 
to other neighbouring countries, the improvement in 
its livestock situation will presumably make it possible 
for Argentina to supply all their requirements.26 It 
is already expected that higher export quotas for 
Argentina will be fixed during the next revision of 
its agreement with Bolivia. In recent years the quotas 
have been generally lower than Bolivia has re-
quested.27 An agreement was reached with Uruguay 
in February 1956 whereby Argentina will provide the 
Uruguayan meat-packing industry with 60,000 head of 
cattle for canning purposes The cattle will be paid for 
in Uruguayan currency, although the sale was deemed 
to be a loan, since the cattle may be returned by Uru-
guay when its own livestock population is again built 
up. With this end in view, negotiations are under way 
to allow Uruguayan cattle-breeders to import cows 
from Argentina. In addition, an export quota of 10,000 
head of cattle to Peru was authorized in April 1956, 
although Peru may reduce its imports of cattle and 
meat during the remainder of the year, as a result 
of the drought which caused an increase in the 
number of animals slaughtered. 
Finally, it is now expected that, when the trade agree-
ment between Argentina and Paraguay is renewed, 
Argentine exports of beef cattle to Paraguayan meat-
packing plants in the vicinity of the frontier will be 
resumed. Although these plants are in a better position 
now that more domestic cattle is available in Paraguay, 
the San Antonio and Bovril plants were set up as 
natural outlets for cattle surpluses from the Formosa 
area of Argentina. Provisions are therefore expected 
to be included in the revised trade agreement which 
would enable these plants to use Argentinian cattle 
on the basis of an agreement for the joint negotiation 
of the resulting foreign exchange proceeds which would 
give them a reasonable return. The tinned meat from 
these plants would be exported chiefly to the sterling 
area. 
Under the foreign exchange regulations governing 
Argentina's cattle and meat exports, these are effected 
through the official market up to the official base value 
(which for these products is higher than the actual 
price), and are subject to a deduction of 15 per cent 
in the case of breeding cattle and meat and 25 per 
cent for beef cattle, sheep and pigs. Moreover, exports 
of these three types of livestock have since March 1956 
been subject to payment of a provisional differential 
of 60 centavos per kilogramme on the hoof. 
The tendency in Argentina's policy regarding cattle 
and meat exports is to replace the quota system by 
free exports, the only condition being the fixing of 
official base values or of prices in the case of transac-
26 It may be pointed out that cattle and meat, like wheat, 
are among the few important commodities exported by Argen-
tina to other southern Latin American countries which can be 
traded without the problems arising from the use of agreement-
dollars as the trading is conducted by official organs. 
27 According to some sources, the monthly quotas have ap-
parently already been increased as from April 1956 to 750 head 
of Formosa cattle and 2,250 head of Santa Fe cattle. 
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tions in which official institutes take part. This policy 
has been facilitated by the increase in cattle supplies 
on Argentine markets. 
3 . E D I B L E FATS A N D OILS 
Few commodities in inter-Latin-American trade have 
fluctuated so markedly in recent years as edible fats 
and oils. The volume had reached a high level in 1953 
(about two-and-a-half times higher than the average 
for the five-year period 1 9 4 6 - 5 1 ) , but fell off severely 
in 1954 and even more in 1955. The greatest decrease 
took place in edible oils, and its main cause was the 
drop in exportable surpluses in Argentina, by far the 
largest, and for some items almost the only, Latin 
American source of fats for the traditional importers 
of the area. 
This decline in exportable surpluses of fats and 
oils in Argentina had begun some years earlier,28 
but up to the end of 1953 it mainly affected Argentina's 
exports outside Latin America, while at the same time 
there was a shift in favour of Latin American markets. 
In 1 9 5 0 total exports reached almost 1 1 9 , 0 0 0 tons of 
oils and 4 5 , 0 0 0 tons of fats, of which only 6 per cent 
and 12 per cent respectively were for other parts of 
Latin America. In 1953, on the other hand, out of 
total sales abroad of only 2 4 , 4 5 0 tons of edible 
oils and 1 2 , 0 6 2 of fats, 2 0 , 0 9 4 tons and 1 1 , 2 8 1 tons 
respectively were absorbed by other Latin American 
countries. In the two following years these countries 
received almost the whole of Argentina's by then 
relatively small exports of fats and oils (see table 19). 
Table 19 
SOUTH AMERICA: EXPORTS OF EDIBLE FATS AND OILS FROM SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
Countries of origin 
and destination 
1953 1954 1955 
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
A. Edible oils 
Argentinaa, exports to: 
Brazil 184 200 304 363 1 1 
Chile 19,473 8,910 2,609 1,194 36 35 
Paraguay 60 72 361 359 364 359 
Latin America15 20,094 9,422 3,290 1,933 416 409 
All countries 24,450 11,026 4,188 2,247 416 409 
Uruguay, exports to: 
Paraguay 757 354 733 343 — — 
Latin America0 764 356 896 422 — — 
All countries 8,455 2,557 3,362 1,082 — — 
B. Edible fats* 
Argentina, exports to: 
Bolivia — — 167 60 104 94 
Brazil 7,943 6,403 634 449 1,444 881 
Chile 2,297 1,571 9,969 6,151 2,158 1,528 
Peru 1,040 864 794 553 1,250 830 
Latin America^ . . . . 11,281 8,838 11,564 7,213 5,471 3,730 
All countries . . . . 12,062 9,028 11,595 7,280 5,471 3,730 
C. Butter 
Argentina, exports to: 
Chile 890 1,483 1,724 2,277 219 210 
Peru 356 590 803 1,056 923 965 
Latin America* 1,280 2,172 2,553 3,370 1,344 1,438 
All countries . . . . 15,000 17,645 15,374 15,133 10,107 9,317 
Sources: Statistical year-books and other data from official sources. 
a The figures for Argentina are based on data for eleven months of the year. 
*> Including exports to Bolivia, which were fairly substantial up to the end of 1953. 
c Including exports to Peru and Brazil in 1954. 
d There were no exports of fats from Uruguay in 1954 or 1955. 
e Including the export of rather more than 500 tons to Paraguay in 1955. 
f Argentina also exported small quantities of butter to Bolivia, Brazil and Paraguay; in 
1955, 164 tons were exported to Uruguay. 
28 Argentina's production of edible oils dropped considerably 
as a result of a sharp decline (almost 75 per cent from 1951 
to 1955) in sunflower seed production, together with a reduced 
peanut harvest (see table 20). Argentina's production of edible 
fats was affected by the falling-off in the number of cattle 
slaughtered from 1951 onwards, and by the breeding of a leaner 
type of cattle, a process caused or encouraged by the Govern-
ment price policy. In addition there was probably some substi-
tution of fats for oils in diet because of the scarcity of the 
latter. 
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Table 20 
SOUTH AMERICA: PRODUCTION OF OIL SEEDS IN 
SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Thousands of tons) 
Country 1953 1954 1955 
Cotton-seed 
Argentina 238.2 257.8 220.6 
Brazil 695.0 741.7 765.5 
Paraguay 23.7 25.7 25.0 
Peru 145.9 157.9 139.6 
TOTAL 1,102.8 1,183.1 1,150.7 
Sunflower seed 
Argentina» 428.3 344.8 282.8 
Chile 55.8 75.2 67.8 
Uruguay 91.7 81.4 68.0 
TOTAL 575.8 501.4 418.6 
Peanuts 
Argentina 204.0 169.7 118.0 
Brazil 146.5 168.0 218.9 
Paraguay 10.0 9.9 10.0 
Uruguay 3.9 5.7 6.0 
TOTAL 364.4 353.3 352.9 
Sources: Statistics and estimates from official sources. 
a Production in Argentina had exceeded a million tons in 
some previous years, having amounted to 930,000 tons in 1948, 
1,088,000 in 1949, and 1,021,000 in 1951; it then dropped to 
692,000 tons in 1952. 
The sharp drop in the production of edible oils 
not only led to the reduction of exports, but forced 
Argentina to prohibit them altogether, and to resort to 
the importation of considerable quantities, a course 
which had not been followed since pre-war times. In 
1954 almost 12,000 tons29 were imported and in 1955 
more than 50,000 tons (see table 21), the imports con-
sisting of cotton-seed oil, nearly all from the United 
States.30 
Chile was the principal market for Argentine exports 
of edible oils in 1953 and 1954 and of fats in 1954 and 
1955. In the case of oils this seemed to suggest that 
Chile might regain the position held prior to 1952, 
when it was the largest purchaser of Argentine oils 
in Latin America. 
For Argentina's exports of fats, on the other hand, 
the Chilean market (like the Brazilian) did not become 
important until recent years, when the traditional Latin 
American markets (Peru and Bolivia), were relegated 
to secondary positions. This was especially true in 
Bolivia's case. 
The main reason for tji€ diversion to Chile of Argen-
tine exports of edible fats, including butter, was un-
doubtedly the Trade and Finance Agreement of Feb-
29 Other sources give a figure as high as 20,000 tons. 
30 In 1955 Argentina obtained from the United States 30,000 
tons of cotton-seed oil purchased directly for dollars, together 
with 19,400 tons (with a value of 5.7 millions dollars) obtained 
under an agreement for the purchase of United States farm 
surpluses signed in April of that year. By a similar agreement 
of December 1955 another 80,000 tons of cotton-seed oil were 
obtained for delivery during 1956. The value in this case was 
24.7 million dollars. (See again table 12.) 
ruary 1954 between Argentina and Chile. The schedules 
drawn up for the first year that the agreement was 
in force included, among the Argentine products that 
could be exported to Chile without an exchange permit, 
lard, edible beef fat and butter, to estimated values of 
100,000 dollars, 95,000 dollars and 500,000 dollars 
respectively. But in response to an unusually high 
demand from Chile, and to the trading facilities granted, 
exports of edible fats from Argentina to Chile in 1954 
exceeded the estimates. The actual figures were 4,000 
tons of lard, with a value of nearly 3.5 million dollars; 
3,100 tons of edible beef fats and tallow, with a value 
of 1.5 million dollars, and something over 1,700 tons 
of butter, with a value of 2.3 million dollars. This 
represented a total value of 7.3 million dollars,31 com-
pared with an estimate in the Agreement schedules of 
barely 700,000 dollars. 
Apparently in the belief that such a heavy increase 
in the imports of fats had affected the marketing and 
prices of similar products in Chile, the Chilean author-
ities, in drawing up the schedules for the second agree-
ment-year, fixed the quotas for imports without an 
exchange permit at 2,500 tons for lard and 900 for 
butter.32 In the case of edible beef fat the increasing 
scarcity of exportable surpluses in Argentina made it 
necessary to include this item without any quota or 
estimated value, but with the designation "p.m.", mean-
ing that the trade in this product would have to depend 
on how much it was possible for Argentina to export. 
Owing to these restrictions, to the frequent increases 
in the prices quoted for Argentine lard and tallow, 
and to the effect of the Argentine currency reform of 
October 1955 on the trade in fats with countries with 
which it was necessary to deal in units of account, 
exports of these products to Chile dropped sharply 
in 1955, amounting to only 2,158 tons of edible fats33 
and butter. On the other hand, during the same year 
there was some recovery in the export of fats from 
Argentina to Brazil and Peru. 
Uruguay, normally an exporter of edible fats and oils 
to non-Latin-American markets,34 found itself in much 
the same situation as Argentina, with a pronounced 
decline in production and in exportable surpluses of both 
oils and fats.35 Nevertheless, none of this has had as 
much effect on inter-Latin-American trade as the drop 
in production in Argentina, since Uruguay's exports 
of fats and oils to the other countries in the area 
are relatively small. 
31 The figures for Argentina's exports to Chile given in 
table 8 also include 2,460 tons of edible mutton fat and tallow 
(with a value of 1.15 million dollars) which in Chile are con-
sidered as commercial tallow and are used in soap manufacture. 
32 With an estimated value of 1.25 million dollars and 700,000 
dollars respectively. 
33 Mainly lard. 
34 With a few exceptions, such as its exports of edible oils 
to Paraguay, and in much smaller quantities to Peru and Brazil, 
in 1953 and 1954. 
35 This was due to the lower production of sunflower seed, 
the country's principal source of edible oils, and a falling-off 
in the slaughter of animals attributable both to a shortage of 
slaughter stock and to strikes in the packing plants. Uruguay 
exported no edible fats in 1954 and 1955 (their export having 
been prohibited in the latter year), and no oils in 1955. There is 
some prospect that the situation may improve in 1956, but not to 
any great extent. 
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Table 21 
SOUTH AMERICA: IMPORTS OF EDIBLE FATS AND OILS IN SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 
Importer country Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
A. Edible fats and oils, excluding butter 
Argentina — Total .... — — 11,919 3,061 50,475a 
From Latin America . . . . — — 14 12 1,075b 890b 
Brazil — Total 17,557 12,570 25,749 15,416 10,607 8,300 
From Latin America 7,541 4,297 26 20 1,300 560 
Chile — Total 21,353 9,235 26,488 11,179 20,422 7,169 
From Latin America 11,146 4,705 22,681 9,877 4,364 2,112 
Bolivia — Total 3,816 5,478 3,003 4,401 1,822 
From Latin America 3,848 3,037 .. • ... ... ... 
Paraguay — Total 664 1,049 ,,, ... ... ... 
From Latin America 655 1,028 ... 1,296 482 
Peru — Total 9,832 3,128 5,934 2,571 12,501 4,204 
From Latin America 1,101 415 708 276 1,490 448 
B. Butter 
Peru — Total 1,035 946 1,560 1,571 1,921 1,728 
From Latin America0 788 668 833 770 1,076 878 
Chile — Total 1,016 1,219 ... 
From Latin America0 1,016 1,219 l,589d l,775d 381d 347d 
Sources: Statistical yearbooks and other data from official sources. 
a These figures cover purchases of cotton-seed oil from the United States, and the exports 
of edible oils to Argentina shown in Paraguay's 1955 statistics, 
b From the statistics of Paraguay on exports to Argentina. 
c From Argentina alone. 
d Figures corresponding to credits opened in Chile for the importation of butter from 
Argentina under the Agreement in force, and relating to the first and second years of the 
agreement (March 1954-February 1955 and March 1955-February 1956). 
A recent feature worthy of note in connexion with 
the supply of edible oils and fats to the southern coun-
tries of South America, apart from the sharp decline 
in the resources of Argentina and Uruguay in these 
products (particularly in edible oils)—and partly as 
a consequence of this decline—is the inclusion of ever-
increasing quantities of these products in agreements 
concluded by various countries with the United States 
in connexion with the purchase of United States 
farm surpluses (see again table 12). It has already 
been mentioned that Argentina, under agreements 
signed in April and December 1955, purchased cotton-
seed oil from the United States.36 In the same way 
Chile obtained some 7,300 tons of cotton-seed oil in 
1955 and expected to receive 36,000 tons in 1956, in 
addition to 1,500 tons of lard and 2,500 tons of edible 
animal tallow. Brazil agreed to take 5,000 tons of lard; 
Peru 10,000 tons of cotton-seed oil and soya-bean oil; 
Paraguay 825 tons of edible oil and 575 tons of lard, 
and Colombia and Ecuador 6,400 and 4,540 tons re-
spectively of cotton-seed oil, to be imported at the end 
of 1955 or during 1956. To this should be added fats 
and oils sent by the United States to Bolivia between 
July 1954 and June 1956 to a value of almost 4 million 
dollars, either as aid or in exchange for local currency 
to be used to finance defence programmes or economic 
development; and account should also be taken of 
smaller quantities of oil and butter sent to various 
Latin American countries (see again table 13). 
36 See footnote 30 above. 
It should be pointed out that, as stipulated in the 
agreements on the sale of United States farm surpluses, 
purchases of oils and fats in exchange for local cur-
rency have to be accompanied by direct dollar purchases 
of these products, in amounts corresponding to the 
normal purchases from the United States in earlier 
years. 
Up to middle of 1956 the principal obstacle to the 
revival of the intra-regional trade in edible oils con-
tinued to be the shortage of exportable surpluses in 
Argentina. Nevertheless, a substantial improvement 
may be looked for, since in response to better prices 
the area sown with sunflower seed in 1955/56 was 
about 150 per cent greater than in 1954/55. Although 
the harvest will be less than originally hoped for, it 
is still expected to be double the preceding crop. If 
to this are added a 25 per cent increase reported in 
the ground nut harvest, a slight increment in that of 
cotton-seed, and the import of 80,000 tons of oils from 
the United States, it can be anticipated that the export-
able surpluses ef edible oils in Argentina for 1956 
will exceed 100,000 tons (see table 22), which may 
perhaps induce the Government to lift its ban on 
exports.37 Moreover, the output of edible oils in 
Uruguay is expected to be somewhat higher than in 
1955. 
37 It was reported in mid-1956 that Argentina had sold 500 
tons of semi-refined sunflower oil to Paraguay, at the price 
of 350 dollars a ton f.o.b. in bulk. 
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Table 22 
ARGENTINA: PRODUCTION, AVAILABILITIES AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF EDIBLE OILS EXCLUDING 
OLIVE OIL 
(Thousands of tons) 
1954 1955 1956s. 
A. Sunflower seed oil 
Availabilities 
Stocksb 10 10 5 
Production .. 78 75 158 
TOTAL 88 85 163 
Distribution 
Internal consumption . . . 76 80 65 
Exports 2 — 
98 
Stocksc 10 5 
TOTAL 88 85 163 
B. Peanut oil 
Availabilities 
Stocksb 45 15 10 
Production . . 55 34 46 
TOTAL 100 50 56 
Distribution 
Internal consumption . . . 83 40 40 
Exports 2 — 
16 
Stocks0 15 10 
TOTAL 100 50 56 
C. Cotton-seed oil 
Availabilities 
Stocksb 5 20 20 
Production . . 30 23 25 
Imports 20 50 80 
TOTAL 55 93 125 
Distribution 
Internal consumption . . . 35 73 60 
Exports — — 
65 
Stocks0 20 20 
TOTAL 55 93 125 
D. Total 
Availabilities 
Stocksb 60 45 35 
Production , 163 132 229 
Imports 20 50 80 
TOTAL 243 227 344 
Distribution 
Internal consumption . . . 194 193 165 
Exports 4 — 
179 
Stocks0 45 35 
TOTAL 243 227 344 
Sources: Foreign Crops and Markets, 21 May 1956. 
a Estimates. 
b 1 January. 
c 31 December. 
Nevertheless it is not likely that Latin America will 
provide an extensive market for edible oils from 
Argentina in 1956. In fact, as already mentioned, 
Chile expects to receive 36,000 tons of cotton-seed 
oil in 1956 from United States surpluses, and in addi-
tion has already obtained some 13,000 tons of semi-
refined oil by direct dollar purchases. These quantities 
will more than cover the Chilean shortage of this 
product in the current year, since they greatly exceed 
the normal imports. Similarly Bolivia and Peru have 
also received edible oils from United States surpluses 
in sufficient quantity to fill their needs, while Brazilian 
imports of oils from Argentina have always been 
small. 
In the case of edible fats, the situation varies accord-
ing to the particular product. There is no great problem 
relating to exportable surpluses of lard in Argentina, 
but there is a price problem, due mainly to the exchange 
reform. As explained above, the export of lard to 
Chile has been made difficult through the quotation 
of excessively high prices. Since authorization was 
given in April 1956 to negotiate on the free market the 
whole of the foreign exchange obtained from the 
export of lard, there has been a further price rise in 
terms of units of account for sales payable in agree-
ment-dollars.38 This particularly affects sales to Chile 
and Brazil, although it has made it possible to lower 
prices in terms of dollars and thus to encourage sales to 
countries trading in that currency. This is the case, 
for instance, as regards the export of lard to Peru, 
which Argentina was able to effect (as soon as it 
had been transferred to the free market) at prices as 
low as 228 dollars a ton. If the problem created by 
the use of agreement-dollars could be solved, it is 
estimated that Argentina could sell to Chile all the 
lard that country needs (approximately 3,000 tons a 
year) at a cost lower than that of lard coming from 
the United States, quite apart from the fact that 
Argentina also benefits from a preferential tariff 
arrangement.39 Nevertheless it should be noted that the 
quota under the current agreement limits the export 
of Argentine lard to Chile to 2,500 tons a year, and 
that in 1956 Chile will probably receive some 1,500 
tons of lard and 2,500 tons of edible animal tallow 
from United States surpluses and a further 540 tons 
of lard by direct dollar purchase. Much the same holds 
38 As already pointed out, agreement-dollars can be negotiated 
in Argentina only on the official market; for this reason an 
exporter gets only 18 pesos for each agreement-dollar, a much 
lower rate than can be obtained for other foreign currency in 
the free market. The exporter makes up for this loss on his 
agreement-dollars by increasing his prices. 
39 By virtue of articles 2 and 3 of the Trade Treaty con-
cluded between Argentina and Chile on 3 June 1933, various 
Argentine products, including edible fats, lard and butter, were 
exempted from the additional charges imposed by the Chilean 
customs in compensation for currency depreciation. When the 
treaty was signed, the sixpenny gold peso used in the customs 
tariff for purposes of conversion into existing currency was 
subject to a surcharge of 100 per cent. That surcharge has 
now risen to 9,760 per cent. As the non-application of the sur-
charge for currency depreciation is a contractual benefit exclu-
sive to Argentina, and therefore does not apply for purposes 
of the most-favoured-nation clause, the import of edible fats 
from the United States would mean a much higher price to 
the Chilean consumer than if they were obtained from the 
neighbouring country. Taking edible fat as an example, while 
the duty on fats from Argentina would amount to about 
9 Chilean pesos per kilogramme, the product from the United 
States would be dutiable at the rate of about 110 pesos. 
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true for exports to Brazil and Paraguay, which would 
rise sharply if a solution could be found to the problem 
of the agreement dollar, although here again purchases 
by these countries of United States surpluses40 might 
have an inhibiting effect 
It appears that Argentina now has sufficient availa-
bilities in edible beef fat to increase its exports to 
neighbouring countries. In fact exports are once again 
being made to Chile, although the volume is compara-
tively small. Here, as in respect of exports to Brazil 
and Paraguay, the use of agreement-dollars is not such 
a stumbling-block as it is in the case of lard, since 
only the foreign currency obtained over and above 
the official base value set by Argentina can be sold on 
the free market. In any case this difficulty has been 
removed by a decision of the Central Bank of Argen-
tina41 providing that, when an official base value has 
been set for a product and it is sold for agreement-
dollars to adjacent countries, the additional amount of 
such units of account obtained because the purchase 
price is higher than the official base value may be 
exchanged through the commercial banks by the ex-
porter for foreign currency of limited convertibility at 
a rate fixed in relation to the quotation for United 
States dollars. This appears likely to encourage the 
export to adjacent countries of beef fat and other 
products for which an official base value has been set 
for exports. But this system does not apply to agree-
ment-dollars obtained for products for which no official 
base value has been set, which is the case with lard. 
Exports of edible beef tallow, as of mutton fats 
and tallow, are likewise hampered by the shortage 
of exportable surpluses. If this shortage were to disap-
pear, exports for agreement-dollars would be affected 
in the same circumstances as in other areas, since this 
product has an official base value set for it, and is 
therefore governed by the system outlined above. 
Lastly, as regards butter, Chilean imports from 
Argentina became practically impossible after the 
devaluation in Chile; when the exchange rate for 
agreement-dollars with Argentina was raised, the price 
of butter went up considerably. There was also a duty 
of 260 Chilean pesos per kilogramme on imported butter 
to encourage domestic milk production, while the maxi-
mum retail price in Chile was fixed at 640 Chilean 
pesos per kilogramme. Argentine butter was thus priced 
out of the market and could not be exported to Chile. 
But when the maximum price was abolished at the 
beginning of September 1956 and the price of butter 
in Chile almost doubled in a few days, the import 
of Argentine butter not only became possible but 
received such an impetus that orders for increasing 
amounts began to be placed at once. In these circum-
stances it appears that Argentina will be able to meet 
the whole of Chile's deficit in this product. 
Table 23 
ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY: EXPORTS OF WHEATA 
(Volume in thousands of tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
1953 1954 1955b 
Countries of origin —— ——— 
and destination Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Argentina, exports to: 
14.1 1,375 — — — — 
Brazil 1,177.2 128,347 767.3 68,682 1,233.3 92,255 
Chile 88.8 8,948 262.7 17,819 127.7 8,258 
Paraguay 48.0 6,134 57.3 5,737 71.4 5,877 
Peru 102.0 8,632 181.4 12,253 131.0 8,106 
Latin American countries 1,430.5 153,472 1,268.7 104,491 1,563.6 114,505 
All countries 2,535.9 244,774 3,041.9 215,469 3,676.5 255,297 
Uruguay, exports to: 
271.0 Brazil 44.0 4,815 256.9 24,242 23,847 
Paraguay 26.0 3,121 18.6 2,098 0.5 52 
Peru — — 5.6 316 53.7 3,228 
Latin American countries 70.0 7,936 281.1 26,656 325.2 27,127 
All countries 70.0 7,936 334.0 29,693 515.1 37,895 
TOTAL, exports to: 
Bolivia 14.1 1,375 — — — — 
Brazil 1,221.2 133,162 1,024.3 92,924 1,504.3 116,102 
Chile 88.8 8,948 262.7 17,819 127.7 8,258 
Paraguay 74.0 9,255 75.8 7,835 71.9 5,929 
Peru 102.0 8,632 186.9 12,569 184.7 11,334 
Latin American countries 1,500.5 161,408 1,549.8 131,147 1,888.8 141,632 
All countries 2,605.9 252,710 3,375.9 245,162 4,191.6 293,192 
Percentage of exports to Latin 
America over total exports . . . 57.6 63.9 45.9 53.5 45.1 48., 
Source: Official statistics and estimates. a Includes wheat-flour in terms of wheat. 
b Provisional figures. 
40 5,000 tons in the case of Brazil. The 575 tons bought by 
Paraguay are enough to cover import needs. 
41 See circular dated 18 July 1956. 
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As in the case of beef fat, foreign currency produced 
by the export of butter can be negotiated at the official 
rate up to the amount of the official base value, and 
above that value at the free rate. If sales are made for 
agreement-dollars, these can be exchanged for foreign 
currency of limited convertibility at a rate of exchange 
equivalent to the quotation of the dollar on the free 
market. 
At the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956, Argen-
tine prices for fats were too high both in the Chilean 
market and in other southern countries of South Amer-
ica, owing to the necessity of dealing in agreement-
dollars, and also because from April 1956 onward 
Chile could import these products from whatever source 
it wished. To these factors which helped to discourage 
the demand for edible fats from Argentina must be 
added the existence of some smuggling through the 
mountain passes in the south. 
4 . W H E A T A N D W H E A T F L O U R 4 2 
In 1954 and 1955 the trade in wheat and wheat flour 
among the southern countries of South America, which 
comprises almost the whole of the inter-Latin-American 
trade in these products, reached record levels in volume, 
though its value was somewhat less than in 1953 be-
cause of the lower prices quoted by Argentina and 
Uruguay in sales to neighbouring countries.43 Indeed, 
exports of wheat and flour from these two countries 
to the rest of Lain America amounted in 1954 to almost 
1.55 million tons and in 1955 to nearly 1.89 million 
tons, as compared with an average of something under 
1 . 2 million tons for the period 1 9 3 4 - 1 9 3 8 , and 8 3 4 , 0 0 0 
tons for the period from 1946 to 1951 (see table 23). 
This increase in the volume of the wheat trade is 
due on the one hand to expanded production in the 
two exporting countries mentioned, and to increased 
consumption in the importing countries, and on the 
other hand, to the existence of trade agreements and 
sales contracts, or barter arrangements. 
Wheat production in the seven southern countries of South America reached 
the maximum figure of 10,683,500 tons in 1955, an increase of more than 40 
per cent over the average yearly production for the periods 1934-1938 and 
1949-51 (see table 24). 
Table 24 
SOUTH AMERICA: WHEAT PRODUCTION IN SEVEN COUNTRIES 





1949-1951 1953 1954 1955 1956 
Average 
1954-1956 
Argentina 6,127.7 5,380.0 7,633.7 6,200.0 7,690.0 5,250.0 6,380.0 
Bolivia 33.0 28.0 20.0a 20.0a 20.0a 20.0a 20.0a 
Brazil 144.2 458.3 689.5 771.7 871.3 982.9 875.3 
Chile 849.9 904.4 989.2 928.4 1,077.6 951.5 985.8 
Paraguay 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.0a 1.0a 1.0a 1.0a 
Peru 76.3 143.2 168.7 162.5 170.0 150.0a 160.8 
Uruguay 360.7 468.3 462.5 818.6 853.6 825.0a 832.4 
TOTAL 7,592.8 7,384.4 9,965.2 8,902.2 10,683.5 8,180.4 9,255.3 
Source: Official data and estimates, 
a Estimates. 
Although 1954 production was over a million tons 
lower than that of 1953, mainly owing to the fall in 
Argentina's production, the latter country had to devote 
a large part of the 1953 crop to re-establishing the 
normal level of its stocks, which had been all but 
exhausted owing to the low production in 1952. On 
the other hand, since Uruguayan production rose by 
almost 80 per cent from 1953 to 1954, the stocks 
42 The term "wheat" in this section includes wheat flour as 
far as trade is concerned. 
available for export from both countries increased 
substantially between those two years. There was a 
similiar increment between 1954 and 1955, attributable 
in this instance to the record crop (see table 25). 
43 The average f.o.b. price per ton for wheat sold by Argen-
tina to Brazil was 112 agreement-dollars in 1953, 81 in 1954, 
71.25 in 1955 and 61.90 for the first delivery in 1956. The price 
of wheat sold by Argentina to Chile dropped from 70 agree-
ment-dollars per ton in 1954 to 62.25 in 1955. Uruguay sold 
wheat to Brazil at 71.25 agreement-dollars per ton in 1955 and 
59.30 in 1956. 
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Table 25 
ARGENTINA AND URUGUAY: PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, STOCKS AND EXPORTS OF WHEAT 
(Thousands of tons) 
Argentina Uruguay Total 
1953 1954 1955 1953 1954 1955 1953 1954 1955 
Stocks on 1 January 160.8 1,111.6 1,100.0 102.0 206.0 1,213.6 1,306.0 
7,633.7 6,200.0 7,690.0 462.5 818.6 853.6 8,096.2 7,018.6 8,543.6 
Total availabilities 7/94.5 7 ¿11.6 8/90.0 920.6 1,059.6 . . . 8,232.2 9,849.6 
Exports 2,535.9 3,041.9 3,676.5 70.0 334.0 515.1 2,605.9 3,375.9 4,191.6 
Apparent consumption 4,147.0a 3,169.7 3,189.5 381.1 417.9 . . . 3,550.8 3,607.4 
Stocks on 31 December 1,111.6 1,100.0 1,924.0 102.0 206.0 130.4 1,213.6 1,306.0 2,054.4 
Estimates for 1956 
Argentina Uruguay Total 
Stocks on 1 January 1,924.0 130.4 2,054.4 
Production 5,250.0 825.0 6,075.0 
Total availabilities 7,174.0 955.4 8J29.4 
Estimated consumption 3,500.0 400.4 3,900.4 
Normal reserves 1,000.0 80.0 1,080.0 
Exportable surplus 2,674.0 475.0 3,149.0 
Probable exports to Latin America — 1,120.0b 340.0 1,460.0b 
Source: Official data and estimates. *> Including more than 80,000 tons of wheat shipped by Argen-
a Including replacement of stocks held by flour mills and tina to Chile in 1956 as a result of sales made in 1955. 
other commercial and industrial enterprises. 
Table 26 shows how the imports of Lat in American countries with a wheat 
deficit increased f r o m 1953 to 1955 and the g rowing par t played dur ing that 
period by wheat f r o m Argent ina and Uruguay , which in 1955 amounted to 
82.5 per cent of wheat imports as compared with 59.5 per cent in 1953. 
Table 26 
SOUTH AMERICA: WHEAT IMPORTS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES* 
(Thousands of tons) 
Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Total Percentage 
1953 
From Latin America 8.6 1,149.5 1.6 48.4 71.1 1,279.2 59.5 
From the rest of the world . . 78.5 508.3 93.3 2.1 188.4 870.6 40.5 
TOTAL 87.1 1,657.8 94.9 50.5 259.5 2,149.8 100.0 
1954 
From Latin America — 1,026.1 202.8 57.3 206.7 1,492.9 65.6 
From the rest of the world . . 95.7 620.0 16.5 — 49.9 782.1 34.4 
TOTAL 95.7 1,646.1 219.3 57.3 256.6 2,275.0 100.0 
1955 
From Latin America — , 1,623.8 183.0 69.1 193.6 2,069.5 82.5 
From the rest of the world . . 77.0 231.0 19.9 — 112.3 440.2 17.5 
TOTAL 77.0 1,854.8 202.9 69.1 305.9 2,509.7 100.0 
1956b 
From Latin America — 1,120.0 230.0 50.0 140.0 1,540.0 54.2 
From the rest of the world . . 80.0 880.0 130.0 30.0 180.0 1,300.0 45.8 
TOTAL 80.0 2,000.0 360.0 80.0 320.0 2,840.0 100.0 
Source: Official statistics and ECLA estimates. 
a Including wheat-flour in terms of wheat, 
b Estimates. 
A s in fo rmer years, sales by Argent ina to Brazil 
accounted f o r the bulk of the wheat t rade a m o n g the 
southern countries of South America. These sales 
are generally made on the basis of yearly contracts. 
I n the contract concluded between the two countries 
at the beginning of 1953 it was agreed that 1.2 million 
tons should be exported fo r that year, at 112 agree-
ment-dollars per ton. T h e following year the signing 
of the contract was delayed fo r var ious reasons until 
the end of June, and, as a result, purchases were limited 
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to 750,000 tons of grain and 26,250 of flour, at 81 
and 113.50 agreement-dollars per ton respectively, 
f.o.b. Argentine ports. In January 1955, a new trans-
action was agreed upon, comprising a contract for the 
sale in 1955, 1956 and 1957 of 1.2 million tons 
of grain per year, within the terms of the trade and 
payments agreements in force. An important feature of 
this contract is that the full quantity must be delivered, 
provided the annual exportable surplus of Argentina 
is 3 million tons or more; if it should be less, the 
Government of Argentina must make every effort to 
supply as much as possible of the quantity agreed 
upon, undertaking in any case to sell to Brazil at least 
30 per cent of the surplus. For its part, the Brazilian 
Government "during any year that this agreement is 
in effect shall be released from the engagement to 
buy any part of the 1.2 million tons of wheat which 
cannot be absorbed by the resources resulting or 
expected to result during that year from Argentine 
purchases on the payments-agreement account in force 
between the two countries". 
It was agreed that the price of the wheat to be 
shipped in 1955 would be 71.25 agreement-dollars per 
ton, f.o.b. Argentine ports; that approximately 100,000 
tons would be shipped per month; and that Brazil 
would import 48,000 tons of wheat grain, or 4 per 
cent of the total for the year, in the form of flour, 
to be deducted from the total. The price of the flour 
would be computed on the basis of the price fixed for 
wheat grain, at an extraction index of 70 per cent. 
To judge by Argentine statistics, both the 1954 and 
the 1955 agreements were fully implemented, with 
exports of wheat and wheat flour amounting to 767,300 
tons in 1954 and 1,221,800 tons in 1955. 
Argentina's exports to Chile were much greater in 
1954 and 1955 than in earlier years (see table 23). 
This is due largely to the trade and payments agree-
ment concluded between the two countries in February 
1954. Wheat to a quantity of 250,000 tons and wheat 
flour up to 5,000 tons are included in the schedule for 
the year 1954 of products exportable to Chile which 
do not require an exchange permit. The wheat exports, 
estimated at a value of 17.4 million dollars, were 
considered to be the counterpart of shipments to 
Argentina of Chilean iron and steel to the same value, 
also included in the schedule of products not requiring 
exchange permits. In addition, it was agreed, by an 
exchange of notes, to amend the terms of a contract 
for the sale of wheat concluded between the Argentine 
Institute for the Promotion of Trade ( IAPI) and the 
Chilean National Trade Institute (INACO) in June 
1953, for a quantity of 200,000 tons. The price of the 
wheat, which had been fixed at 100 dollars per ton 
f.o.b. Buenos Aires, was reduced to 73 dollars for 
the 95,000 tons already shipped and to 70 dollars for 
the 105,000 tons awaiting shipment. With the addition 
of a further purchase made subsequently by INACO 
from IAPI, the total quantity of wheat to be delivered 
after February rose to 215,000 tons. 
The full quota of wheat and flour agreed upon- for 
1954 was exported. According to Argentine statistics, 
262,700 tons were exported to Chile as compared with 
88,800 tons in 1953 and considerably less in earlier 
69 
years. In the schedules for the second year of the 
agreement,44 the amount of Argentine wheat to be 
exported to Chile was reduced to 200,000 tons and 
the amount of wheat flour was fixed at 5,500 tons, 
inasmuch as Chilean needs were estimated to have 
decreased, both because of increased domestic produc-
tion and because of an agreement Chile concluded with 
the United States in January 1955 for the purchase of 
farm surpluses, which included some 33,000 tons of 
wheat (see again table 12). In September 1955, INACO 
concluded an agreement with the National Grain Insti-
tute (Instituto Nacional de Granos) (ING) in Argen-
tina for the purchase of 150,000 tons of wheat at 
62.25 agreement-dollars f.o.b. per ton. Some 70,000 
tons of that quantity were delivered by the end of 
1955, bringing the total exports for that year to 128,000 
tons. As indicated, the decrease as compared with 1954 
exports is attributable to the smaller deficit in Chilean 
supplies of wheat and to the purchase of United 
States wheat under the programme for the liquidation 
of surpluses. This purchase amounted to 37,000 tons 
at 58.96 dollars f.o.b. per ton. 
Like Chile, Peru has greatly increased its imports 
of Argentine wheat in the last two or three years; 
Argentina, which has become Peru's main source of 
supply, exported 181,400 tons to that country in 1954 
and 131,000 in 1955. This increase is all the more 
remarkable in that the schedules of commodities an-
nexed to the trade and payments agreement concluded 
between these two countries in August 1949 does not 
mention wheat among the commodities of major im-
portance in Argentine-Peruvian commercial exchanges. 
Moreover, in February 1955, Peru signed an agreement 
with the United States, which was amplified in June 
and September of this year, with regard to farm sur-
pluses, which includes a contract for the sale of about 
100,000 tons of wheat under title I of Law 480 (see 
table 12). 
In 1954 and 1955, Argentina maintained its tradi-
tional role of sole supplier of wheat and wheat flour 
to Paraguay. On the contrary, Bolivian imports of 
wheat came, as in former years, from outside Latin 
America. This was the more true inasmuch as Bolivian 
requirements for imported wheat are being met in 
whole or in the main through the United States pro-
grammes for the disposal of farm surpluses. 
By an exchange of notes dated 12 December 1953, 
and coinciding with the signing of the Charter of 
Economic Union, Argentina and Ecuador concluded a 
purchase and sale contract during 1954 providing for 
approximately 30,000 tons of Ecuadorian oil to be 
exchanged against Argentine wheat to the same value, 
at the prices governing sales of wheat to Ecuador 
under the International Wheat Agreement. It appears, 
however, that the transaction did not go through, for 
the statistics of both countries fail to show any exports 
of Argentine wheat to Ecuador in 1954 or 1955. 
Uruguayan wheat exports showed a marked increase 
in 1954 and 1955 as compared with former years, owing 
to the increase in production (see tables 23, 24 and 25). 
The principal market for this increased exportable 
44 March 1955-February 1956. The validity of the schedules 
was later extended until 31 August 1956. 
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surplus was Brazil, which, under a barter agreement 
concluded at the end of 1953, undertook to buy 300,000 
tons of Uruguayan wheat each year for three years. 
Mainly as a result of that agreement, Uruguayan wheat 
exports to Brazil rose to more than 250,000 tons in 
1954 and 1955, as compared with much smaller quan-
tities in earlier years.45 
Uruguayan statistics also show steady and sometimes 
increased exports to Paraguay; this is not revealed by 
the Paraguayan import figures, perhaps because the 
wheat was exported through Argentina. In addition, 
in 1954 Uruguay started to export wheat to Peru; 
the quantity exported that year was less than 6,000 
tons, but in 1955 it amounted to almost 54,000 tons. 
All the data and information to hand on 1956 seem 
to indicate a considerable decline in the wheat trade 
among Latin American countries, owing mainly to the 
smaller exportable surpluses available in Argentina and 
Uruguay as a result of the damage caused to the crops 
by adverse weather conditions, especially in Argentina. 
According to the estimates given in table 14, the ex-
portable surplus in both countries is about 3.15 million 
tons for this year, which compares unfavorably with 
the total of 4,191,600 tons exported in 1955. Side 
by side with this decrease in exportable surpluses, there 
has been a marked increase in contracts for the sale 
of United States wheat and wheat-flour to the south-
ern countries of Latin America by virtue of agreements 
concluded by those countries with the United States 
under title I of Law 480, to which frequent reference 
has been made. Under these agreements, which were 
signed at the end of 1955 and during the first six 
months of 1956, the United States engages to sell wheat 
in the fiscal year 1955/1956 up to a value of 42.5 
million dollars, representing some 684,000 tons.46 To 
those quantities should be added the direct dollar pur-
chases of wheat which the importing countries are 
to make in free-market dollars under the terms of 
Law 480, and in conformity with the agreements con-
cluded. Moreover, in accordance with other provisions 
of the United States programme for the disposal of 
farm surpluses embodied in that Law and in section 
402 of the Mutual Security Act, the United States 
shipped substantial quantities of wheat and wheat-flour 
to Bolivia and Peru and other Latin American coun-
tries in the course of the first two years of the pro-
gramme's implementation (July 1954 to June 1955) 
(see table 13). 
On the basis of production figures for 1956 in the 
southern countries with a wheat deficit (see table 24), 
and taking into account the available stocks or apparent 
consumption of wheat in those countries in recent years 
and the normal increase in that consumption, it has 
been estimated that they will need to import something 
like 2.84 million tons of wheat this year as against a 
little more than 2.5 million in 1955 (see table 26). Of 
the total amount to be imported, possibly 54 per cent 
—or about 1.54 million tons—will come from Argen-
45 Uruguay sold Brazil 300,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour 
in 1955 at the f.o.b. price of 71.25 and 150.54 dollars per ton 
respectively. 
46 Compare these figures with those for 1954/1955, when the 
value of these sales commitments rose to 6.8 million dollars, 
representing some 130,000 tons (see table 12). 
tina and Uruguay, and the rest from outside Latin 
America. 
Brazil's requirements for wheat and flour imports 
in 1956 are in the neighbourhood of 2 million tons, 
if it is to have total availabilities of about 3 million 
tons. Brazil has agreed to purchase 800,000 tons of 
wheat in Argentina during this year, taking into 
account the provisions of the Wheat Agreement between 
the two countries and the fact that the Argentine 
exportable surplus is far below 3 million tons (see 
table 25). The purchase was made at the international 
price, on the understanding that the quotation will 
be adjusted for each shipment—a procedure similar 
to that used for the export of Brazilian timber to 
Argentina.47 Again in conformity with the agreement 
in force between the two countries and under a contract 
signed in April 1956, Brazil has undertaken to buy 
265,000 tons of wheat and 40,000 of flour from Uru-
guay in the course of this year (making a total of 
320,000 tons in terms of wheat) at 59.30 and 123.14 
dollars per ton respectively. The 880,000 additional 
tons required by Brazil to bring its imports up to 
2 million tons in 1956 will probably come from the 
United States and Canada. In November 1955 Brazil 
concluded an agreement with the United States on the 
purchase of farm surpluses, including wheat to a 
value of 31 million dollars (representing some 500,000 
tons) and flour to a value of 1.1 million dollars (re-
presenting some 17,000 tons in terms of wheat). If 
the price should be lower than anticipated, which may 
happen, the quantity corresponding to the agreed values 
will be greater. To that quantity should be added the 
dollar purchases of wheat to be made by Brazil from 
the United States, through the normal channels and 
in quantities comparable to those purchased in former 
years. Finally, it should be borne in mind that under 
the new International Wheat Agreement Brazil is 
assigned an annual quota of 200,000 tons, which does 
not include purchases made from Argentina or from 
United States surpluses. 
In Chile the estimated wheat deficit for 1956 amounts 
to about 360,000 tons, a much higher figure than was 
reached by imports in former years. This is due to 
the increase in consumption and to the fact that the 
crop was some 125,000 tons smaller than that of 1954/ 
1955. To meet this difficulty, Chile has 109,500 tons 
of wheat from United States surpluses—bought in 
May under the agreement signed with the United States 
last March—plus a direct dollar purchase of 20,000 
tons, making a total of 129,500 tons of United States 
wheat.48 To this quantity should be added 80,000 tons 
of Argentine wheat bought in 1955 and not yet received 
in 1956, as also another 50,000 tons from the same 
source, the purchase of which was being negotiated 
47 The 800,000 tons of wheat sold by Argentina to Brazil in-
clude the equivalent of 24,000 tons in flour (i.e., 16,800 tons 
of flour). Delivery of the wheat is made in shipments of 200,000 
tons. For the first 200,000 tons an average price of 61.90 dollars 
f.o.b. per ton was agreed upon; the price of each of the sub-
sequent shipments will be decided when the shipment is made. 
48 The agreement concluded with the United States specified 
a sale of 6.2 million dollars worth of United States wheat, 
representing some 100,000 tons. As the price at which the wheat 
was actually purchased was 56.55 dollars f.o.b. per ton—less 
than expected—the quantity obtained was greater. The direct 
dollar purchase was made at the price of 55.20 dollars per ton. 
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at the end of July. Nevertheless, there is still a deficit 
of some 100,000 tons, which the estimates given in 
table 26 have attributed to Argentina, bearing in mind 
the fact that the most recent schedules in the agreement 
(extended until 31 August 1956) mention 200,000 tons 
of wheat. It would appear that Argentina set aside 
from 100,000 to 150,000 tons of wheat for export 
to Chile this year. It is believed, however, in informed 
circles that Chile will decide to buy no more than 
50,000 tons more from Argentina and will not pur-
chase the remainder unless it can do so from the United 
States under title I of Law 480. To that end the 
United States Government was consulted with regard 
to the possibility of allocating to the purchase of 
wheat 3.7 million dollars which in the agreement on the 
sale of farm surpluses in 1956 were allocated to frozen 
beef, a commodity which Chile is apparently not going 
to buy in the United States market after all. 
With regard to Peru's wheat import requirements 
in 1956, estimated at some 320,000 tons, it is considered 
that imports from Argentina will probably rise to 
140,000 tons, this quantity being apparently already 
reserved for Peru, according to the information avail-
able. The rest will probably come from Canada and 
the United States. In May 1956 Peru concluded an 
agreement with the United States on the purchase of 
agricultural surpluses, which includes 2.5 million dol-
lars' worth of wheat (representing some 40,000 tons). 
In addition, that same month the United States decided 
to ship some 45,000 tons of wheat, barley and maize 
to Peru, as a grant, under title II of Law 480, in 
view of the effects of the drought in the south of 
Peru. To this should be added any purchases Peru 
may make under the International Wheat Agreement, 
in which it is committed to the purchase of 200,000 
tons. 
Bolivia's requirements, estimated at 80,000 tons, will 
apparently be fully covered, as in former years, by 
United States wheat, most of which is received in the 
form of grants or the value of which is used in Bolivia 
to finance programmes of mutual defence or economic 
development. Under the International Wheat Agree-
ment, Bolivia is formally committed to buy 110,000 
tons of wheat per year, an amount exceeding its ap-
parent residual needs. Paraguay, which also needs to 
import about 80,000 tons, will satisfy its requirements 
with some 30,000 tons of United States wheat, to be 
bought in accordance with the agreement signed with 
the United States in May 1956, plus 20,000 tons of 
Uruguayan wheat, the purchase of which was nego-
tiated in February 1956. The remaining 30,000 tons 
will probably be supplied by imports of wheat from 
Argentina. 
According to the foregoing estimates, Argentina's 
exports of wheat to its traditional Latin American 
markets will be somewhere between 1,100,000 and 
1,150,000 tons in 1956, leaving a balance of more or 
less the same quantity for export to other areas. 
Uruguayan exports to neighbouring countries will 
amount to some 340,000 tons, Uruguay having appar-
ently already arranged for the disposal of all its 
exportable wheat for 1956, an estimated 475,000 tons. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that since this trade 
among the southern countries of South America is 
conducted mainly or exclusively through official bodies, 
the wheat trade has not been substantially affected by 
the alterations in the exchange control regulations of 
Argentina and Chile. Nevertheless, there is a clear 
tendency in those countries, at least with regard to 
the contractual price for wheat, to bring their wheat 
trade into line with conditions and prices on the inter-
national market, thus discontinuing the practice, fol-
lowed for many years in inter-Latin-American trade, 
of charging for wheat and other commodities prices 
differing from those on the international market or 
those agreed upon in negotiations with other countries 
outside the area. 
5. COTTON 
Judging from export figures, trade in cotton among 
the countries of South America, after undergoing a 
sharp decline in 1954 as compared with the high volume 
exported in 1953, has again shown a very marked 
increase in 1955, when it reached its peak level (see 
table 27).49 
Apart from these general fluctuations, statistics reveal 
several important changes in 1954, which are even more 
marked in 1955, as compared with the main trends in 
former years, and two of which are worth particular 
mention. The first is the falling-off in Colombian im-
ports, and the second the supplanting of Paraguay by 
Brazil as the main supplier of Uruguay. 
In the post-war years Colombia had become an im-
portant market for Latin American cotton, and espe-
cially for cotton from Peru, though it also made sub-
stantial purchases of Mexican cotton. It was the 
chief importing country in Latin America and, after 
Chile and Uruguay, the most important Latin American 
market for the region's cotton. Colombian imports have, 
however, decreased in the last two years, particularly 
those from the countries of the region, which were 
reduced to practically nothing in 1955. This is un-
doubtedly due to the increase in domestic production, 
which has been even more marked than the equally 
rapid rise in consumption and has consequently reduced 
import needs. Except for cotton of lengths and qualities 
of staple that are not produced in the country, the 
Colombian textile industry can obtain its supply of 
cotton from domestic production. 
This decrease in total Colombian imports affected 
Colombia's purchases in Latin America only; it con-
tinued to import the same quantity of cotton from the 
United States. There can be no doubt that a contri-
butory factor in 1955 was constituted by the purchasing 
facilities granted by the United States under the agree-
ment signed with Colombia in June, which provided 
for the sale of 1,900 tons of United States surplus 
cotton valued at 1.6 million dollars (see table 12). 
With regard to imports effected by Uruguay, it 
should noted that this country was almost the sole 
market in Latin America for Paraguayan cotton, most 
of which has since the war been exported to areas 
outside the region (see table 27). In 1954 and 1955, 
Uruguayan cotton imports, although supplemented by 
regular and increasing purchases of Peruvian cotton, 
49 The development indicated, however, differs considerably 
from that reflected in the import figures (see table 28). 
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Table 27 
SOUTH AMERICA: COTTON EXPORTS TO SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
Countries of origin 
and destination 
1953 1954 1955 
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Argentina, exports to: 
Latin America» 1,062 684 — — — — 
All countries 61,444 39,729 27,512 18,918 2,400 1,520 
Brazil, exports to: 
Chile 1,232 1,200 3,374 2,872 3,478 2,859 
Bolivia — — 562 476 499 426 
Uruguay 1,843 1,558 4,303 3,621 5,681 4,790 
Latin America1» 3,985 3,280 10,215 8,173 10,659 8,635 
All countries 139,515 107,510 309,486 223,116 175,706 131,365 
Peru, exports to: 
Argentina 2,607 2,255 1,961 1,396 9,266 6,928 
Bolivia 908 658 — — — — 
Chile 14,727 10,535 8,765 6,741 19,261 15,507 
Uruguay 1,183 1,009 680 545 806 670 
Colombia 10,379 7,261 2,561 1,933 226 184 
Latin Americac 30,161 21,981 14,140 10,745 30,183 23,433 
All countries 88,545 64,898 83,180 64,549 85,050 68,090 
Paraguay, exports to: 
Uruguay 2,624 994 3,100d 2,326d 10 8 
Latin America 2,677 994 3,253e 2,444e 10 8 
All countries 12,952 4,400 11,645 6,848 9,469 5,499 
TOTAL exports to: 
Latin America 37,885 26,939 27,608 21,362 40,852 32,076 
All countries 302,456 216,537 431,723 313,431 272,625 206,474 
Sources: Official statistics. 
a Argentina's cotton exports to Latin America in 1953 were more or less equally divided 
between Cuba and Ecuador. 
b Other Latin American countries to which Brazil regularly exports cotton, sometimes in 
fairly considerable quantities, are Cuba, Ecuador and Colombia; in 1955, 660 tons were also 
exported to Argentina. 
c Peru also exports fairly regularly to Ecuador, 
d Uruguayan figure for imports from Paraguay, 
e Uruguayan and Chilean figures for imports from Paraguay. 
were made chiefly from Brazil, under a bilateral agree-
ment concluded between the two countries in December 
1953. In this instrument, Uruguay undertook to author-
ize cotton imports to the value of 7 million dollars 
annually.60 
In 1954, Paraguay also concluded a modus vivendi 
with Bolivia under which Bolivian petrol and paraffin 
(kerosene) are to be bartered for Paraguayan cotton. 
The value of the goods to be bartered was originally 
set at 150,000 dollars annually, but it is understood 
that it was raised to 300,000 dollars when the agree-
ment was renewed in 1956. However, it appears that 
other Paraguayan products, such as cement, tanned 
hides, tobacco, cotton textiles, fresh fruit, etc., were 
included in this amount. 
Chile has replaced Colombia as the leading Latin 
American importer of raw cotton. Its imports in 1954 
and 1955 were drawn, to a greater extent than in 
previous years, from other Latin American countries, 
chiefly Peru, for whose cotton Chile is now the largest 
market (see table 28). Peruvian cotton of the Tanguis 
type, in addition to its length and quality, has the 
advantage in Chile of a special tariff reduction on 
50 Probably the existing arrangement between Brazil and 
Uruguay, under which Brazil engages to buy some 400,000 tons 
of Uruguayan wheat, contains a similar undertaking by Uru-
guay with regard to the purchase of Brazilian cotton. 
quantities up to 5,000 tons a year,51 and lower freight 
charges than cotton from any other source. 
In addition, Peru produces small quantities of extra 
long-staple Pima and Karnak cotton (1J4" and over), 
which have been used in Chile to replace Egyptian 
cotton when it has been difficult to import the latter 
owing to problems of prices, foreign exchange, etc. 
Apart from Peruvian cotton, Chilean manufacturers 
seem to prefer United States and Egyptian cotton; on 
the other hand, they appear to have some objections 
to the use of Brazilian cotton, as its price is presumably 
higher than that of cotton from other sources, consider-
ing the length and other qualities of the staple. Never-
theless, Chile has tried to maintain a certain volume of 
purchases of Brazilian cotton by the allocation of part 
of its foreign exchange budget under the previous 
system or through the operation of the present State 
import monopoly,52 in order to comply with the provi-
51 This concession, which is considered exclusive because it 
is made to an adjacent country, is granted on a reciprocal 
basis. Peru allows a 50 per cent reduction on certain additional 
duties on Chilean iron and steel products. 
52 Since June 1955, Chilean imports of cotton have been made 
exclusively through the National Trade Institute (INACO). 
To judge from some comments, the reluctance of Chilean mills 
to use Brazilian cotton appears to be due, partly at least, to 
their objection to the inferior types of cotton purchased by 
INACO in Brazil. 
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Table 28 
SOUTH AMERICA: COTTON IMPORTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
Importer country 
1953 1954 1955 
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Argentina, imports from: 
Peru 2,510 6,409 2,497 4,683 674 1,251 
Latin America 2,510 6,409 2,512 4,694 674 1,251 
All countries 2,510 6,409 2,585 4,790 2,012 3,108 
Bolivia, imports from: 
Peru 1,039 1,117 . i . ... ... ... 
Latin America 1,059 1,136 
All countries 1,121 1,221 2,630 2,082 570 459 
Colombia, imports from: 
Peru 10,646 8,664 2,360 2,066 203 242 
Mexico 1,856 1,390 604 490 — — 
Latin Americab 13,020 10,429 3,575 2,942 203 242 
All countries 15,453 12,516 5,874 4,920 2,404 2,265 
Chile, imports from: 
Brazil 1,602 1,985 3,848 2,998 1,070 968 
Peru 3,770 3,555 11,871 10,989 10,224 9,324 
Latin Americaa 5,446 5,609 16,006 14,220 11,294 10,292 
All countries 12,824 13,139 29,793 27,350 16,429 15,395 
Ecuador, imports from: 
Peru 471 415 173 149 
Latin Americac 967 844 1,061 828 ... ... 
All countries 2,687 2,202 1,380 1,035 984d 801d 
Uruguay, imports f rom: 
Brazil 1,802 1,438 4,646 3,868 6,995 5,505 
Paraguay 5,529 3,970 3,100 2,326 50 43 
Peru 1,154 1,126 637 650 845 848 
Latin America 8,485 6,534 8,383 6,844 7,890 6,396 
All countries 8,654 6,662 8,777 7,174 8,009 
Venezuela, imports from: 
Brazil 85 35 157 102 213 126 
Latin Americae 94 37 157 102 381 222 
All countries 534 149 1,118 362 1,915 618 
Sources: Official statistics. 
a Chile also imported a small quantity from Paraguay in 1954, and from Mexico in 1953 
and 1954. 
b The remaining imports from Latin America were from Paraguay and Haiti in 1953 and 
from Brazil in 1954. 
c Ecuadorian statistics show imports from Argentina in 1953, and from Chile in 1954. 
d Figures for nine months. 
e Venezuela is shown as having imported cotton from Uruguay in 1955. 
sions of the additional protocol of 1947 and to facilitate 
the sale in Brazil of Chilean products, particularly 
nitrates. Chile might offer a wider market for Brazilian 
cotton if the latter were sold in conditions better en-
abling it to compete with cotton from other sources. 
Apart from the purchases of Brazilian cotton by 
Chile and Uruguay, most of the other South American 
deficit countries import considerable quantities of 
Peruvian but little or no Brazilian cotton (see tables 
27 and 28). This is because most of the countries 
concerned are cotton producers and most of their 
production is short- or medium- staple cotton, more or 
less similar to that produced in Brazil. In consequence, 
they wish to obtain longer-staple cotton of the Peruvian 
type, of which domestic supplies are insufficient. A typ-
ical example is provided by Argentina, which is 
self-sufficient in short-staple cotton, and even exports 
it, in some years on a substantial scale, but does not 
produce long-staple cotton and so has to import about 
2,500 tons annually, usually from Peru and sometimes 
from Egypt. Both Colombia and Ecuador now seem to 
be in a similar position. 
It should be noted that Mexico has exported cotton 
to certain South American countries. The amounts 
involved are small, but are tending to increase. 
The level of inter-Latin-American trade in cotton 
may possibly be adversely affected in 1956 by various 
factors. In the first place there will probably be a 
heavy increase in purchases of United States cotton as a 
result of the United States farm surplus disposal policy. 
Cotton is included in three agreements concluded in late 
1955 and early 1956 with the following Latin American 
7 4 P a r i II. Main b a c k g r o u n d d o c u m e n t s 
countr ies : Colombia (7,800 tons) , Chile (6,800 tons) 
and Ecuador (1,130 tons) (see table 12). Fur thermore , 
the Uni ted States Government has of fered fo r sale, 
on a competitive basis, all the Upland cotton held by 
the Commodity Credit Corporat ion (CCC) . 5 3 The sale 
of Uni ted States Upland cotton at low prices affects 
Brazilian and possibly Peruv ian cotton.54 Fol lowing the 
sale by the Uni ted States in early 1956 of one million 
bales of short-staple cotton held by the CCC, Brazil 
was obliged to reduce the expor t price f o r its cotton 
in J a n u a r y 1956 and raise f r o m 5 to 12 per cent the 
discount it made on the N e w York prices f o r fu tu re s 
of similar cottons, al though the increased discount was 
only fo r sales against convertible currencies or cur-
rencies of limited convertibility.55 Fur the rmore , under 
the Brazilian exchange system and fo r the purposes 
of the auctioning of fore ign exchange, cotton was t rans-
fe r red in M a y 1955 f r o m category I I to category I I I , 
which meant an increase in the bonus received by 
exporters . Wi th the r e f o r m of May 1956, category I I I 
became category I I , but the corresponding bonus re-
mained unchanged. 
E x p o r t s of Brazilian cotton in 1956 may also be 
curtailed by a reduction of the exportable surplus. 
The heavy rains in the southern cot ton-growing areas 
reduced the 1955/56 harvest and also affected its 
quality. In May 1956 the fore ign t rade department 
( C A C E X ) of the Bank of Brazil temporari ly suspended 
cotton exports until it could be determined whether 
stocks were sufficient to meet domestic needs. 
W i t h the purchases of Uni ted States cotton stipulated 
in the agreements mentioned, in addition to the direct 
dollar purchases to be effected, it is possible that Colom-
bia and Ecuador will be able to sa t is fy all their re-
quirements of imported cotton in 1956. Owing to the 
loss of par t of its 1955/56 harvest, Colombia will 
have a deficit of about 8,000 to 9,000 tons in 1956. 
Chile has already bought over 6,600 tons of Uni ted 
States cotton in the course of the year—4,500 tons 
under the agreement and 2,100 in the f o r m of direct 
dollar purchases.5 6 I n addition, in late 1955 and early 
1956 I N A C O bought 14,650 tons of Peruvian , 4,040 
tons of Brazilian, 972 tons of Mexican and 350 tons 
53 It is estimated that the CCC held about 10 million bales 
(about 2.3 million tons) of Upland cotton on 10 July 1956, 
most of it short-staple (15/16" to 1"). 
54 The best-quality and longest-fibre United States Upland 
cotton can compete with the Peruvian Tanguis, especially if 
the prices and conditions of sale are sufficiently attractive. Of 
United States cotton exports between 1 August 1955 and 31 May 
1956 (about 420,000 tons), 47 per cent consisted of fibres under 
1" in length, 43 per cent of fibres in the range from 1" to 
1-3/32", and 10 per cent of fibres of 1-1/8" and over. The 
average length of the Peruvian Tanguis type is 1-3/16", and of 
the Brazilian Paulista No. 5, 1". 
55 Up to October 1955 Paulista No. 5 (the basic Brazilian 
variety) was exported at prices at par with prices for futures 
on the New York market in the nearest month for United 
States Middling 15/16" cotton (less freight and insurance from 
Brazilian ports to New York). From October 1955 to Octo-
ber 1956, export permits for Brazilian cotton were granted at 
a price 5 per cent below the New York quotations. 56 According to information received, the United States cot-
ton bought by Chile through INACO is of the Middling, Strict 
Middling and Good Middling types, in the range from 1-1/16" 
to 1-1/8", i.e. medium- and long-staple cotton of better than 
average quality. The price of cotton purchased under the agree-
ment averaged 0.3372 dollars c.i.f. per pound. 
of Egypt ian cotton, a total of ra ther more than 26,600 
tons, some of which really corresponds to 1955, al-
though it is not shown in the import statistics f o r 
that year. W i t h these purchases, plus a balance of 
2,300 tons of Uni t ed States cotton still to be purchased 
under the agreement, the needs of the Chilean textile 
industry will probably be satisfied in 1956. 
N o m a j o r changes are expected in the cotton imports 
of U r u g u a y or Argent ina in 1956, except possibly 
a modification due to an increased shortage of better-
quality cotton in Argent ina, caused by the effect of 
adverse weather conditions on the quanti ty and quality 
of the Argent ine cotton harvest in 1955/56. 
ANNEX 
Brazilian cotton and the Chilean market 
Chile is now the leading Latin-American importer of cotton. 
In order to work at full capacity, the Chilean cotton textile 
industry would require annual imports of about 30,000 tons. 
However, the restrictions imposed by the foreign exchange 
budget in previous years limited imports to an annual average 
of something under 20,000 tons during the past six years. The 
new exchange regulations of April 1956 eliminated such restric-
tions. It is expected that during the next three or four years, 
once the contraction of demand at present produced by anti-
inflationary measures has disappeared, the textile industry will 
require about 26,000 tons of cotton a year. 
As part of cotton import policy, the Chilean authorities have 
for several years been attempting to shift some purchases to the 
Brazilian market, to bring imports of Brazilian cotton to the 
level provided for in the additional protocol of 194757 and to 
avoid expenditure in convertible currencies by making use of 
the unit of account stipulated in the payments agreement be-
tween Chile and Brazil. Furthermore, as Brazil has often had 
substantial adverse balances on this account during the last 
five-year period, and this tends to depress the level of trade, 
exports of Brazilian cotton to Chile may help to balance trade 
between the two countries without need for restricting the 
purchases of the debtor country. 
In spite of these endeavours, Chilean cotton requirements 
have been met by Peruvian, United States and Egyptian cot-
ton to a far greater extent than by the Brazilian product. On 
the average during the past six years, Brazilian cotton has 
accounted for only 10 per cent of Chile's total cotton imports, 
i.e., under 2,000 tons a year. 
The main obstacle to a substantial flow of Brazilian cotton 
to Chile seems to be that of price. As a result of Brazil's main-
tenance of over-valued rates of exchange, coupled with the 
effect of inflation on production costs, Brazilian cotton has 
often been quoted at prices above the competitive level; more-
over, the prices of Brazilian cotton on the Chilean market are 
increased by heavier freight charges than those paid for Peru-
vian or United States cotton. Because of these and other 
factors, Brazilian cotton was, and to a certain extent still is, 
at a competitive disadvantage on the Chilean market as com-
pared with cotton from other sources. Furthermore, the main-
tenance in Chile for many years of a preferential exchange 
régime for cotton imports encouraged the industry to import 
57 By an exchange of notes dated July 1947 and annexed to 
the additional protocol to the 1943 Trade and Navigation 
Treaty between Brazil and Chile quotas, Chile undertook to 
impose no restrictions (licences, prohibitions, etc.) on the an-
nual importation of specified quantities of certain Brazilian 
products, including 5,000 tons of cotton. 
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better-quality cotton than would have been bought if the price 
of the foreign exchange had been realistic.58 
The adoption of official measures by Chile to secure the im-
portation of larger quantities of Brazilian cotton has more 
than once met with objections on the part of Chilean manu-
facturers, based apparently on certain differences in the charac-
teristics of Brazilian as compared with Peruvian and United 
States cotton. Such differences can be, and ordinarily are, off-
set by price. The differences must be stated in quantitative 
terms to determine at least approximately their relative impor-
tance. 
The bulk of Brazil's cotton production and exports consists 
of Paulista cotton, the basic type being No. 5, the average 
length of which is 25 millimetres or 31/32" to 1", whereas the 
average length of Peruvian Tanguis is 30 millimetres (1-3/15"), 
and that of United States Upland is for the most part 26 to 
28 millimetres (1" to 1-1/16"). Most Brazilian cotton is there-
fore short-, Peruvian long-, and United States medium-staple. 
If classified by grade, taking into account colour, uniformity 
of length, strength, impurities, etc., Paulista No. 5 cotton would 
be a grade lower than the basic United States type, Middling, 
and would be equivalent to Strict Low Middling, whereas Tan-
guis is of higher grade.59 According to some Chilean manu-
facturers, in the case of both Peruvian and United States cot-
ton there is a 10 per cent waste as a result of impurities and 
irregularity in length, as against 13 per cent in the case of 
Brazilian cotton. In addition to the larger wastage, less yarn 
is produced when shorter-staple cotton is used because more 
twist is required with short-staple cotton than with longer-
staple to produce yarn of the same strength. Assuming that the 
loss due to lower output is about 2 per cent if Brazilian cotton 
is used instead of the United States variety, the use of the 
former instead of the latter would mean an increase of about 
5 per cent in costs. 
It may be assumed that if the c.i.f. price of Brazilian cotton 
offset this difference, there would be no economic obstacles to 
its use. However, as noted above, this is not the situation on 
the Chilean market. This would appear to be the main reason 
for the attitude of Chilean manufacturers in this connexion.60 
From the technical point of view, there appears to be no 
major obstacle to the use of Brazilian cotton in the Chilean 
textile industry. According to the information available, 90 per 
cent of the yarns produced in Chile are of counts lower than 30, 
most of them being from 8 to 14, or in any case less than 20. 
For yarns of these counts it is not only possible but customary 
to use cotton similar to the Brazilian Paulista type, which is 
apparently used in Brazil for yarns of much higher counts. 
Paulista No. 5 is chiefly used in yarn for sheeting, calico, 
gabardine, sailcloth, ticking, towels etc.; the better grade 
No. 4 1/2 is used for printed goods and poplins, and No. 6, 
which is of lower grade, is used for sacking, Osnaburg etc.61 
58 This preferential régime was abolished in April 1956, 
when the new Chilean exchange regulations were introduced. 
At present Brazilian cotton is at an advantage, as the agree-
ment-dollar with Brazil is quoted at a lower rate than the 
United States dollar on the Chilean exchange market, but this 
is still not enough to offset the higher price asked by Brazilian 
exporters. 
59 Mexican cotton, which is of the United States Upland 
variety, is equivalent to Strict Middling, which is better than 
Middling, and is in the 1-1/16" to 1-1/32" range. 
60 There are also fairly substantial fluctuations in the quality 
and length of the Brazilian cotton available for export from 
year to year, as the quality of the cotton grown is affected by 
adverse weather conditions to a much greater extent than is 
Peruvian or United States cotton. Thus, in 1954, 62 per cent 
of the production of Paulista cotton consisted of grades 4/5 
to 5/6, with 32 per cent of grade 5, and in 1955, 70 per cent of 
the production consisted of grades 5/6 to 6/7 (lower quality), 
only 13 per cent being of grade 5. 61 Some of the tables in Labour Productivity of the Cotton 
Textile Industry in Five Latin American Countries (E/2833, 
Annex), pp. 138 and 215, appear to indicate that the type of 
cotton utilizable for 30-count yarns is Middling or Strict 
Consequently, most of the yarns and fabrics produced in Chile 
could be manufactured from Brazilian cotton if it were offered 
at a price and on terms which would offset the lower factory 
yield that would result if it was substituted for Peruvian and 
United States cotton. There would also have to be some assur-
ance of a normal and regular supply at competitive prices 
and of reasonably uniform quality. 
Textile mills are planned and built to use certain types of 
cotton, and as most of the cotton employed by the Chilean in-
dustry in the past has been of types different from that of the 
Brazilian product, the use of this latter, in mills which have 
not hitherto utilized it, would normally require some reorganiza-
tion of the plant, in particular more pickers to clean the cotton, 
in order to maintain normal feeding, and adjustments of the 
distance between cylinders to adapt them to shorter-staple 
cotton. It is estimated that in order to do this production in the 
plant would have to be suspended for about three days. 
6 . T I M B E R 
T h e r e was a substantial increase in the volume and 
value of in ter-South-American trade in t imber between 
1953 and 1955. T h e volume increased by almost 45 
per cent, and the value doubled, more than making 
u p fo r the decline since 1951. However , the situation 
in the period under consideration was not the same in 
each of the three countries—Brazil , Chile and P a r a -
guay—whose exports together account fo r almost all 
South American t imber exports . While Brazilian t imber 
expor ts fell in volume and value f r o m 1953 to 1954 
and then rose substantially f r o m 1954 to 1955, Chilean 
exports , a f t e r r ising f r o m 1953 to 1954, fell in volume, 
al though not in value, f r o m 1954 to 1955; Paraguayan 
exports , on the other hand, increased in volume and 
value in thie two years und-er consideration (see 
table 29) . 
Almost all the t imber exported to Lat in American 
countries is imported by Argent ina and Uruguay , a 
situation that has become more marked recently as 
the purchases of t imber f r o m Lat in American sources 
former ly made by Bolivia, P e r u and Venezuela have 
almost ceased, although the two countries first men-
tioned are maintaining the level of the imports they 
have traditionally maintained f r o m countries outside 
the region. I n view of the importance of the Argent ine 
market , which absorbs about 80 per cent ( in 1955 
almost 90 per cent) of the t imber exported to Lat in 
America, the fluctuations mentioned can be explained 
largely by developments in the market in question and 
Argen t ina ' s t rade relations with the countries f r o m 
which it imports t imber. 
In the first place it should be noted that the decline 
which occurred in 1953-1954 in Argent ina ' s t imber im-
por ts f r o m Brazil, traditionally its largest supplier,62 
was the continuation of a process which started in 
1948. T h e decline was caused by an increase in the 
price of Brazilian pine over the price of European 
spruce and the purchases of this latter by I A P I and 
other official Argent ine organizat ions in European 
countries. I n some years a contr ibuting cause was the 
decline in the purchasing power of Argent ine wheat in 
Middling of 1" to 1-1/16" in length etc. For yarns of counts 
lower than 18, lower-grade and shorter-staple cotton can be 
used. For higher-count yarns, the quality must be better and 
the length greater. 
62 These imports consist for the most part of white or South 
American pine in the form of planks and boards. 
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Table 29 
SOUTH AMERICA: TIMBER EXPORTS* 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
Countries of origin 
and destination 
1953 1954 1955 
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
Brazil, exports to: 
Argentina 245,994 16,705 176,828 13,506 424,639 35,033 
Uruguay 73,966 6,595 114,291 9,093 92,145 7,621 
Latin America*» 321,271 23,482 292,690 22,703 516,784 42,654 
All countries 619,724 46,214 563,600 42,796 785,792 64,430 
Chile, exports to: 
Argentina 76,667 8,557 120,758 14,698 113,004 16,630 
Peru 1,436 111 268 27 295 41 
Latin America0 78,423 8,702 121,139 14,750 113,440 16,691 
All countries 92,289 9,539 124,293 15,015 115,527 16,896 
Paraguay, exports to: 
Argentina 145,768 3,865 181,026* 12,317* 170,119 12,233 
Uruguay 28,028 496 8,222E 1,187* 15,320 805 
Latin America 173,796 4,361 182,773 11,138 185,439 13,038 
All countries 173,849 4,362 182,773 11,138 185,439 13,038 
Other countries,f exports to: 
Latin America 486 4 4,787 481 6,914 689 
All countries 20,023 1,421 37,741 3,922 60,073 2,686 
TOTAL, exports to: 
Argentina? 468,429 29,127 479,681 40,890 711,712 64,494 
Uruguay 101,994 7,091 122,513 10,280 107,465 8,426 
Latin America 573,976 36,549 601,389 49,072 822,577 73,072 
All countries 905,885 61,536 908,407 72,871 1,146,831 97,050 
Source: Official statistics. 
a Comprising wood in the round or simply worked, posts, railway sleepers, piling and pro-
cessed timber. 
b Including exports to Cuba in 1953 to 1954. 
c Including small exports to Bolivia, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
d Data refer to Argentine imports of Paraguayan lumber. 
e Data refer to Uruguayan imports of Paraguayan lumber. 
f Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and small quantities from Bolivia and Venezuela. 
g Including exports from Peru to Argentina in 1954 and 1955. 
terms of Brazilian pine, which, combined with other 
factors, caused periodic restrictions of the permits 
issued by the Central Bank of Argentina for the 
importation of Brazilian timber. Furthermore, sales 
of Brazilian timber to Argentina are made under an-
nual agreements, the renewal of which is sometimes 
delayed for months, sales being virtually suspended 
in the meantime. The intervention of the Argentine 
Government agencies which had been granted a mono-
poly of purchases of Brazilian pine appears also to 
have created some difficulties which hampered the 
normal development of the trade. In the early months 
of 1954 these difficulties became acute, and it was 
impossible to solve them until June of that year, 
when a timber protocol was signed by the Brazilian 
National Pine Institute and DINIE-CIFEN, the Ar-
gentine official agency acting as the sole importer and 
distributor of Brazilian pine in Argentina. Under the 
protocol, and in accordance with the new schedules of 
commodities then approved (appended to the trade 
agreement which had been in force between the two 
countries since 1953), provision was made for exports 
of Brazilian pine to Argentina of up to 250,000 square 
feet (approximately 300,000 tons) in 1954; of the 
timber to be exported approximately 68 per cent was 
to be first and second class, 29 per cent third class 
and 3 per cent fourth class, the qualities, dimensions 
and prices of the timber to be delivered, and other 
appropriate specifications, being indicated in the pro-
tocol. The prices agreed upon in 1954 (varying accord-
ing to the quality, place of origin or shipment and 
length of the timber) ranged from eighty-eight dollars 
f.o.b. per 1,000 square feet of first- and second-class 
pine (80 and 20 per cent respectively) and seventy-
three dollars for third-class timber shipped from Alto 
Parana, to 120 dollars for long first- and second-class 
timber and 105 dollars for third-class timber from the 
Atlantic coast area. 
However, in view of the date at which the protocol 
was signed, its full effect was not felt, or at least 
was not shown in the statistics, until 1955. In that 
year sales of Brazilian timber to Argentina more than 
doubled in both volume and value. In accordance with 
the provisions of the 1954 protocol, another agreement 
was concluded in 1955 between the National Pine 
Institute and DINIE-CIFEN, under which the latter 
bought 200 million square feet of Brazilian pine (about 
240,000 tons) for delivery in 1955, which were pos-
sibly added to large deliveries still outstanding under 
the 1954 agreement. 
On the other hand, there was an increase of over 
50 per cent in the volume and value of exports of 
2. Commodity trade in 1 9 5 4 / 5 5 ; situation and prospects in 1956 77 
Chilean timber to Argentina between 1953 and 1954, 
and a decrease in volume but not in value in 1955. 
Argentina has become almost the only external market 
for Chilean timber, since Chile's sales to other Latin 
American countries, chiefly Peru, and to other markets 
outside Latin America have recently declined sharply, 
as a result of the rise in prices caused by inflation and 
over-valuation of the Chilean peso. With regard to 
the composition of these exports, mention must be 
made of the increasing proportion of soft woods (co-
nifers), principally pine (araucaria, insignis), larch 
and mañío. This proportion rose from an average of 
42 per cent in 1950-54 to 50 per cent in 1954 and 
1955.63 The remainder, consisting of hard and semi-
hard woods, includes largely rauli, laurel, coigüe, tepa, 
and oak. 
The notable increase in exports of Chilean timber 
to Argentina in 1954 was largely due to the latter 
country's difficulties in importing Brazilian timber. 
Another contributing factor was the Argentine-Chilean 
trade agreement concluded in February 1954.64 The 
schedule of Chilean products which could be exported 
to Argentina without an exchange permit included 
timber to an estimated value of 8 million dollars for 
the first year of the agreement, a figure that was 
far exceeded, as timber exports in 1954 totalled ap-
proximately 15 million dollars. In view of that fact, 
the estimated value of such exports for the second 
year of the agreement was raised to 20.5 million dollars. 
However, although the total value of exports in 1955, 
according to the Chilean statistics, was nearly 17 
million dollars (the volume being slightly less than 
in 1954), the position of Chilean timber on the Argen-
tine market changed during the year. This change was 
due to the substantial rise in prices which began in 
mid-1954 and was accentuated in 1955 with the accelera-
tion of the rate of inflation, the expansion of domestic 
consumption and the unfavourable exchange rates ap-
plicable to timber, as well as to the larger volume of 
timber from other sources, particularly Brazil, available 
on the Argentine market. As a result, Chilean exports, 
which had been very high in the first quarter of 1955, 
began to decline, particularly in the second half of 
the year, and were very low in the last quarter. After 
the Argentine devaluation in late October 1955, exports 
ceased almost entirely, although only temporarily, as 
the improvement early in 1956 in the rate of exchange 
applicable to sales of Chilean lumber abroad resulted 
in a recovery of exports to Argentina. 
Paraguayan timber exports, after declining for a 
number of years owing to the adverse influence of 
high prices,65 showed a slight recovery after 1953, 
63 The bulk of Chilean conifer production, particularly arau-
caria, pine and mañío, is exported. 
64 Another factor encouraging the Chilean-Argentine trade in 
timber may have been the fact that it was in the hands of pri-
vate enterprise, as, at the request of the Chilean authorities, 
the Argentine Government waived regulations under which im-
ports of Chilean timber were to be made through DINIE-
CIFEN, as was the case with imports of Brazilian and Euro-
pean timber. 
65 About 60 per cent of Paraguayan timber exports consist 
of cedarwood, which was particularly affected by high prices, 
as it can be replaced in the Argentine and Uruguayan markets 
by timber from other sources. On the other hand, exports of 
Paraguayan hard woods declined much less because they face 
comparatively little competition. 
when the effect of that factor weakened and a stimulus 
was afforded by the Paraguay-Argentina Economic 
Union Agreement of August 1953 which provided 
for the importation of Paraguayan timber to the value 
of 11 million dollars out of the total of 15 million 
dollars' worth of commodities to be imported under 
the Agreement. Argentina now absorbs almost all 
Paraguay's exports of timber, while Paraguay's exports 
to Uruguay have continued to fall. In 1954 and 1955 
Argentina was virtually the only foreign market for 
Paraguayan timber, as it was for Chilean timber (see 
table 29). It also appears that by an exchange of 
notes, Argentina and Paraguay concluded an agreement 
valid from 1 June 1955 to 31 May 1956, providing for 
the delivery to Paraguay of 7.2 million dollars' worth 
of Argentine wheat and the shipment of 15 million 
dollars' worth of Paraguayan timber to Argentina. 
Provision was also made for the importation of 
considerable quantities of timber under the Economic 
Union Agreement concluded between Argentina and 
Bolivia in September 1954. Among the Bolivian prod-
ucts whose export to Argentina was to be facilitated 
by both countries were hardwood railway sleepers 
(350,000 dollars), wood in the round (350,000 dollars) 
and sawn timber (300,000 dollars). In June 1955, when 
new schedules were drawn up under the Agreement, 
provision was made for sleepers to the value of 1 mil-
lion dollars, wood in the round and beams to the value 
of 400,000 dollars and sawn timber to the value of 
300,000 dollars. It would appear, however, that trade 
did not reach the stipulated levels, as, according to 
the available statistics, Argentine imports of Bolivian 
timber have been very small in the past two years. 
It is understood that, in order to enable Bolivia to 
buy Argentine goods, the Argentine railways con-
tracted mass purchases of harwood railway sleepers 
from Bolivia, but that, owing to difficulties in regard 
to mechanization and transport, Bolivia was able to 
deliver only a small part of the timber contracted for. 
Imports of timber by Uruguay, which is, after 
Argentina, the only South American market of any 
size for timber produced in the region, have reached 
higher levels than usual. At the same time there has 
been a marked concentration of purchases in Brazil, 
which has become almost the sole supplier of the 
Uruguayan timber market. One reason for this was 
the Paraguayan-Argentine Agreement of 1953, which 
led Paraguay, formerly a considerable exporter of 
timber to Uruguay, to concentrate its sales on Argen-
tina's market. In addition, the sale of Brazilian lumber 
has been facilitated by arrangements enabling Uruguay 
to market the greater part of its exportable surplus of 
wheat in Brazil. Brazilian timber is used in Uruguay 
for building and even carpentry, for which other 
countries use semi-hard woods. 
The devaluation of the Argentine peso as a result 
of the exchange reform of late October 1955 affected 
the sale to Argentina of timber from neighbouring 
countries. The countries concerned had to take measures 
to offset the effect of that devaluation and thus accept 
a fall in their export prices, which had been steadily 
rising because of the increase in domestic production 
costs. 
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In February 1956 Brazil increased the cruzeiro value 
of foreign exchange obtained from timber exports by 
over 50 per cent. Later, under the regulations intro-
duced in May, timber exports were classified, for the 
purposes of negotiating foreign currency earnings, 
in category III66 in the case of wood in the rough 
or sawn boards or planks, and in category IV67 in 
the case of processed wood (plywood, veneer, boxes, 
etc.). 
In January 1956 Paraguay raised by nearly 50 
per cent the return in guaraníes on timber exports. 
In Bolivia it was established in February that 40 per 
cent of foreign exchange earnings from timber exports 
might be used for imports of any kind and 40 per 
cent might be sold on the free market (provided the 
funds were used to import certain capital goods) while 
the remaining 20 per cent should be sold at the official 
rates. Early in the year Chile issued special regulations 
which in practice doubled the effective return rate for 
timber exports; the rate was further improved with 
the introduction of the free exchange market and the 
devaluation of the Chilean peso in relation to the 
Argentine-Chilean agreement-dollar. 
The prospects of exporting timber from the countries 
mentioned to the two South American markets, Argen-
tina and Uruguay, depend primarily on the price, 
because the demand for and consumption of timber are 
highly sensitive to price changes,68 and because South 
American timber has to meet European competition 
in both the markets mentioned, particularly in the 
case of soft wood. The Argentine market is now open 
without restriction to imports of Chilean and Para-
guayan timber of all kinds and to imports of Brazilian 
pine. Furthermore, these imports, which are made 
through the official market, were handed over to private 
enterprise, when the State monopoly held by DINIE-
CIFEN was abolished in June of this year. The general 
tendency in Argentine trade policy is to negotiate on 
the basis of world prices. Finally, it is probable that 
imports from neighbouring countries have already 
reached a maximum. In this connexion, it is thought 
in some circles in Argentina that if any of the neigh-
bouring nations increases its exports to that country, 
it will be at the expense of one of the others. 
For all these reasons, the Argentine timber market 
is highly competitive. If South American white pine 
from Brazil were offered at competitive prices it could 
be sold in Argentina without great difficulty, as it is 
preferred on account of its quality, length and clas-
sification.69 When supply conditions on the Argentine 
market are normal, buyers cannot readily be found for 
Chilean soft woods, particularly in competition with 
Brazilian pine, partly because of the relatively high 
cost of the maritime freight.70 On the other hand, 
66 In this category 55 cruzeiros are allowed to the dollar for 
exports to hard-currency or limited-convertibility areas, and 
52.77 cruzeiros to the dollar for exports to agreement areas. 
67 67 and 64.22 cruzeiros respectively. 
68 As appears to be shown by recent FAO studies. 
69 In Argentina, European spruce is competitive only with 
the third and fourth classes of Brazilian pine. 
70 Freight charges for Chilean timber-—45 dollars per 1,000 
square feet from Corral to Buenos Aires (as against approxi-
mately 34 dollars for timber from Brazil or Europe)—were 
increased during the year as a result of the accentuation of the 
Argentina provides a more or less permanent market 
for Chilean semi-hard woods (rauli, laurel, coigüe, tepa, 
oak, etc.), with some competition from Paraguayan 
woods, although timber from the two sources is gen-
erally used for different purposes. In addition, the 
export of Chilean woods, both to Argentina and other 
South American countries, has been encouraged by 
the devaluation of the Chilean peso with the introduc-
tion of the free exchange market, to which may be 
added the effects of free imports of certain equipment.71 
In view of the enhanced prospects of offering Chilean 
timber at competitive prices, it may be expected that 
exports to markets such as Peru, which had dwindled 
owing to the unduly high prices, may be resumed. 
7. COPPER 
In 1955, there was a revival of the inter-South-
American trade in copper after several years of decline. 
This was mainly due to the doubling of the volume 
of Chilean copper exports to Argentina between 1954 
and 1955, and, to a lesser degree, to the resumption of 
Peruvian copper exports to Argentina. On the other 
hand, exports to Brazil, which was an even more im-
portant market for Latin American copper than Argen-
tina, continued the downard trend which began in 
1950. At least, foreign trade statistics for 1954 and 
1955 show quite low figures for those exports (see 
table 30). 
During the post-war years, direct sales of Chilean 
copper to Brazil consisted mainly of electrolytic copper, 
of which Chile was the principal Brazilian supplier, but 
since 1950 Brazil has gradually shifted its purchases of 
electrolytic copper to countries outside the region. One 
reason for this lies in the Chilean regulations under 
which exports of copper produced by the large mining 
companies may only be authorized against payment in 
dollars.72 Nevertheless, the shift is less than is sug-
gested by the statistics, as a proportion of Brazil's im-
ports of electrolytic copper from the United States and 
Germany consists in fact of copper produced by the 
smaller Chilean companies. This copper is sent to 
Tacoma (United States) and Hamburg (Germany) to 
be refined and is then shipped to Brazil, which pays 
Chile for it in agreement-dollars. According to the 
statistics of the Chilean Central Bank, Brazil's pay-
ments to Chile under this head were about 2 8 5 , 0 0 0 
dollars in 1954 and 3.73 million dollars in 1955. 
customary disequilibrium in the cargoes carried between the 
Atlantic and the Pacific via the Straits of Magellan; the ag-
gravation was caused by the fall in Argentine exports to Chile. 
The provisions of the Argentine-Chilean trade agreement, un-
der which cargoes are to be divided equally between Argentine 
and Chilean vessels appear also to have been a factor. It is 
understood that tramp steamers have offered rates as low as 
20 dollars per 1,000 square feet. 
71 However, according to information furnished by the Chil-
ean Consejo de Comercio Exterior, exports of Chilean timber 
to Argentina continued at a low level through the first half of 
1956: the value of shipments during that period was 3.1 mil-
lion dollars, which compares unfavourably with 11.9 million in 
the same period of 1955. 
72 Chile continues, however, to sell copper produced by the 
large mines for non-dollar currencies, when the use of these is 
stipulated in international agreements, which are also legally 
binding. This is true, for example, of Chilean copper sales to 
Argentina. 
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Table 30 
CHILE AND P E R U : EXPORTS OF COPPER 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
Countries of origin 
and destination 
1953 1954 1955 
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
A. Electrolytic copper in ingots 
Chile, exports to: 
Argentina — — — 2,000 1,323 
Latin America» 2,207 1,732 19 12 2,091 1,399 
All countries 70,015 54,152 114,004 75,417 107,405 83,794 
Peru, exports to: 
Argentina — — 1,749 999 500 374 
Latin America — — 1,749 999 500 374 
All countries 20,888 12,363 22,734 13,184 24,158 18,479 
B. Refined copper in ingots 
Chile, exports to: 
Argentina — — 1,000 647 — — 
Latin America1» 18 14 1,000 647 484 396 
All countries 95,251 74,344 81,008 53,169 102,923 83,646 
C. Copper in sheets and bars 
Chile, exports to: 
Argentina 5,450 5,163 4,475 3,181 8,568 7,759 
Latin America0 5,507 5,211 4,494 3,198 8,780 7,929 
All countries 6,137 5,705 4,499 3,201 9,199 8,179 
Peru, exports to: T 
Argentina 700 398 1,353 710 1,000 704 
Latin America 700 398 1,367 718 1,000 704 
All countries 700 398 2,001 1,268 4,802 3,949 
D. Manufactured or processed^-
Chile, exports to: 
Argentina 5,450 5,193 4,679 3,388 10,027 8,756 
Latin America 6,379 5,943 4,944 4,007 10,083 8,800 
All countries 6,446 5,998 7,545 5,297 13,714 11,867 
E. Totals (of the items specified above) 
Chile, exports to: 
Argentina 10,900 10,356 10,154 7,216 20,595 17,838 
Brazil 2,158 1,693 79 56 529 450 
Latin America 14,111 12,900 10,457 7,864 21,438 18,524 
All countries 177,849 140,172 207,056 138,084 233,241 187,486 
Peru, exports to: 
Argentina 700 398 3,102 1,709 1,500 1,078 
Latin America 700 398 3,116 1,717 1,500 1,078 
All countries 21,588 12,761 24,735 14,470 28,954 22,428 
GRAND TOTAL, expor t s t o : 
Argentina 11,600 10,754 13,256 8,925 22,095 18,916 
Brazil 2,158 1,693 79 56 529 450 
Latin America 14,811 13,298 13,573 9,581 22,938 19,602 
All countries 199,437 152,933 231,791 152,554 262,195 209,914 
Sources: Official statistics. 
a In 1953, as in previous years, exports of Chilean electrolytic copper to Latin America 
went almost exclusively to Brazil. 
b Exports to Latin America in 1955 went to Brazil and Uruguay. 
c Including, in addition to exports to Argentina, exports to Brazil and, in smaller quan-
tities, to other countries in the region. 
^ d According to the Chilean statistics, these exports of manufactured copper consist almost 
entirely of wire, but there is reason to believe that this item also includes wire rods or elec-
trolytic copper in rods, a semi-finished product exported from Chile to Argentina in consider-
ably larger quantities than wire proper. 
Apar t f r o m this, the 1947 Trea ty of Economic Co-
operation between Brazil and Chile, under which Chile 
agreed to authorize the expor t to Brazil of up to 1,000 
tons of copper ingots a year, while Brazil undertook 
to place no restrictions on the importat ion of 3,000 
tons of finished copper goods annually, has already been 
denounced. In consequence, Argent ina has become vir-
tually the only direct importer of Chilean and Peruvian 
copper in Lat in America, and in 1955 accounted fo r 
over 96 per cent of the volume and value of Chilean 
and Peruvian copper expor ts to Lat in American 
countries. 
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The above increase in sales of Chilean copper to 
Argentina began in 1954, although, owing to the lag 
in shipments, it was not shown in the statistics until 
1955. It is mainly to be attributed to the facilities for 
trade between the two countries afforded by the Argen-
tine-Chilean trade and payments agreement of February 
1954. Copper was included in the list of Chilean prod-
ucts which may be exported to Argentina without 
an exchange permit, the estimated value of exports 
being 17 million dollars for the first agreement year and 
22.5 million dollars for the second, equivalent in both 




(March 1954- (March 1955-
February 1955) February 1956) 
Tons Tons 
Copper in ingots 
Wire bars (electrolytic copper 
in ingots) 2,000 3,000 
Ingot bars (furnace-refined 
copper in ingots) 1,000 — 
Semi-processed copper 
Wire rods (electrolytic copper 
in rods) — 7,500 
Slabs (furnace-refined sheet 
copper) 17,000 9,500 
Processed copper 
Trolley wire 1,200 — 
4.5 mm wire 1,800 3,000 
TOTAL 23,000 23,000 
Estimated value (in thousands of 
dollars) 17,000 22,500 
In addition, schedule C-2 of the agreement (compris-
ing Chilean products which may be exported to Argen-
tina with exchange permits) includes other processed 
copper products, in particular, copper or brass tubing; 
and in the notes exchanged when the Agreement was 
concluded it was agreed that the quantities and prices 
of the copper would be specified in each sales contract, 
the transactions being conducted in dollars at world 
price levels. The "international base price" for copper 
in ingots (wire bars and ingot bars) would be the 
price of ingot copper in the United States, obtained 
by taking the average of the quotations for "electrolytic 
copper, domestic and export, f.o.b. refinery" for the 
month preceding the date on which the contracts were 
concluded, provided that prices on the United States 
domestic market were not Government-controlled, in 
which case the two parties would agree on future pro-
cedure. The surcharges and discounts accepted in trade 
publications would be applied in the case of other types 
of ingots (cakes, billets and cathodes), while the prices 
of finished and semi-finished products would be based 
on those of similar products in the world market, or, 
failing these, on the ingot price as determined above 
plus current cost of processing prevailing in the inter-
national market for such purchases. 
This formula was later modified by an exchange of 
notes dated June 1955, when it was agreed that during 
the second agreement-year the prices of the various 
copper products would be calculated on the basis of 
the average copper prices in the United States and on 
the London Stock Exchange. The United States prices 
would be determined in accordance with the previous 
formula, i.e., by averaging the quotations for "elec-
trolytic copper—domestic and export, f.o.b. refinery". 
It should be noted that in the lists for the two agree-
ment-years, the bulk of the specified quantities of 
Chilean copper to be exported to Argentina consists 
of semi-finished copper goods—wire rods and sheets— 
and that in both cases the specified quantities of copper 
ingots are offset by the specified quantities of processed 
copper products. The reason for this is that, while 
Argentina wants to import copper in primary forms 
(ingots), Chile prefers to sell it in manufactured forms, 
because both countries are interested in protecting and 
stimulating their copper processing industry. Conse-
quently, as a compromise, it was understood that ex-
ports of ingots must be offset by an equal volume of 
finished products.74 As the importation of increased 
quantities of finished products would injure certain 
industries, Argentina has decided to import Chilean 
copper where possible in semi-finished forms, i.e., 
wire rods, or electrolytic copper in rods, which is used 
to make wire, and slabs (furnace-refined sheet copper), 
which are frequently melted down again to obtain ingots 
which can then be processed.75 
Of the Chilean copper bought by Argentina during 
the first agreement-year, a balance of 6,000 tons was 
still undelivered at the beginning of the second year 
(March 1955). This balance was regarded as a carry-
over quota between the two years. For this reason, 
when the lists for the second agreement-year were 
drawn up, a quota of 23,000 tons was established on 
the understanding that this figure included 6,000 tons 
which would constitute a carry-over quota between the 
second and third agreement-years. In accordance with 
this arrangement and the composition of the quota, 
IAPI—which was responsible for importing Chilean 
copper to Argentina—concluded contracts in August 
1955 with the Chilean firms MADECO and FAMAE 
to buy 14,000 tons of copper76 valued at 15,705,800 
dollars, to be delivered by February 1956. In April 
of this year IAPI signed a contract with the Chile 
Exploration Company for the purchase of 3,000 tons 
of wire bars (electrolytic copper in ingots) and sub-
sequently with MADECO and FAMAE for the pur-
chase of the 6,000 tons of semi-processed and pro-
cessed copper77 needed to make up the quotas stipulated 
in the schedule covering the second agreement-year. 
73 It should be noted that, in the 1954 Agreement, the prac-
tice of direct bartering of copper for cattle, instituted between 
Chile and Argentina in 1951, was abandoned. See chapters VIII 
and XI of Study of the Prospects of Inter-Latin-American 
Trade (Southern Zone of the Region) (E/CN.12/304/Rev.2), 
United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1953.11.G.4. • 
74 Usually uncoated 4.5-millimetre wire. 
75 According to Chilean statistics, copper exports to Argen-
tina consist mainly of wire, a finished product (see table 30) ; 
Argentine statistics of imports from Chile give the same indica-
tion. This seems to be due to the fact that under the heading 
of wire are also included wire rods, which are electrolytic 
copper in rods of 8 millimetres and more in diameter and which 
are a semi-processed product. 
76 3,960 tons of 8-millimetre wire rods, 1,500 tons of 12.7-
millimetre wire rods, 6,650 tons of copper slabs and 1,890 tons 
of 4.5-millimetre wire. 
77 2,040 tons of wire bars, 2,850 tons of copper slabs and 
1,110 tons of 4.5-millimetre wire. 
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It has been stated that in 1956 Argentina purchased 
9,000 tons of Chilean copper. Although these purchases 
form part of the quota specified in the lists for the 
agreement-year running from March 1955 to February 
1956, they, or at least 6,000 tons of the total, are 
covered by the quota to be established for the third 
agreement-year. Consequently, although the period of 
validity of the schedules for the second agreement-
year has been extended to 31 August 1956, it would not 
be surprising if any further sales of copper to Argen-
tina against agreement-dollars were postponed until 
new schedules were drawn up, in view of the fact that 
the 6,000 tons in question constitute the carry-over 
quota which had been considered sufficient to cover 
normal trade requirements pending the establishment of 
these new schedules. 
Under normal trade conditions, the sale of Chilean 
copper to Argentina against agreement-dollars does not 
appear to involve any major difficulties. The copper 
ingots sold by Chile to Argentina for agreement-dollars 
are supplied by the large copper mining companies. 
Under a special arrangement, the Chilean Government 
has agreed that the mining companies may transfer 
agreement-dollars to it as if they were United States 
dollars and apply them to settle their financial obliga-
tions with the Chilean State in respect of production 
costs and taxes. Obviously this operation can be effected 
without fiscal loss if the agreement-dollar is maintained 
at par with the United States dollar on the Chilean 
exchange market.78 
Argentina78 is interested in Chile as a continuous 
source of copper supplies because it can obtain Chilean 
copper without using the convertible currencies that 
would be required if it were to buy from other sup-
pliers, especially at times when copper is in short 
supply, as occurs periodically. In order to obtain Chilean 
copper for agreement-dollars, Argentina has made 
certain concessions, such as paying a price differential 
and agreeing to make the purchase of copper ingots 
conditional upon the purchase of processed products, 
or alternatively accepting semi-processed products. The 
already traditional over-pricing is tending to disappear 
now that Chile is applying a more realistic export 
exchange rate; but the other factor—the condition that 
purchases of ingots must be offset by purchases of 
processed products—may become a more serious ob-
stacle since Argentina's industry is in a position to 
produce from ingots practically all the finished and 
semi-processed products of copper and other non-
ferrous metals needed by the domestic market. Thus, 
now that the multilateral agreement between Argentina 
and several European countries, the Paris Club, has 
been concluded, it is likely that, even if the price of 
Chilean copper is adjusted to the world price, con-
sumers in Argentina will prefer to buy ingots from 
78 In other words, Chile can offer copper to Argentina in 
agreement-dollars at world prices, provided the Central Bank 
guarantees a rate of exchange more or less equal to that of 
the United States dollar. 
79 Argentina's normal copper requirements are estimated at 
some 25,000 tons, not including the special demand which may 
arise as a result of the construction of the San Nicolas iron and 
steel plant. Other sources estimate the latent demand to be 
between 30,000 and 35,000 tons. Argentina's imports of copper 
and its manufactures are effected through the official market. 
the United Kingdom or from Belgium, in order to 
utilize the installed capacity of domestic industry, and 
will refrain from buying processed products. A con-
tributing factor may be the absence of a central pur-
chasing agency in Argentina, or the lack of any other 
device enabling the Government to control its copper 
imports and apply the agreements relating to the pur-
chase of a certain proportion of processed products 
with each shipment of ingots. 
Sales of Chilean copper to Uruguay are being affected 
by the Uruguayan system under which import permits 
may not be granted for goods from countries with 
which Uruguay has an unfavourable balance of trade. 
Nevertheless, sales have sometimes been made, when 
offers were submitted at competitive prices under a 
bidding procedure based on the principle that the lowest 
price offer had to be accepted, regardless of the cur-
rency to be used in payment or the origin of the 
product. 
Recently there have been a number of sales of Chilean 
processed copper to Venezuela, the products being 
shipped on Netherlands steamers which call at La 
Guaira on their way from Chile. 
Argentine imports of Peruvian copper ingots may 
continue if the conditions which stimulated them in 
1954 and 1955 still obtain. These purchases were made 
using quotas assigned to the sterling area which were 
diverted to Peru because Peruvian prices were more 
advantageous than those quoted in the United Kingdom. 
8 . IRON AND STEEL 
After reaching a peak in 1953, inter-Latin-American 
trade in iron and steel underwent a marked decline in 
1954 and 1955. In 1953 and 1954 it was virtually limited 
to exports by Chile, and in 1955 to exports by Chile 
and Brazil; the latter re-entered the export field in 
that year, although the products exported were not the 
same as those it had sold abroad before 1952. Chilean 
exports found a market in nearly all the countries of 
South America, although, as in previous years, the 
major portion went to Argentina. Brazil, on the other 
hand, emerged for the first time in 1954 and 1955 as 
a relatively heavy buyer of Chilean iron and steel 
(see tables 31 and 32). 
The marked decline in inter-Latin-American trade 
in iron and steel in 1954 and 1955 was due primarily 
to the decrease in the quantities available for export 
from Chile as a result of the great expansion of its 
domestic market. Stimulated by the boom in the con-
struction industry and by the development of the can-
ning and metallurgical industries, etc., the volume of do-
mestic iron and steel products absorbed by the Chilean 
market in 1954 and 1955 was substantially higher than 
in 1953 and larger than had been estimated. In addition, 
production during those two years fell below the planned 
level. It had been estimated in Chile that approximately 
116,000 tons of iron and steel would be available for 
exports in 1954, and on the basis of this estimate 
arrangements were made early in the year for large 
sales to various countries, notably Argentina and 
Brazil, amounting to 60,000 tons and 26,000 tons 
respectively. These commitments could not be fully 
discharged until 1955 or early 1956, the volumes actually 
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Table 31 
CHILE: EXPORTS OF IRON AND STEEL TO LATIN AMERICA1 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
Countries of destination 
1953 1954 1955 1956 
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value 
A. Pig iron 
12,086 1,012 — — — — — — 
Latin America 12,161 1,019 — — — — — — 
All countries 12,161 1,019 — — — — — — 
B. Ferro-alloys*> 
1,345 2,157 639 — — 
Peru 104 — — — 155 18 
Uruguay 104 25 231 46 79 18 
Latin America 2,559 1,390 2,388 685 234 31 
All countries 3,036 1,478 6,164 1,192 8,030 1,101 
C. Bars, shapes and stripc 
2,144 402 — — — — __ — 
Brazil — — 12,358 1,215 5,239 576 249 28 
Bolivia 138 13 •85 8 1,772 212 1,757 213 
Peru 11,651 987 3,369 256 5,177 475 3,923 485 
Uruguay 444 46 3,170 259 300 26 260 26 
3,504 294 178 16 1,493 163 — — 
Ecuador 3,136 290 1,857 161 401 39 233 26 
Latin America** . . . 21,875 2,104 21,244 1,934 14,473 1,502 7,422 876 
All countries . . . 21,875 2,104 21,303 1,938 17,521 1,757 9,831 1,128 
D. Sheet« 
. . . 54,270 13,283 31,634 6,853 17,768 2,533 4,067 650 
— — 3,320 427 4,528 649 31 7 
Bolivia 110 13 119 23 31 4 — — 
Peru 200 43 388 59 1,372 205 196 35 
Uruguay 32 5 1,016 147 __ — 8 7 
Colombia 294 60 695 133 — — 3,161 448 
Ecuador 438 92 49 8 70 9 150 20 
Latin Americaf . . . 55,344 13,496 37,221 7,650 23,769 3,400 8,037 1,215 
All countries . . . 55,344 13,496 37,221 7,650 24,795 3,514 16,732 2,256 
E. Totals 
Argentina . . . 70,851 16,042 33,791 7,492 17,768 2,533 4,067 650 
— — 15,678 1,642 9,767 1,225 280 35 
Bolivia 248 26 204 31 1,803 216 1,757 213 
Peru . . . 11,955 1,050 3,757 315 6,704 698 4,119 520 
Uruguay 655 82 4,417 452 379 39 268 28 
Colombia 3,798 354 873 149 1,493 163 3,161 448 
Ecuador 3,574 382 1,906 169 471 48 383 46 
Latin America . . . 91,939 18,009 60,853 10,269 38,476 4,933 15,459 2,092 
All countries . . . 92,436 18,097 64,688 10,780 50,346 6,372 26,563 3,384 
Sources: Chilean foreign trade statistics. For 1956, data fur-
nished by the Compañía de Acero del Pacífico. 
a In addition to the items specified in the table, Chile makes 
sporadic and generally small exports to other Latin American 
countries of tinplate (these were relatively large in 1953), wire 
rods, products made from bars, tubing and structures. It also 
exports, for considerably larger sums, by-products of the iron 
and steel industry (coal oils and coke breeze) to Argentina, 
b Mainly ferromanganese and smaller quantities of ferro-
exported having amounted to only 54,224 tons in 1954 
and 42,878 tons in 1955.80 
T h e reduction of the surplus available fo r expor t 
mainly affected Chile's expor ts to Argent ina , the p r in -
80 Data furnished by the Compañía de Acero del Pacífico 
(CAP) ; the Chilean foreign trade statistics show exports of 
iron and steel products (not including ferroalloys) of 58,524 
tons in 1954 and 42,316 tons in 1955 (see table 31). 
silicon. 
c This group consists for the most part of iron and steel 
round bars. 
d Including small and decreasing exports to Panama and 
1,000 tons of billets to Cuba in the first half of 1956. 
e Mainly uncoated flat sheets; includes small quantities of 
galvanized sheets. 
i The figures for the first half of 1956 include a shipment of 
424 tons of heavy plate to Cuba. 
cipal fore ign market fo r Chilean iron and steel. Sales 
to Argen t ina were also influenced by other factors, 
in part icular the policy of market diversification which 
Chile appears to have pursued, and which partially 
accounted fo r the fact that expor t s to Argen t ina fell 
ra ther more than total Chilean expor ts of i ron and 
steel. I n 1953, sales of iron and steel products to 
Argen t ina passed the 70,000-ton mark (near ly two-
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Table 32 
BRAZIL: EXPORTS OF IRON AND STEEL TO LATIN-AMERICA* 
(Volume in tons; value in thousands of dollars) 
1953 1954 1955 































Source: Brazilian export statistics. 
a In addition to the groups mentioned, the Brazilian statistics record the exportation of 
nearly 21,000 tons of foundry iron to the United Kingdom in 1955. Neither this nor other 
iron and steel products were exported in 1953 and 1954. 
b The 1955 exports consisted of ferrosilicon alloy. In 1951 and 1952 Brazil exported large 
quantities of ferro-alloys (predominantly ferromanganese and smaller quantities of ferro-
silicon) to Argentina. 
c The Brazilian statistics show exports to Argentina in 1955 under the heading of "Angles, 
shapes and other types of structural iron and steel", while the Argentine statistics record the 
importation of 9,300 tons of iron billets from Brazil. 
iron and steel exports to Argentina in 1954, 1955 and 
1956 to date represent sales to IAPI contracted for 
in March 1954. 
Chile's sales to Argentina under this contract consisted 
almost entirely of flat rolled products, i.e., sheets and 
plates, annealed and pickled, in nearly equal quantities. 
They also included about 4,000 tons of slabs and about 
100 tons of tinplate.83 On the other hand, exports of 
pig-iron ceased; Chile had exported pig-iron to Argen-
tina and other countries between 1951 and 1953 to 
the value of over 1 million dollars a year, when the 
steel industry still could not absorb the entire output. 
As regards tinplate, Chilean exports to Argentina, 
which were substantial in 1952 and 1953, declined 
sharply in 1954 and ceased altogether in 1955, owing 
to the increase in domestic demand caused by the devel-
opment of the Chilean canning industry. 
It has been noted that in 1954 Brazil emerged for 
the first time as an importer of iron and steel from 
Chile, which in that year shifted to the Brazilian 
market some of the exports previously sent to Argen-
tina, in the form of a sale of 26,000 tons which took 
place in 1954. About 15,700 tons of this purchase were 
shipped in 1954, and 9,800 tons in 1955, some 500 
tons remaining to be delivered in 1956. The steel sold 
to Brazil consists for the most part of merchant mill 
products, mainly round bars and some angles and other 
products, but it also includes steel sheet, plate and semi-
finished products such as slabs, sheet bars and billets. 
83 In addition, since 1951 Chile has been exporting to Argen-
tina coal oils and coke breeze, by-products of the iron and steel 
industry (the term "coal oils" refers to oil derivatives of coal 
such as benzol, toluol and xylol). These exports rose in value 
from 450,000 dollars in 1952 to 600,000 dollars in 1953 and 
865,000 dollars in 1954, only to drop to 590,000 dollars in 1955. 
and-a-half times higher than exports in 1951 and 1952), 
under the stimulus of a large surplus available for 
export in Chile and an automatic import licensing ré-
gime in Argentina. The suspension of this régime in 
September 1953 cancelled sales by Chile of a further 
60,000 tons to Argentine firms. Until March 1954, 
when the Argentine-Chilean Trade Agreement was 
concluded,81 no further contracts could be made. On 
this occasion, Chile sold to IAPI, which had become the 
sole Argentine importer of iron and steel, some 56,500 
tons of sheet (to which was added the outstanding 
balance for the preceding year of about 5,500 tons 
to be delivered before 30 April 1955). About 27,600 
tons were delivered to IAPI in 1954 and a further 
quantity of 17,500 in 1955,82 some 15,000 tons remain-
ing to be delivered in 1956. In other words, all Chilean 
81 Schedule C-l of the Agreement, covering Chilean prod-
ucts which may be exported to Argentina without an exchange 
permit, included 100,000 tons of iron and steel products to the 
value of 17.4 million dollars (plus 100,000 dollars' worth of 
tinplate). For the second agreement-year, the estimated volume 
of iron and steel products was reduced to 60,000 tons, to the 
value of 10 million dollars (including pending contracts for 
approximately 34,000 tons to the value of 6 million dollars). 
In addition, by an exchange of notes in February 1954 Argen-
tina agreed to purchase 14,981 tons of sheet steel at an average 
price of 321.83 dollars per ton c.i.f. and a further quantity of 
45,019 tons at the average price of 147.86 dollars per ton; this 
agreement was given effect by IAPI's purchase from CAP the 
following month. It should be noted that the higher price set for 
the first quantity of 14,981 tons was intended to compensate 
for the difference resulting from an adjustment in the price of 
Argentine wheat sold to Chile. It was obviously intended to 
match the sales of Argentine wheat to Chile with those of 
Chilean iron and steel to Argentina, since the same value was 
assigned to both products in the respective lists. However, this 
intention was not adhered to subsequently. 
82 CAP figures, which differ in some cases from those given 
in the Chilean export statistics (see table 31). 
84 Pari II. Main background documents 
Generally speaking, apart from a few fluctuations, 
Chilean shipments to other South American countries 
were affected in 1954 and 1955 by the shortage of 
products available for export to which reference has 
already been made. In most cases, Chile confined itself 
to making such sales as were needed to keep the market 
open or to deliver goods contracted for in 1954. It 
should be noted that in November 1954 Chilean ex-
porters concluded an agreement with the Bolivian Yaci-
mientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, for the exchange of 3,000 
tons of steel (chiefly round bars to be used in construc-
tion) for 15 million litres of Bolivian petrol to the 
value of 500,000 dollars. This enabled Chile to increase 
substantially its exports of steel products to Bolivia in 
1955, the total amounting to nearly 2,000 tons. In 
the case of Uruguay, Chile continued to exchange steel 
for dolomite, as in previous years. In 1954 Chile pur-
chased 500,000 dollars' worth of Uruguayan dolomite, 
to be delivered in 1954 and 1955, and in return shipped 
to Uruguay 4,200 tons of steel products in 1954 and 
about 1,400 tons in 1955. 
Chilean exports of ferro-alloys, mostly ferroman-
ganese, to Latin America after reaching a fairly high 
level in 1953 and 1954 owing to sales to Argentina, 
fell off sharply in 1955 because of the decline in Argen-
tina's import needs. 
In addition to Chilean exports, mention should be 
made of Brazil's exports to Argentina in 1955 (see 
table 32), although these may not indicate that Brazil 
has reappeared as the normal supplier of iron and steel 
to the rest of Latin America. In 1951 and 1952 Brazil 
sold fairly large quantities of ferro-alloys and billets 
to Argentina, but the development of its own steel 
industry has absorbed the entire output. The needs of 
its domestic markets prevent Brazil from becoming a 
normal exporter of semi-finished steel products. This 
situation is likely to continue for several years to come. 
During the first six months of 1956, the downward 
trend shown in the two preceding years in Chilean 
exports of iron and steel products to the rest of Latin 
America continued, although less markedly (see table 
31). The deliveries made in those six months corres-
ponded for the most part to sales made in 1954 and 
1955. It should be noted that, partly owing to the 
policy of diversifying its markets which Chile has been 
pursuing with greater vigour since the closing months 
of 1955, its iron and steel exports to Latin America 
have fallen to only 60 per cent of its total exports, 
as against nearly 100 per cent in 1953 and 1954. In 
other words, most of the new sales made in 1956 went 
to markets outside the region, in particular the United 
States, Canada and the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, 
a sale of almost 1,500 tons was made to a new Latin 
American market—Cuba. 
During the past few months, there has been a fairly 
substantial increase in the surplus of iron and steel 
available for export in Chile, owing to the contraction 
of the domestic market and the expansion of produc-
tion. In 1956, production is expected to reach peak 
figures in nearly all branches. Nevertheless, new sales 
to the two largest markets in the two preceding years, 
Argentina and Brazil, may be somewhat affected by 
possible difficulties in negotiating the corresponding 
units of account or by a possible drop in the rate of 
exchange of these units, since during the current year 
Chile appears to have a heavy favourable balance in 
its trade with the countries mentioned. Moreover, Ar-
gentina's imports of iron and steel, most of which were 
formerly effected by IAPI, are now in the hands of 
co-operatives and private firms, which are able, under 
Argentina's new exchange regulations, to place orders 
in any of the European countries that are members 
of the Paris Club, as well as in Japan or Chile, within 
the limits of a general quota set by the Argentine 
authorities. Consequently, Chilean exports now face a 
more competitive market in Argentina than under the 
previous system. On the other hand, sales to Brazil are 
handicapped by the need to quote higher prices in 
order to offset the lower value of the Chilean-Brazilian 
agreement-dollar. 
On the basis of competitive prices, Chilean exports 
of iron and steel to Argentina and Brazil might reach 
higher levels than in the past two years. Both countries 
are attractive markets, because of their large import 
requirements, which may be expected to remain at a 
high level for many years if not permanently, and 
because of their proximity. It might be said that Brazil 
and especially Argentina are the natural export markets 
for Chilean iron and steel. The Argentine market is 
now interested in sheet (particularly light sheet) and 
the Brazilian market in round bars. Chile could sell 
in these markets the entire exportable surplus of 
both products available (especially in the case of sheet) 
under normal conditions of production ánd demand on 
the domestic market. This surplus will increase when 
the semi-continuous rolling mill which is being installed 
by CAP comes into operation in early 1958. The mill 
will produce strip, too, thus making it possible to 
increase the output of bars also. In the meantime, as 
the production of the Corral blast furnace has tripled 
in the current year, Chile once again has an exportable 
surplus of pig-iron of approximately 15,000 tons, 10,000 
of which have already been sold to Japan. This situa-
tion will continue for some time and Chile should there-
fore be able to resume exports of this product to 
Argentina. 
The problem of the imbalance of trade in favour 
of Chile, with the consequent possibility that there will 
be no way of disposing of agreement-dollars, is even 
more serious in the case of Bolivia than in that of the 
two countries already mentioned. The agreement under 
which petrol was exchanged for steel worked well, but 
it was a single transaction completed early in 1956, 
and Chile apparently shows no interest in further trans-
actions of this type. Nevertheless, when the proposed 
oil pipeline to Arica is constructed, the situation may 
be substantially changed, if Chile becomes a buyer of 
Bolivian oil, as Bolivia will offer an interesting market 
for Chilean iron and steel. 
Sales of iron and steel to Uruguay are virtually 
limited to the amounts exchanged for dolomite, as 
Uruguay normally grants import permits only for 
purchases from countries which buy Uruguayan pro-
ducts. At the moment deliveries are being made 
against earlier sales, but new transactions might be 
negotiated, with Chilean deliveries spread over a long 
period of time. At the same time, however, Chile's 
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need for Uruguayan dolomite has been declining, as 
greater use is being made of domestic dolomite. 
Trade with Colombia presents a problem similar 
to trade with Uruguay, as the Colombian Government 
has issued regulations limiting imports from countries 
with which Colombia has an unfavourable trade balance. 
Before this measure was instituted, Chile sold 3,000 
tons of steel plate for the Bogota municipal aqueduct; 
these were delivered in the first half of 1956. It is 
generally considered that, despite the production of 
the Paz del Rio iron and steel plant, Colombia may 
continue to offer a market for some Chilean steel pro-
ducts. On the other hand, Peruvian demand for Chilean 
iron and steel, normally the largest in Latin America 
after Argentina's (and in 1955 Brazil's) may decrease 
with the operation of the Chimbóte iron and steel 
plant, which entered production early in August 1956. 
Broadly speaking, it may be said that, in the present 
situation and for several years to come, the possibility 
of an increase in the trade in iron and steel between 
Latin American countries must be considered prin-
cipally in terms of Chilean exports to the other coun-
tries. Apart from the specific problems to which atten-
tion has been drawn, these exports depend on the sur-
pluses available for export in Chile and the ease with 
which Chile can find markets for its iron and steel 
outside Latin America. If the shortage of iron and 
steel products available for export which has existed 
since early 1954 until early 1956 is substantially re-
lieved, the problem of the Chilean iron and steel in-
dustry may be not so much to increase its capacity 
as to dispose of its surplus products. The logical and 
perhaps the least unstable market for such surpluses 
would be the other countries of Latin America, parti-
cularly those of South America. 
Me 33 
LATIN AMERICA: PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO LATIN AMERICA 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 
Product 
Average for 1934-38 Average for 1946-51 1953 1954 1955 
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
Tons Value centage Tons Value centage Tons Value centage Tons Value centage Tons Value ceñtage 
112,791 100.0 580,696 100.0 720,428 100.0 696,700 100.0 737,200 100.0 
92,671 81.9 496,736 85.3 671,275 93.2 648,418 93.0 684,056 92.8 
67,596 59.8 276,067 47.6 372,718 51.7 349,141 50.1 329,930 44.8 
19,451 921 0.8 62,191 10,728 1.8 17,735 3,891 0.5 28,311 4,741 0.7 29,431 3,589 0.5 
167,354 4,139 3.7 343,605 43,728 7.5 416,778 34,667 5.0 358,371 27,609 4.0 419,666 32,880 4.5 
6,670b 597 0.5 12,879 4,850 0.8 10,724 5,882 0.8 17,215 9,274 1.3 11,187 7,312 1.0 
11,067 2,144 1.9 7,350 4,487 0.8 2,276 2,039 0.3 861 836 0.1 1,086 1,190 0.2 
357 39 0.0 776 717 0.1 450 313 0.0 287 198 0.0 1,407 555 0.1 
572 74 0.1 435 310 0.1 138 222 0.0 1,901 2,120 0.3 1,851 2,383 0.3 
372 47 0.0 1,249 0.2 83 68 0.0 858 685 0.1 600 521 0.1 
88 18 0.0 1,105 589 0.1 507 270 0.0 630 370 0.0 475 354 0.0 
8,791 1,175 1.0 14,322 7,779 1.3 20,231 12,479 1.7 16,454 19,801 2.8 17,987 13,692 1.9 
26,542 4,285 3.8 50,900 23,957 4.1 44,282 47,121 6.5 42,580 62,581 9.0 42,380 40,110 5.5 
0.6 0.2 0.0 323 341 0.1 502 596 0.1 188 221 0.0 215 308 0.0 
67,111 4,685 4.2 53,394 8,799 1.5 36.079 8,366 1.2 52,099 15,195 2.2 55,921 14,735 2.0 
15,007 729 0.6 14,930 2,648 0.5 6,669 1,028 0.2 5,040 668 0.1 9,644 1,380 0.2 
206,414 3,617 3.2 226,130 22,113 3.8 287,618 35,741 5.0 321,853d 31,867d 4.6 328,929 36,783 5.0 
4,492 758 0.7 5,412 2,756 0.5 5,068 5,652 0.8 3,916 2,072 0.3 4,925 3,015 0.4 
29,239e 1,193 1.1 24,440 3,849 0.7 5,469 1,286 0.2 8,233 2,713 0.4 3,412 1,283 0.2 
159 33 0.0 4,670 977 0.2 2,666 1,005 0.1 2,136 913 0.1 1,909 415 0.0 
78,90 l f 4,114 3.6 142,768 21,680 3.7 50,114 15,350 2.1 39,518 12,047 1.7 39,936 8,274 1.1 
289 39 0.0 8,370 4,694 0.8 21,006 9,584 1.3 5,129ff 2,65 Iff 0.4 1,616 743 0.1 
1,576 244 0.2 5,228 3,273 0.6 11,359 8,875 1.2 12,160 7,504 1.1 5,782b 3,934k 0.5 
248 89 0.1 1,803 1,534 0.3 1,348 2,199 0.3 2,553 3,370 0.5 1,344 1,438 0.2 
6,034 352 0.3 19,231 3,453 0.6 22,202 3,780 0.5 15,856 3,355 0.5 27,319 8,708 1.2 
303 91 0.1 1,723 1,237 0.2 1,554 1,697 0.2 1,708 1,386 0.2 1,652* 1,735* 0.2 
15,361 93 0.1 22,573 346 0.1 11,325 226 0.0 24,673 472 0.1 25,059 470 0.1 
7,669 1,611 1.4 9,194 5,667 1.0 5,355 4,131 0.6 5,174 3,158 0.5 2,184i l,780i 0.2 
13 119 0.1 402 474 0.1 891 541 0.1 987 567 0.1 0.0 
15 35 0.0 22 100 0.0 18 82 0.0 14 61 0.0 11 11 0.0 
094,120 32,929 29.2 781,735 85,380 14.7 1,423,315 152,398 21.2 1,277,976 101,881 14.6 1,690,597 121,972 16.5 
5,906 105 0.1 27,242 1,664 0.3 50,467 3,785 0.5 12,090 837 0.1 5,747m 426m 0.1 
70,870 3,145 2.8 36,572 5,500 0.9 55,560 9,010 1.3 195,724 29,271 4.2 142,687 19,660 2.7 
1,254 83 0.1 3,854 735 0.1 664 140 0.0 1,000 348 0.0 783 207 0.0 
772 93 0.1 893 453 0.1 278 215 0.0 344 193 0.0 161 77 0.0 
GRAND TOTAL 
Total of products listed . 
1. FOODSTUFFS 
Hulled rice 

































































Standard or blister 
in ingots 
Refined or recast.. 
Bars, sheet, scrap.. 
Tin: 
Bars and ingots . . . 
Iron and steel; 
Pig iron 
Bars, shapes and 
Strip 
Sheet and rolled 
metal 










Bars and ingots . . . 
10,457 9.1 
8,967 7.8 
2,986 773 0.7 
10,044° 1,862 1.7 
38 70 0.1 
709 116 0.1 
1,258 503 0.4 
944 617 0.5 
10,407 695 0.6 
34,473 1,290 1.1 
3,578 47 0.0 
221,503 2,926 2.6 
314 9 0.0 
3,274 31 0.0 
7,115 28 0.0 
1,490 1.3 
1 0.4 0.0 
10,273 203 0.2 
1,215 20 0.0 
547 129 0.1 
84 24 0.0 
114 99 0.1 
3,656 257 0.2 
3,556 310 0.3 
17,495" 432V 0.4 
128 16 0.0 
109,116 18.8 
83,667 14.3 
30,551 19,945 3.4 
4,362 2,163 0.4 
1,422 2,863 0.5 
5,880 2,328 0.4 
1,476 1,740 0.3 
2,221 3,594 0.6 
200 26 0.0 
18,350 3,445 0.6 
6,397 1,352 0.2 
2,354 168 0.0 
731,414 43,756 7.5 
6,056 1,689 0.3 
20,168 392 0.1 
9,934 206 0.0 
25,449 4.5 
52 11 0.0 
6,283 316 0.1 
35,653 968 0.2 
14 7 0.0 
11,767 5,019 0.9 
6,864 3,775 0.7 
872 260 0.0 
799 393 0.1 
1,813 1,271 0.2 
164 259 0.0 
25,158 2,180 0.4 
1,872 211 0.0 
409 56 0.0 
5 3 0.0 
2,154 353 0.1 
15,754 4,417 0.8 
150,315 5,183 0.9 
268 24 0.0 
2,389 743 0.1 
126,110 17.5 116,609 16.7 149,935 20.3 
85,830 11.9 91,327 13.1 122,997 16.6 
40,184 28,183 3.9 25,286 19,352» 2.8 42,483 33,014 4.5 
4,363 2,658 0.4 10,001 7,096 1.0 11,606 5,892 0.8 
624 1,701 0.2 725 1,613 0.2 288 1,102 0.2 
3,460 1,549 0.2 5,824 2,117 0.3 2,666q 789q 0.1 
859 1,033 0.1 294 365 0.1 91 217 0.0 
1,000 2,810 0.4 1,089 3,360 0.5 858 2,204 0.3 
19,807 4,620 0.6 19,067 4,566 0.7 19,634 4,527 0.6 
13,115 2,362 0.3 978 469 0.1 4,771 991 0.1 
590 54 0.0 493 34 0.0 1,170 124 0.0 
657,697 39,583 5.5 685,748 51,615 7.4 828,497 73,192 9.9 
1,626 237 0.0 2,203 297 0.0 2,270 302 0.0 
16,955 314 0.0 1,389 124 0.0 2,027 178 0.0 
12,625 726 0.1 4,567 319 0.0 12,952 307 0.0 
40,280 5.6 25,282 3.6 27,096 3.7 
361 95 0.0 47 8 0.0 
19,487 3,590 0.5 539 64 0.0 9,970 355 0.0 
63,443 1,619 0.2 30,282 628 0.1 29,806 638 0.1 
2,207 1,732 0.2 1,768 1,011 0.1 2,791 1,989 0.3 
163 30 0.0 190 152 0.0 
18 14 0.0 1,000 647 0.1 484 396 0.0 
6,207 5,609 0.8 5,861 3,916 0.6 9,780 8,633 1.2 
231 338 0.0 — — — — 
14,723 2,409 0.3 2,421 687 0.1 872 163 0.0 
21,876 2,105 0.3 21,247 1,936 0.3 26,359 2,931 0.4 
55,364 13,500 1.9 37,222 7,652 1.1 23,769 3,400 0.5 
5 1 0.0 — — 
1,504 397 0.1 107 24 0.0 — — 
7,155 1,291 0.2 
4,790 1,199 0.2 4,751 1,220 0.2 1,707 482 0.1 
114,893 5,330 0.7 110,401 4,978 0.7 140,027 6,856 0.9 
20 4 0.0 
4,776 1,017 0.1 9,536 1,808 0.3 5,450 1,253 0.2 
Table 33 (continued) 
LATIN AMERICA: PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO LATIN AMERICA (continued) 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 
Average for 1934-38 Average for 1946-51 1953 1954 1955 
Product Tons Value 
Per-
centage Tons Value 
Per-
centage Tons Value 
Per-
centage Tons Value 
Per-
centage Tons Value 
Per-
centage 
3. FUELS 13,624 12.2 63,453 10.9 151,892 21.1 162,057 23.3 182,124 24.7 
Coal 58,241 282 0.3 87,653 1,791 0.3 35,726 490 0.1 36,645 551 0.1 65,815 1,332 0.2 
Petroleum and its deriv-
atives 918,776 13,342 11.9 3,629,524 61,662 10.6 7,109,749 151,402 21.0 7,387,200 161,506 23.2 8,613,310 180,792 24.5 
Crude 375,031 4,381 3.9 1,629,142 24,804 4.3 3,082,256 58,994 8.2 3,259,205 67,994 9.8 4,785,446 99,064 13.4 
Petrol, aviation 132,929 3,095 2.7 258,632 9,118 1.6 123,736 4,644 0.6 — — — — 
Petrol, ordinary 50,851 1,616 1.4 193,451 6,365 1.1 1,135,596 44,087 6.1 1,079,786 42,903 6.1 630,840 23,646 3.2 
Kerosene 50,766 1,025 0.9 48,234 1,208 0.2 113,350 3,215 0.4 191,801 5,253 0.7 295,755 10,148 1.4 
Diesel oil 13,890 183 0.2 358,461 6,057 1.0 928,642 21,004 2.9 977,857 22,217 3.2 1,171,252 26,173 3.5 
Fuel oil 285,988 2,527 2.2 1,134,374 13,622 2.3 1,690,515 17,998 2.5 1,848,438 22,087 3.2 1,694,356 20,520 2.8 
Mineral oils and greases 4,872 434 0.4 2,295 343 0.1 9,798 446 0.1 8,331 569 0.1 3,207 482 0.1 
Asphalt 4,439 80 0.1 3,451 84 0.0 25,856 1,014 0.1 21,782 483 0.1 30,138 667 0.1 
Other derivatives 10 1 0.0 1,484 61 0.0 — — — — 2,316 92 0.0 






Iron and steel: 
Wire rods and related 
products, barsw 








Paper and cardboard . . . 
Pharmaceutical products 

































1,677 1,077 0.2 6,377 5,939 0.8 4,714 3,814 0.5 10,053 8,779 1.2 
243 186 0.0 8 8 0.0 235 196 0.0 30 23 0.0 
446 585 0.1 2 3 0.0 2 3 0.0 9 28 0.0 
202 61 0.0 3 3 0.0 — — — — 
1,717 88 0.0 
724 440 0.1 — — 5 1 0.0 73 4 0.0 
3,774 862 0.1 82 41 0.0 196 85 0.0 634 165 0.0 
1,661 5,995 1.0 75 198 0.0 30 47 0.0 161 498 0.1 
502 2,590 0.4 617 3,758 0.5 810 4,761 0.7 730 4,859 0.7 
108 264 0.0 101 419 65 163 0.0 125 385 0.1 
780 232 0.0 218 711 0.1 1,100 282 0.1 455 189 0.0 
1,702 4,545 0.8 2,532 0.4 1,914 3,418 0.5 l,427x 3,253* 0.4 
291 134 0.0 204 68 0.0 238 86 0.0 132 67 0.0 
7,609 29,110 5.0 1,839 3,886 0.5 2,098 4,353 0.6 1,484 3,574 0.5 
119 1,093 0.2 10 40 0.0 5 42 0.0 40 243 0.0 
386 838 0.1 1,874 2,949 0.4 2,172 3,360 0.5 z 2 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics, 
a Including beef, mutton and lamb, pork, poultry, offal. 
b 6,433 tons exported by Brazil to Uruguay not shown 
in Uruguay's import statistics. 
c 7,886 tons exported by Brazil to Uruguay not shown 
in Uruguay's import statistics. 
<1 Excluding Paraguay. 
e 28,048 tons exported by Argentina to Chile. Chile 
shows imports from Argentina of only 19,207 tons, 
f 32,891 tons exported by Uruguay to Brazil. Brazil 
s Excluding Paraguay, 
h Excluding Honduras, 
i Excluding Honduras, 
i Excluding Honduras. 
k No information from Cuba and Honduras. 
1 No information from Cuba. t m Excluding Honduras. 
n Excluding Paraguay. 
° 6,203 tons exported by Brazil to Uruguay, not shown 
in Uruguay's statistics. 
q Excluding Cuba. 
r Including peanuts, copra, palm nuts, cotton seed, 
soya beans, sesame, sunflower seed. 
s Including exports of posts and sleepers from Cen-
tral America. 
t Including only exports from South America. 
u Import figures. 
v Estimate. 
w Including wire, nails, bolts, nuts, screws and rivets. 
x Excluding Cuba. 
y Including jute, henequen, hemp, etc. 

Table 34 
LÁTIN AMERICA: PRODUCTS EXPORTED TO T H E WORLD 
(F.o.b. values in thousands of dollars) 
Average for 1934-38 Average for 1946-51 1953 1954 1955 
Per- Per- Per- Per- Per-
Product Tons Value i centage Tons Value i centage Tons Value centage Tons Value centage Tons Value < centage 
GRAND TOTAL 1,922,973 100.0 6,146,895 100.0 7,659,533 100.0 7,799,300 100.0 7,878,004 100.0 
Total of products listed 1,632,637 84.8 5,296,989 85.7 6,830,102 88.9 6,996,956 89.7 6,980,992 88.6 
1. FOODSTUFFS 802,814 41.6 2,781,562 45.1 3,597,765 47.0 3,579,571 45.9 3,314,523 42.1 
Hulled rice 42,529 2,294 0.1 228,466 38,218 0.6 97,850 19,744 0.3 108,087 29,699 0.4a 57,870a 6,354 0.1 
Refined and raw sugar.. 3,346,201 117,827 6.1 6,015,434 629,977 10.2 6,584,935 593,297 7.7 5,386,001 493,201 6.3 6,420,227 574,586 7.3 
Frozen meats^ 593,481 78,404 4.1 438,709 138,758 2.3 264,393 123,481 1.6 266,306 123,028 1.6 209,623 114,492 1.5 
Tinned goods: 
Meats 67,192 25,691 1.3 203,197 104,633 1.7 99,249 83,761 1.1 111,593 86,103 1.1 104,031 82,093 1.0 
Fruits 4,223 430 0.0 31,722 8,064 0.1 25,012 5,672 0.1 29,059 5,786 0.1 20,467c 3,554c 0.0 
Milk 662 87 0.0 1,870 1,327 0.0 133 378 0.0 1,903 121 0.0 1,851 2,384 0.0 
Vegetables 521 71 0.0 2,443 1,952 0.0 406 224 0.0 1,156 866 0.0^ 815<* 612 0.0 
Fish 2,443 567 0.0 12,270 6,350 0.1 15,193 7,936 0.1 7,486 10,202 0.1 19,578e 9,833c 0.1 
Stimulants: 
Cacao 185,684 22,639 1.2 181,128 98,593 1.6 184,482 119,548 1.6 202,686 218,752 2.8 202,698 146,156 1.9 
Coffee 1,154,983 245,793 12.8 1,574,962 1,070,452 17.4 1,702,809 1,968,015 25.7 1,317,183 1,907,537 24.5 1,523,819 1,753,639 22.3 
Tea 2 1 0.0 420 420 0.0 534 628 0.0 282 307 0.0 310 402 0.0 
Maté 67,841 4,972 0.3 53,789 8,942 0.1 36,454 8,631 0.1 56,491 16,867 0.2 56,732 15,204 0.2 
Dried beans 37,402 1,782 0.1 75,966 11,646 0.2 29,487 4,916 0.1 38,405 5,510 0.1 39,938* 5,847* 0.1 
Fruits: 
Fresh 1,969,556 40,787 2.1 1,777,725 83,866 1.4 2,226,649 170,392 2.2 2,351,943 181,356 2.3 2,269,116 183,280 2.3 
Dried 12,436 3,265 0.2 10,469 6,996 0.1 14,899 13,629 0.2 11,764 9,108 0.1 33,436s 13,411s 0.2 
Livestock: 
Sheep 29,653 1,233 0.1 24,463 4,154 0.1 5,479 1,290 0.0 8,243 2,719 0.0 3,412 1,283 0.0 
Pigs 211 39 0.0 4,680 981 0.1 2,666 1,005 0.0 2,137 916 0.0 1,900 415 0.0 
Cattle 126,657 5,792 0.3 165,055 24,763 0.4 80,998 23,076 0.3 44,470 13,250 0.2 88,925 16,602 0.2 
Edible oils and fats: 
Oils 2,049 288 0.0 86,316 45,873 0.7 33,549 13,714 0.2 8,493 3,626 0.0 1,630 751 0.0 
Fats 35,493 4,895 0.3 36,406 20,773 0.3 12,740 9,234 0.1 12,191 7,571 0.1 5,782h 3,934h 0.0 
Butter 8,332 2,823 0.1 9,383 9,658 0.2 15,068 17,717 0.2 15,436 15,198 0.2 10,109 9,319 0.1 
Malt 7,870 463 0.0 22,046 4,095 0.1 22,212 3,787 0.0 15,857 3,355 0.0 27,359 8,713 0.1 
Cheese 1,451 424 0.0 10,220 7,432 0.1 4,732 5,468 0.1 3,462 2,833 0.0 3,187* 3,701» 0.0 
Salt 15,712 99 0.0 26,801 370 0.0 22,558 295 0.0 25,193 488 0.0 25,829 477 0.0 
Tobacco, leaf 55,216 16,044 0.8 78,871 59,605 1.0 61,682 62,533 0.8 70,264 62,319 0.8 71,598J 26,682i 0.3 
Tobacco, manufactured: 
Cigars 211 3,891 0.2 584 6,389 0.1 1,069 7,424 0.1 1,149 7,096 0.1 2,040k 8,747k 0.1 
Cigarettes 31 68 0.0 46 187 0.0 27 92 0.0 16 14 0.0 18 78 0.0 
Wheat 3,298,191 93,675 4.9 2,185,946 250,622 4.1 2,527,237 243,552 3.2 3,103,771 215,798 2.8 3,993,380 273,526 3.5 
Maize 6,619,447 121,344 6.3 1,635,646 125,683 2.0 1,110,719 77,210 1.0 2,245,054 121,626 1.6 408,120» 26,6251 0.3 
Wheat flour 102,828 4,465 0.2 44,755 6,449 0.1 57,225 9,222 0.1 195,698 29,369 0.4 142,718 19,666 0.2 
Wines 13,891 674 0.0 19,492 1,738 0.0 4,118 644 0.0 14,187 1,849 0.0 11,354 1,668 0.0 
Liquors 3,415 1,987 0.1 3,033 2,596 0.0 1,436 1,180 0.0 1,442 1,101 0.0 2,176 1,019 0.0 
. RAW MATERIALS 478,094 24.9 1,360,064 23.3 
A. Agricultural: 272,997 14.4 915,567 16.0 
Cotton, raw 328,629 85,728 4.5 430,191 291,858 4.7 
Hides: 
Raw 280,443 67,180 3.5 285,115 178,111 2.9 
Tanned 801 782 0.0 11,467 19,908 0.3 
Vegetable fibres"1 . . . 114,968 9,535 0.5 150,053 42,977 0.7 
Wool: 
Greasy 176,265 73,447 3.8 178,348 174,009 2.8 
Washed 18,604 10,459 0.5 37,685 55,473 0.9 
Cellulose and pulp . . — — 1,454 266 0.0 
Quebracho 232,503 13,702 0.7 216,361 65,724 1.1 
Oil seed0 144,959 5,670 0.3 74,662 13,460 0.2 
Tagua 29,708 848 0.0 10,415 743 0.0 
Timber: 
Rough and partly 
worked? 385,946 5,513 0.3 1,213,499 68,050 1.1 
Manufacturers1" . . . 877 23 0.0 16,886 4,233 0.1 
Posts'1 10,637 80 0.0 21,503 446 0.0 
Sleepers1" 7,717 30 0.0 14,228 309 0.0 
B. Minerals: 205,097 10.5 444,497 7.3 
Asbestos 4 3 0.0 168 32 0.0 
Sulphur 19,653 357 0.0 10,733 531 0.0 
Cement 1,547 25 0.0 40,995 1,050 0.0 
Copper: 
Ores 144,975 5,823 0.3 162,826 17,029 0.3 
Electrolytic in in-
gots 138,502 29,022 1.5 185,345 81,552 1.3 
Electrolytic in bil-
lets — — 8,814 4,853 0.1 
Standard or blister 
in ingots 194,945 44,878 2.3 141,296 56,394 0.9 
Refined or recast.. — — 73,142 34,424 0.6 
Bars, sheet, scrap.. 34,340 11,101 0.6 19,782 10,703 0.2 
Tin: 
Ores and concen-
trates 1,011 404 0.0 132 31 0.0 
Bars and ingots . . . 43,096 31,728 1.6 53,411 64,164 1.0 
Iron and steel: 
Pig-iron 44,928 3,589 0.1 
Bars, shapes and 
strip 2,016 228 0.0 
Sheet and rolled 
metal 654 93 0.0 
Various forms . . . 85 17 0.0 
Tinplate — — 
Lead: 
Ores and concen-
trates 106,645 6,702 0.3 82,737 12,086 0.2 
Bars and ingots . . 222,217 22,545 1.2 230,653 65,250 1.1 
Fertilizers 1,440,896 32,973 1.7 1,599,484 54,671 0.9 
Zinc: 
Ores and concen-
trates 260,819 15,888 0.8 416,318 26,328 0.4 
Bars and ingots . . 31,568 3,648 0.2 43,240 11,472 0.2 
1,556,268 20.3 1,552,303 19.9 1,567,933 19.9 
985,706 12.9 980,060 12.6 898,142 11.4 
559,478 360,142 4.7 696,095 465,980 6.0 659,578 432,317 5.5 
238,182 119,617 1.6 210,705 119,548 1.5 204,563 94,979 1.2 
4,416 8,350 0.1 5,216 6,985 0.1 5,356 6,647 0.1 
109,546 27,525 0.4 132,849 27,806 0.4 144,027" 23,332" 0.3 
226,570 290,339 3.8 145,294 196,168 2.5 97,778 126,103 1.6 
26,271 49,089 0.6 13,884 27,718 0.4 17,700 31,919 0.4 
6,493 2,017 0.0 — — — — 
202,547 42,041 0.5 153,622 34,215 0.4 147,432 32,535 0.4 
78,792 11,438 0.1 103,119 18,572 0.2 164,919 23,336 0.3 
7,999 510 0.0 7,718 523 0.0 6,325 374 0.0 
1,145,190 73,122 1.0 1,143,882 82,506 1.1 1,402,7333 128,313^ 1.6 
1,901 319 0.0 3,286 582 0.0 4,389 830 0.0 
17,129 319 0.0 1,688 135 0.0 2J37 181 0.0 
19,399 868 0.0 5,061 422 0.0 23,997s 480s 0.0 
570,562 7.4 563,143 7.2 669,790 8.5 
743 208 0.0 336 76 0.0 811 155 0.0 
26,518 4,318 0.1 23,233 1,314 0.0 234,045 5,756 0.1 
63,485 1,621 0.0 33,063 672 0.0 90,224 1,572 0.0 
212,489 25,000 0.3 163,789 19,333 0.2 221,813 32,962 0.4 
98,768 72,021 0.9 152,505 98,309 1.3 147,592 115,957 1.5 
171,604 128,648 1.7 184,411 122,450 1.6 206,861 169,155 2.1 
95,251 74,344 1.0 81,104 53,246 0.7 102,923 83,646 1.1 
6,837 6,103 0.1 7,680 5,383 0.1 14,001 12,128 0.2 
166 33 0.0 _ t t 
65,035 62,482 0.8 76,068 66,900 0.9 69,987 52,200 0.7 
29,009 2,088 0.0 
15,197 2,497 0.0 6,197 1,194 0.0 
36,452 4,892 0.1 
24,899 2,108 0.0 21,331 1,944 0.0 
55,364 13,500 0.2 37,222 7,652 0.1 24,795 3,514 0.0 
22 13 0.0 — — — — 
1,504 397 0.0 107 24 0.0 — — 
141,029 20,911 0.3 101,497 15,418 0.2 114,308 16,282 0.2 
269,290 67,184 0.9 259,813 69,109 0.9 237,488 68,763 0.9 
,235,054 54,716 0.7 1,576,741 67,651 0.9 1,323,384 56,217 0.7 
497,421 21,714 0.3 518,166 21,688 0.3 591,374 29,244 0.4 
60,839 12,777 0.2 55,650 10,780 0.1 160,159 15,259 0.2 
Table 34 (continued) 
L A T I N AMERICA: PRODUCTS E X P O R T E D TO T H E W O R L D {continued) 
Average for 1934-38 Average for 1946-51 1953 1954 1955 
Product Tons 
Per-
Value centage Tons 
Per-
Value centage Tons 
Per-
Value centage Tons 
Per-
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20.6 102,948,412 1,848,563 
16.6 81,244,084 1,482,718 
23.7 2,065,534 26.2 
0.0 66,015 1,335 0.0 
23.7 108,116,559 2,064,199 26.2 
19.0 82,724,367 1,635,697 20.8 
0.9 
0.1 
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13,682 11,842 0.2 
— — 243 186 0.1 9 9 0.0 235 197 0.0 32 25 0.0 
285 38 0.0 651 862 0.1 327 136 0.0 78 40 0.0 231 147 0.0 
213 67 0.0 7 5 0.0 1 1 0.0 13 9 0.0 
1,744 91 0.0 
784 489 0.0 2 0.2 0.0 7 2 0.0 136 7 0.0 
5,143 1,080 0.0 199 68 0.0 398 130 0.0 1,956 389 0.0 
157 111 0.0 2,088 6,609 0.1 76 200 0.0 31 55 0.0 169 539 0.0 
20 26 0.0 2,906 13,460 0.2 15,422 44,230 0.6 939 5,201 0.1 827 5,080 0.1 
4 5 0.0 119 272 0.0 101 419 0.0 65 163 0.0 153 390 0.0 
309 53 0.0 1,806 510 0.0 793 257 0.0 1,646 327 0.0 565 208 0.0 
298 315 0.0 12,330 8,826 0.1 5,518 7,184 0.1 6,320 4,097 0.0 11,380* 8,258" 0.1 
1,964 346 0.0 431 217 0.0 505 147 0.0 541 159 0.0 372 118 0.0 
431 418 0.0 16,089 51,091 0.8 2,373 4,688 0.1 2,332 4,808 0.1 1,851 5,465 0.1 
28 64 0.0 311 2,252 0.3 165 558 0.0 94 353 0.0 120 525 0.0 
42 32 0.0 603 1,299 0.0 2,741 4,175 0.1 2,864 4,335 0.0 w w 
Source: Official foreign trade statistics, 
a Excluding Honduras. 
b Including beef, mutton and lamb, pork, poultry, offal, 
c Excluding Cuba, 
d Excluding Cuba. 
e Excluding Cuba, 
f Excluding Cuba. 
s Excluding Bolivia. 
h Excluding Honduras. 
* Excluding Honduras, 
j Excluding Honduras, 
k Excluding Cuba. 
1 Excluding Cuba and Honduras. 
m Including jute, hemp, flax, henequen, sisal. 
" Excluding Cuba. 
o Including peanuts, copra, palm nuts, cotton 
soya, sesame, sunflower seed. 
seed, 
P Including exports of posts and sleepers from Cen-
tral America. 
q Excluding Bolivia and Cuba. 
r Export only from South America, 
s Excluding Bolivia. 
t Estimate for Bolivia based on figures for six months. 
u Excluding Cuba. 
v Includes jute, henequen, hemp, etc. 
w No information available for Cuba, the sole exporter. 
3. PAYMENTS AND THE REGIONAL MARKET IN INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE 
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{Signed) Eusebio CAMPOS {Signed) José GARRIDO TORRES 
Mr. Raúl Prebisch, 
Executive Secretary of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America, 
Santiago, Chile 
Chapter I 
THE PAYMENTS PROBLEM 
Document E/CN.12/C.1/3 summarizes the findings 
of the survey carried out by the group of ECLA 
experts in the countries they visited,1 namely, those 
among which the intra-regional trade links are strongest. 
It now remains to deduce those guiding principles and 
suggestions which appear to be in the best interests of 
inter-Latin American commerce, particularly in the 
* The first document in part II of this volume. 
1 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay. 
southern zone of the region. The following pages 
contain an analysis of the payments problem, the ques-
tion of the regional market being dealt with in 
chapter II. 
1. GENERAL TRENDS TOWARDS MULTILATERALISM 
Field studies of the most recent exchange reforms 
have revealed a trend towards a multilateral payments 
system, which a view to possible convertibility. In this 
connexion, most of the southern countries show a lean-
9 3 
94 Pari II. Main background documents 
ing towards competitive foreign trade based on parity 
with the convertible dollar. 
On the other hand, in South America the motives 
which gave rise to the practice of bilateral agreements 
still exist: the shortage of means of external payment 
and the wish to encourage reciprocal trade on an ever-
increasing scale. Under this latter head the desire to 
stimulate exports of industrial products, especially to 
the region itself, must be included; this is attributable 
to the inability of each individual country's market 
to absorb the output of local industries, many of which 
have idle installed capacity. 
In the opinion of the persons interviewed, these cir-
cumstances would seem to suggest that inter-Latin-
American bilateral agreements should remain in force 
as useful instruments of exchange and trade policy, 
although the need to revise or replace them in order 
to meet the needs of the current situation is also re-
cognized. 
(a) Co-ordinated transition 
The task to be faced seems extremely complex. 
Apparently a compromise must be sought whereby the 
existing watertight bilateralism could be gradually re-
placed by a progressive multilateralism in intra-regional 
trade. It is thought that such a solution could be put 
into effect if the Latin American countries would agree 
to adopt certain basic principles and uniform technical 
standards tending to encourage regional trade by means 
of a steady increase in the transferability of payments, 
along lines compatible with the monetary and exchange 
reforms already under way. The principles referred 
to, which are gaining ground in the countries visited, 
as was emphasized by the survey, would include parity 
or near parity with the convertible dollar, competitive 
prices, non-discriminatory exchange treatment, progres-
sive establishment of equilibrium in the bilateral trade 
channels, granting of reciprocal credits, levels of intra-
regional compensation and transferability of residual 
balances outside Latin America. As to the technical 
standards on the basis of which agreements would be 
remodelled, there is a more or less widespread tendency 
to advocate greater uniformity in the determination of 
margins of credit, official base values for tariff pur-
poses, the position of invisible items, re-exports, ac-
counting, etc. 
There is a consensus of opinion that the basic prin-
ciple which must be respected is that of decisively 
expanding trade between any two countries in their 
own direct mutual interests and to the indirect benefit 
of the Latin American countries in general. Given the 
shortage of hard currency, for the promotion of trade 
priority would have to be accorded to correcting exist-
ent disequilibria. As matters stand at present, the com-
position of exports and imports to and from neigh-
bouring countries is such that some are persistently 
debtors and others permanently creditors. Although it is 
true that this position makes the establishment of a 
regional clearing system difficult, it should emphasize 
the desirability of a common and united effort to 
encourage gradual progress towards a more comple-
mentary integration of trade, dictated by considerations 
of dynamic efficacy, rather than the adoption of meas-
ures which, far from following the path outlined, are 
designed only to intensify trade in convertible cur-
rencies, and merely serve to aggravate cross-payment 
difficulties within the region. Many opinions were ex-
pressed to the effect that this type of "isolationism" 
on the part of the Latin American countries would 
imply a subsidiary contribution to the integration of 
other regions, and would, in the long run, inevitably 
redound to the detriment of their own interests and 
those of the region to which they belong. 
(b) Transferability 
An examination of the various situations in the dif-
ferent countries visited is, by its very complexity, not 
conducive to facile solutions. Nevertheless, merely as 
a basis for discussion, certain general outlines are sug-
gested for a system which might help towards a joint 
solution, provided that Governments were willing to 
co-operate in correcting specific trade disequilibria, if 
not at bilateral at least at triangular or multilateral 
levels, and in removing certain difficulties such as those 
inherent in the quotation of units of account on the 
recently-created free markets. There is no doubt that 
the establishment of a trend towards equilibrium at 
progressively higher levels will make it easier to work 
out technical solutions to the other problems. 
There is an apparently well-founded hope that a 
possibility exists of reducing the structural imbalances 
in intra-regional trade and of solving the problems 
involved little by little. Signs of this are already 
appearing in those countries which are chronically in 
debt.2 The trend towards equilibrium could be sti-
mulated to some extent by means of a flexible payments 
system which would permit of the gradual liquidation 
of balances in several stages and would thus mean that 
the need for convertible foreign exchange was less 
acute. The highest or lowest limits to which the equali-
zation of payments could be carried would not neces-
sarily be attained within periods of a year.3 A trial 
could be made by means of a mechanism based on 
swing credits granted through the Central Banks, on 
conditions and within time-limits agreed upon before-
hand, so as to ensure their coverage in goods. The 
balances in excess of these credits would be subjected, 
at the end of the year, to as much regional compensa-
tion as possible. Any remaining balances not com-
pensatable within the region would be payable, as the 
case might be, in United States dollars, in sterling 
or in other extra-regional currencies of limited con-
vertibility.4 For this purpose, it might also be possible 
up to a point to have recourse to the monetary areas 
established by certain South American countries with 
others in Europe, namely, The Hague Club and the 
Paris Club.5 The risk of inflation implicit in the 
2 See E/CN.12/C.1/3, in part II of this volume. 
3 The trend towards stabilization observable in the years 1954 
and 1955 has been upset during 1956 by the appearance of dis-
equilibrium in trade between Argentina and Chile, brought 
about by the decrease in the former's exportable balances and 
by Chile's purchases of agricultural surpluses. 
4 The need to resort to these currencies would be limited, 
according to the picture presented by intra-regional trade dur-
ing the years 1954 and 1955, which can be studied in E/CN. 12/ 
C.l/3, in part II of this volume. 
5 See also E/CN.12/C.1/3, in part II of this volume, with 
reference to both these Clubs. 
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expansion of the credits would be counteracted by the 
measures aimed at stabilizing the balance of trade 
in each separate channel as well as in the region as 
a whole; moreover, it would be limited by the amount 
of credit stipulated. Presumably this would not be 
large enough to affect the economic stability of the 
supplier countries. 
The combined objectives of such a system would be 
the expansion of regional trade and progressive con-
vertibility. Duly adapted so as to conform with the 
new trend, inter-La tin-American bilateral agreements 
would become useful instruments of this twofold policy. 
Following the example of other regions of the world, 
a sudden and disturbing change in the trade currents 
in Latin America would be avoided. Thus an initial 
move would be made along practical lines towards 
solving the complex problem of a steadily expanding 
multilateralism. Time would have to be allowed for the 
trade currents in question to adapt themselves gra-
dually to the changing circumstances, and for the 
discovery of the methods most consistent with the 
principles of competition and specialization. 
Clearly, a hard task lies ahead. However, though the 
first steps may not be very ambitious, the use of the 
transfer mechanism should help to clear the way. 
This type of general solution, based on concepts 
and desires evinced, above all, in the countries which 
account for a large share of Latin American trade and 
where the most serious convertibility problems exist, 
might have the double advantage of dealing with cur-
rent difficulties and of establishing the bases of a pos-
sible system of regional payments, which, in its turn, 
should greatly further the aim of trading at progres-
sively higher levels, not merely within Latin America 
but with the rest of the world. 
It is not anticipated that hard currency will prove 
essential for the financing of trade. Nor, apparently, 
is it considered either possible or advisable to select 
a single currency even for the liquidation of balances. 
It is thought that the enforced use of a particular 
currency might only aggravate the problem unneces-
sarily, since one of the advantages of bilateral pay-
ments agreements between Latin American countries 
is precisely the avoidance of the compulsory use of 
foreign exchange which is in short supply, and, what 
is more, is essential for purchasing the capital goods, 
fuels and raw materials that their economic develop-
ment requires on an ever-increasing scale. 
As matters now stand, the effort to secure monetary 
stabilization will leave less and less opportunity of 
using bilateral trade and payments agreements, within 
Latin America, to safeguard overpricing, to facilitate 
exchange manoeuvres, to negotiate barter arrangements 
or to impose the acceptance of products under non-
competitive conditions. Apart from the application of 
certain special measures suggested during the survey, 
the aim would be an increase in payments facilities, 
which, instead of discouraging bilateral and regional 
trade, would safeguard it at the level already achieved 
and promote its future expansion. Presumably, there-
fore, as a natural result of stricter adherence to the 
principles of parity, competitive prices and non-discrim-
ination, the exchange rates applied under the agree-
ments will approximate more closely to those prevailing 
for trade with other regions. 
(c) The agreements and the promotion of trade 
The second object of inter-Latin-American agree-
ments, in their new phase—that is, the more effective 
direction of trade into intra-regional channels—could 
be achieved by the mainly administrative measures, 
within the reach of the various countries, which are 
being applied already or whose adoption is recom-
mended. They would replace exchange controls until 
a satisfactory tariff policy became feasible, and would 
include import licences and prior deposits, regulation 
of the exchange supply for auction, prohibitions, etc. 
Further, measures of this and other kinds, such as 
purchases effected by Governments or official agencies, 
either for State industrial enterprises or in the public 
interest, would help to promote a possible balance of 
trade.6 
There is a general conviction that such measures 
could not at present be completely discarded, and that 
they are likely to exert an expansive rather than a 
restrictive influence on trade, both within the region 
and between the Latin American countries and the 
rest of the world. 
For the smooth running of the system, it would be 
indispensable that trade and payments problems should 
not continue to be dealt with on a purely bilateral basis. 
The establishment of technical principles and standards 
referred to earlier would have to be simultaneously 
considered and accepted by the different countries of 
the region. This once achieved, probably by means of 
a joint agreement, and possibly, as was suggested, 
within the Trade Committee itself, the next step would 
be the negotiation of bilateral agreements, with simul-
taneous triangular and multilateral consultations aim-
ing at the settlement of balances. A technique could be 
employed similar to that of GATT, which has proved 
successful, and advantage could be taken of the ex-
perience acquired by the Trade Development Com-
mittee of the Economic Commission for Europe. 
(d) Expedients for the settlement of balances 
The genuine advantage of this method of negotia-
tion would be further reinforced by another expedient, 
6 As an example, it is worthwhile mentioning here one of the 
possibilities indicated in the course of the survey. Exports of 
railway equipment manufactured in Brazil might further the 
aim of balancing accounts between that country and Argen-
tina, through a programme of short and medium-term pur-
chases of such equipment whereby Argentina would renew the 
equipment concerned. It was also pointed out that certain im-
portant public works in some countries, e.g. drinking water and 
main drainage in large towns in Paraguay, could also contri-
bute to the expansion of inter-Latin-American trade if the nec-
essary materials, instead of being imported from other regions, 
were bought from those Latin American sources where there 
was idle installed capacity for the manufacture of the appro-
priate items, as in the case of tubes in Argentina and Brazil, 
to follow up the Paraguayan example. It was taken into account 
that, when such works are financed by foreign credit, it is 
usually on the undertanding that the necessary materials will 
be imported from the country financing the undertaking. Never-
theless, it was suggested that it might not be impossible to 
arrange for part of the credits to be used to buy materials in 
Latin America itself. The dynamic effect of these credits on 
the economies of the countries concerned would thus be inten-
sified. 
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and one on which there was almost entire agreement 
among the authorities consulted. It may also be re-
called that the idea in question had already been put 
forward in competent Latin American circles. It 
consists in the setting-up of a simple mechanism for 
the maintenance of permanent contact among the Cen-
tral Banks of contracting parties to the agreements, 
in order that, apart from other services, each should 
receive from the rest, at regular—perhaps monthly— 
intervals, a statement of their accounts and data on 
their balances. Such a step would be most useful, since 
it would remedy the present lack of any means where-
by one country can ascertain another's balances in its 
clearing accounts with third nations. It might also serve 
to facilitate the settlement of balances within the region, 
if the mechanism established were to include the recep-
tion and distribution of information, proposals and 
counter-proposals among the various countries, in 
accordance with standards previously laid down in the 
bilateral agreements and with the conditions as to 
exchange rates and other requisites stipulated by the 
creditor country. Among its other functions, the me-
chanism referred to would permit closer and fuller 
co-operation among the Latin American Central Banks, 
thus creating a tradition virtually non-existent hitherto. 
Once the setting-up of this mechanism had been 
agreed upon, and the method of negotiating and perio-
dically and simultaneously revising bilateral trade and 
payments agreements had been determined, the tech-
nical bases would have been jointly established on 
which to build up a regional system adapted to exist-
ing conditions, if only on empirical lines as yet. From 
such a system might -perhaps develop a payments union 
and a freer and more complementary trade zone. This 
would be no more than a modest and tentative begin-
ning, but there is no doubt that it would represent a 
step towards the gradual attainment of an essential 
goal: the progressive co-ordination of the monetary, 
exchange and trade policies of the Latin American 
countries. Only thus could advantageous results be 
hoped for on a regional and world scale. 
(e) Procedure to be followed 
With due regard to the ideas expressed at its first 
session, the Trade Committee might convene, if the 
Governments so decided, a special initial meeting of 
Latin American countries which had agreements to 
revise or negotiate, and might at the same time set 
up a small working group. To this group, which would 
be composed of exchange experts, could be entrusted 
the task of sketching out a standard draft to be used 
at the special meeting as a basis for the remodelling 
of the agreements concerned with the object of secur-
ing the maximum of uniformity and flexibility. Further, 
in view of the difficult situation of bilateral trade, if 
there were any possibility that some of the delegations 
to the meeting had been granted sufficiently wide powers 
and had enough statistical material at their disposal, 
the ECLA secretariat, in co-operation with the ex-
change experts mentioned, might anticipate certain 
aspects of this task, so as to secure the adoption of 
certain basic principles, where possible at the outset 
of the meeting, or, to begin with, by those countries 
intending to negotiate agreements. If this procedure 
were followed, in accordance with the example set at 
the second meeting of the United Nations Trade and 
Employment Conference, held at Geneva in 1947, when 
the first tariff concessions were negotiated within 
GATT, there would be a chance of making progress 
over the short term. To this end, the first session of 
the Trade Committee might perhaps be divided into 
two parts. One would be devoted to general problems 
and principles and the other to the negotiation of the 
agreements. In any case, whatever the procedures 
adopted, competent Latin American circles agree that 
the development of inter-Latin-American trade calls 
for close collaboration among a number of countries 
and for the devotion of attention both to general prin-
ciples and to ways of solving the numerous practical 
problems which impede its full evolution. 
2 . RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. A considerable number of the trade and payments 
agreements signed between Latin American countries 
are incompatible with the new trends evident in the 
monetary trade and exchange policies of the countries 
concerned, and this fact has a disturbing influence on 
intra-regional trade. Thus it appears necessary to revise 
these instruments so as to adapt them to the tendencies 
indicated and give new life to trade within the region. 
It has not so far been possible to make satisfactory 
progress towards this end by means of purely bilateral 
agreements; for this reason the time would now seem 
to be ripe for tackling certain basic difficulties by re-
course to a more effective type of co-operation than 
isolated efforts on the part of pairs of countries. 
2. The technique of bilateral negotiation within the 
framework of multilateral meetings would enable a 
gradual solution to be sought for the common problem 
of the settlement of certain intra-regional balances as 
well as for that of the transferability of given sur-
pluses in such balances to other currency areas. 
3. The procedure outlined in points 1 and 2 above 
would represent a first step towards increasing co-
ordination of monetary, trade and exchange policies. 
This appears indispensable, since otherwise no lasting 
results could be achieved. 
If sufficient Government support were forthcoming, 
the practical action deriving from the three foregoing 
conclusions might perhaps take the following form at 
the meeting of the Trade Committee: 
(a) Consideration of the principles and standards to 
be followed in inter-Latin-American trade and payments 
agreements; 
(b) Simultaneous revision of bilateral agreements 
through multilateral consultations among those Govern-
ments which, at the time of the Trade Committee meet-
ing, are prepared to conduct the appropriate negotia-
tions; or, alternatively, determination of a date for 
such consultations soon after the end of the conference. 
In order to facilitate revision, a working party made 
up of exchange experts and members of the ECLA 
secretariat would draw up a standard draft agreement; 
and 
(c) The establishment of machinery to promote and 
facilitate the transferability of balances. 
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Chapter II 
THE REGIONAL MARKET 
1. ITS IMPORTANCE FOR T H E INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF L A T I N AMERICA 
The effect produced on inter-Latin-American trade 
in certain intermediate and manufactured goods by 
the exchange reforms carried out in some of the Latin 
American countries is giving rise to more or less 
universal concern. Reliance is placed on these reforms 
to promote exports to convertible currency markets, 
especially in those lines of basic domestic production 
where specialization creates favourable conditions of 
productivity, but certain doubts can be observed as 
to the competitive capacity of most of the manufactured 
products currently traded among Latin American coun-
tries. In a word, it is feared that the ground gained 
in this field may be lost.7 
(a) Latin American manufactures in 
intra-regional trade 
Stimulated as it was by the temporary disappearance 
of supplies from Europe, Japan and, to some extent, 
the United States, during the Second World War, intra-
regional trade in manufactured goods, despite the reduc-
tion experienced after the re-opening of the old chan-
nels, still survives in some measure, mainly thanks to 
the bilateral agreements. Such manufactures are for 
the most part the products of new industries, where 
productivity is often lower than in their extra-regional 
counterparts, which makes it difficult for them to gain 
a foothold in the markets. In effect, apart from price 
considerations, the advertising and prestige of the tra-
ditional trademarks or suppliers militate against their 
acceptance; so do the credit assistance and other facil-
ities which overseas exporters are afforded by the 
organization of trade in other regions. 
In spite of these obstacles, which are not under-
estimated, renewed efforts are clearly being made in 
the industrialized countries of South America to export 
manufactured goods, principally to other markets within 
the region, where it is thought that the natural outlet 
for their surpluses may be found. Thus Argentina 
and Chile have accorded free-market exchange treat-
ment to their manufactured goods. It should, however, 
be noted that in the latter country certain articles were 
in effect benefiting by exchange rates higher than that 
at present in force on the free market, as a result 
of the barter system. Also with a view to encouraging 
exports of manufactured goods, Brazil has increased 
the existing bonuses in their favour.8 Uruguay grants 
special exchange rates to facilitate the sale of such 
products. In general, in the countries mentioned the 
7 Statistical research specially carried out for the Study 
of Inter-Latin-American Trade (E/CN.12/C.369/Rev.l) (see 
table I-a), shows that intra-regional trade in semi-finished 
products of mineral origin and in manufactured goods other 
than foodstuffs represented only about 2 per cent of total inter-
Latin-American trade in pre-war days (1934-38). By 1952-53 
it had already risen to almost 12 per cent. 
8 Instruction No. 131 issued by SUMOC on 19 May 1956. 
industrialists themselves are forming organizations to 
collaborate with official efforts.9 
The success of such efforts is of course conditioned 
by both circumstantial and structural factors. The 
adverse effects of the former tend to be increasingly 
offset as anti-inflationary policy and the abolition of 
the system of over-valued exchange rates for exports 
manage to stabilize domestic production costs and facil-
itate the elimination of over-pricing of exported goods. 
The latter is more difficult to counteract, as in many 
cases the solution is not to be found within the bound-
aries of the individual countries concerned. That is, 
if specific industries are to be able to compete, they 
must be guaranteed larger markets. The volume of 
domestic demand does not suffice to enable certain in-
dustries to approach optimum production. In many 
lines, moreover, there is a marked tendency for in-
dustrial development to run parallel in different coun-
tries and for idle manufacturing capacity to exist as 
a consequence, though these two circumstances do not 
always represent cause and effect, and the problem 
of idle capacity is distinctly greater in the smaller 
countries. Both characteristics are thrown into special 
relief by the spectacle of the veritable cross-fire of 
offer and counter-offer, deriving, inter cdia, from mutual 
ignorance of prevailing production conditions in the 
different countries. 
Again, attempts to increase intra-regional trade in 
manufactured goods have been up to a point frustrated 
by the lack of an appropriate policy pursued in com-
mon. Broadly speaking, efforts have been made to 
encourage exports mainly by means of exchange man-
oeuvres. But the attitudes adopted towards imports 
have varied widely. Some countries have usually 
exempted from licence regulations certain manufactured 
goods from adjacent countries or from the same geo-
graphic area. Sometimes, as in the 1954 agreement 
between Chile and Argentina, this was done by means 
of reciprocal concessions in favour of specific com-
modities. Other countries prefer to apply to Latin 
American manufactured goods the same prohibitions 
or restrictions as govern their imports from other 
parts of the world. There have been cases—and 
not a few—in which the effects of agreements, 
whereby certain articles that were difficult to export 
were bartered in European markets for manufactured 
goods normally subject to import restrictions, have ad-
versely affected the development of the corresponding 
inter-Latin-American trade. From the above general 
outline, it is obvious that the lack of a common policy 
as regards trade in manufactured goods is reflected 
in an absence of reasonably homogeneous provisions 
in the bilateral agreements and neutralizes many of the 
endeavours made from diverse angles to expand inter-
Latin-American relations in this field. 
9 In Brazil, the Federagáo das Industrias do Estado de Sao 
Paulo has set up a Department of Foreign Trade to this end. 
In Argentina, the Unión Industrial plans, in its turn, to estab-
lish an Export Commission. 
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Another aspect relates to countries where domestic 
consumption is very limited. In some there is a con-
siderable number of markedly anti-economic and very 
highly-protected industries which are beginning to 
feel the effects of their non-productivity; weekly shifts 
have been reduced, and, in many instances specifically 
cited, works have been closed down and equipment 
exported, with the resultant unemployment. Cases were 
also quoted in which enterprises are seeking palliatives, 
so far without success, by using raw materials supplied 
on a re-export basis by neighbouring countries. These 
are feared to be the first symptoms of evolution in a 
direction highly undesirable for the process of indus-
trialization. Disequilibrium in the region's foreign ac-
counts gave rise to an exaggeratedly protectionist policy 
which has militated against sound industrialization, and 
which found concrete expression in the practice of 
replacing imports by domestic production. This meant 
that encouragement was given to all manufacturing 
activities which might either apparently or in fact help 
to lessen the disequilibrium in question. Thus problems 
were created whose solution will depend only in part, 
and not principally, on an improvement in the organiza-
tion of inter-Latin-American trade relations. 
(b) Industrialization and the balance of payments 
A more detailed account must be given of some of 
the opinions on this point gathered during the survey, 
particularly those relating to industries set up without 
regard to the principle of comparative costs, to the avail-
ability of natural resources and to the capacity of the 
domestic market. Their establishment has brought about 
a transfer of capital and labour from productive to 
other less productive activities. The high monetary pro-
fitability with which these latter were thus artificially 
endowed has led to a certain distortion of investment, 
and sometimes to production which is not really essen-
tial by contrast with the sacrifices imposed on the basic 
sectors (transport and energy), whence the familiar 
"bottlenecks" in economic development have resulted. 
The somewhat negligent treatment of typical and tra-
ditional lines of production, the increase in domestic 
consumption and the continuous rise in costs, aggra-
vated by the social policy adopted, have tended to dis-
courage exports. This trend, in combination with the 
inadequate influx of foreign capital and the deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade, was not conducive to an 
expansion of the capacity to import commensurate 
with the requirements of the various countries. The 
inevitable outcome of the limitation of this capacity 
on the one hand, and, on the other, of the stimulus to 
the propensity to import provided by income increases 
and by the inflationary process affecting the majority 
of Latin American countries, was the stagnation of 
the investment coefficient, a development which neces-
sarily prevented the acceleration of the rate of growth, 
given the reflex nature of the economies within which 
it took place. 
In seeking to stabilize their balance of payments 
by substituting domestic production for imports, some 
countries seem to have used this means, as already 
pointed out, in such an indiscriminately horizontal 
fashion as to run a serious risk of even worse dis-
equilibrium, caused not only by the direct action of 
"income-effect", but to a considerably greater extent 
by "price-effect", as a result of the inflationary condi-
tions prevailing in the countries in question. Thus the 
curious case exists to-day of countries that are obliged 
to grant more favourable rates of exchange for exports 
of some of their basic products than for the manu-
factured goods derived therefrom. It is a vicious circle; 
the disequilibrium in the balance of payments has led 
to import replacements which in their turn have helped 
to accentuate this same disequilibrium, because they 
were undertaken without careful prior study of their 
economic possibilities. Several countries are now in the 
paradoxical situation of having to restrict or prohibit 
imports of capital goods. This is apparently largely 
attributable to the steadily-increasing rigidity of im-
ports, demand for which tends to grow at a proportion-
ately faster rate than the national gross product. This 
rigidity, most noticeable in the case of raw materials 
and fuels, induces certain countries to waive such 
restrictions and prohibitions when capital goods are 
brought in as a result of foreign investment; and 
the modernization of equipment in already existing 
manufacturing concerns has suffered accordingly. 
Domestic industries have thus found themselves at a 
disadvantage vis-á-vis new activities financed with 
foreign capital. Lastly, in some countries the capacity 
to import has reached such critical levels as to help 
to spread the conviction that a new path must be fol-
lowed towards balance-of-payments equilibrium, pre-
ferably that of expanding exports. This belief has 
proved a decisive factor in the recent reforms.10 
(c) Revision of national industrialization programmes 
During the survey identical suggestions were put 
forward in this connexion in various countries, and 
are summed up below. In the area visited almost uni-
versal interest was displayed in economic stabilization 
programmes, for which the encouragement of exports 
is indispensable. In the industrial sector a trend towards 
specialization for export is appearing. The recognition 
of this need likewise implies awareness that concerned 
multilateral action might greatly help to meet it, 
since it is not bounded by the frontiers of each indi-
vidual country. Consequently, the problem of the reform 
of industrialization within this region—beginning, 
perhaps, with the group of countries in which industrial 
progress is most intensive—must be envisaged in terms 
of wider or more complementary markets, and in a 
spirit of co-operations reflected in the endeavour to 
co-ordinate national policies, along the lines exemplified 
in Europe. This idea is already very widely accepted. 
The progressive creation of a large Latin American 
market would be the only way of solving—by means 
of complementarity, the improvement of productivity 
and the consequent increase in consumption—the exist-
ing binomial of parallel industries and idle installed 
10 In Brazil, where no exchange reform was introduced as 
in other Latin American countries, the importance of exports 
is declining in relation to domestic production, whereas that of 
imports is increasing (see table 35). A proposal put forward by 
the Conselho Nacional de Economia recently led to the organ-
ization of a commission of experts from the civil service and 
from producers' associations, to study this problem and sug-
gest measures of trade policy whereby exports might be 
expanded. 
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Table 35 
BRAZIL: GROWTH OF PRODUCTION IN RELATION TO FOREIGN TRADE, 
1939-1954 
(Billions of cruzeiros at 1952 prices) 
Exports Imports Average percentages 
Percentage Percentage 
Domestic Absolute of domestic Absolute of domestic Exports/ Imports/ 
Year production values production values production production production 
1939 200.3 39.4 19.7 23.6 11.8 
1940 200.3 32.5 16.2 20.8 10.3 
1941 210.0 25.7 12.2 21.4 10.2 
1942 203.5 28.1 13.8 16.1 7.9 
1943 209.0 28.9 13.8 19.2 9.2 
1944 219.4 31.7 14.4 23.4 10.7 
1945 234.6 34.1 14.5 23.6 10.1 
1946 257.7 42.2 16.4 26.7 10.4 
1947 278.3 39.8 14.3 40.9 14.6 
1948 294.1 40.1 13.6 36.9 12.5 
1949 302.1 36.1 11.9 39.3 13.0 
1950 324.1 31.7 9.8 32.1 13.3 
1951 346.5 34.9 10.1 61.3 17.7 
1952 360.9 26.1 7.2 55.0 15.2 
1953 376.1 30.9 8.2 44.8 11.9 









Source: Joint BNDE/SUMOC/CNE/CTEF/FGV Group, Situagao Atual e Perspectivas 
Imediatas da Economía Brasileira, Rio de Janeiro, January 1956, p. 35; and Joint BNDE/ 
ECLA, Group, Esbozo de um Programa de Desenvolvimento para a Economía Brasileira 
(Periodo 1955-62), Rio de Janeiro, May 1955, p. 19. 
capacity. In contrast with what frequently occurs at 
present, especially in the countries with the smallest 
markets, consumers would derive great benefits from 
a genuinely economic industrialization. The success of 
the policy of replacing certain imports by domestic 
production is basically dependent on the possibility of 
offering them wider regional markets. If no united ac-
tion in this direction were to prove feasible, and if each 
country were to continue to pursue its industrialization 
policy in the same isolation as at present, it is to be 
feared that the heterogeneous courses followed by the 
different countries, taking the form of unco-ordinated 
measures which sometimes defeated their own ends, 
might sow the seeds of future difficulties. Therefore, 
some of the opinions expressed to the effect that the 
attempt to initiate the necessary co-operation must not 
be postponed, envisage such collaboration within the 
framework of a twofold programme, comprising long-
term and short-term solutions and based on the ideas 
summed up below. 
Thanks to the long-standing moral and political 
traditions of the American continent, the collaboration 
outlined, instead of alienating the several countries, 
would bring them into closer economic contact, and 
would at the same time constitute the point of departure 
for a regional economic co-operation programme. In 
this context, and in present circumstances, it would 
seem advisable to begin by taking the same sort of 
action as that already indicated in the case of payments 
and trade problems.11 Such measures might represent 
the first great stride towards the closer economic in-
tegration of Latin America, 
11 See chapter I, section 1. 
2 . T H E PROBLEM, OF T H E COMMON M A R K E T 
(a) Evolution of the idea 
Concern for the need to broaden domestic markets 
is no new development in the Latin American countries. 
Of the various endeavours to which it has given rise, 
virtually not one has proved successful. In both the 
Northern and Southern Zones of South America steps 
were taken in this direction between two and some-
times more countries, but for various reasons the 
desired goal was never attained. At the present mo-
ment the Central American republics are trying to 
build up a single market as a solution to their economic 
problems and as a means of achieving a degree of 
development and prosperity beyond the reach of their 
individual territories, populations and resources. 
A number of factors are already helping to create 
an atmosphere conducive to the realistic reconsideration, 
in a proper perspective, of the usefulness of finding 
over-all solutions to problems common to the Latin 
American countries and not confined to the industrial 
field alone. These factors include the greater economic 
maturity attained, the better understanding of reci-
procal problems, the mutual inter-dependence of the 
Latin American countries as regards the fulfilment 
of their aspirations, certain progress already achieved 
or under way with respect to transport facilities, includ-
ing overland communications, and, above all, the fact 
that exactly the same difficulties have arisen at exactly 
the same time in industrial, foreign trade and payments 
sectors, especially in South America. 
At the same time, growing interest is being aroused 
in Latin America by the progress of economic integra-
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tion in other parts of the world, as, for example, in 
Western Europe, and between this area and its coun-
tries' African possessions, to cite only two outstanding 
instances. Furthermore, as the survey showed, concern 
is felt as to the increasing gap between the more highly-
industrialized and the under-developed countries—a 
gap which tends to be still further widened by the 
disparity between their technological resources and 
availabilities of capital and skilled labour. 
Attention is also drawn to the remodelling of the 
world economy, a process which began in the war of 
1914-1918, gathered new impetus during the 'thirties 
and ended by taking definite shape during and after 
the Second World War, radically altering the composi-
tion of international trade flows. The fear—perpetuated 
by the insecurity of peace—of being cut off from the 
centres supplying manufactured goods; the belief that 
the prices of the region's raw materials are apt to be 
more unstable than those of manufactured goods, and 
that the terms of trade may become unfavourable 
in the long run; the desire to raise the standard of 
living of their peoples; all these considerations have 
joined to impel Latin American countries along the 
path of industrialization. Such industrialization would 
diversify their economies, and, if achieved, would 
secure the desired stability combined with prosperity. 
These principles of economic policy have been further 
strengthened of late, in view of the encouragement of 
lines of production in Africa parallel to those charac-
teristic of Latin America, and the increased techno-
logical progress in the United States and Europe which 
tends to produce synthetic substitutes for many of the 
traditional Latin American exports.12 Another con-
tributory factor has been the fear of the depressive 
influence that may be exerted on world market prices 
for products competing with those of United States 
origin, by the latter country's policy of subsidies for 
agriculture. 
Nevertheless, the results so far obtained, besides 
perhaps falling at national level below what might 
reasonably have been expected within the time that 
has elapsed, have also led to situations that have in-
volved certain readjustments which might direct the 
future course of the desired policy of economic union. 
12 Relevant in this context are some of the findings of the 
GATT report, international Trade 1955, Geneva, May 1956. 
Although the value of world exports attained record levels in 
1955, the relative importance of exports from non-industrialized 
regions continued to decline (see p. 3). There was a sharp drop 
in the volume of raw materials purchased from such regions 
by the industrial centres, partly on account of the expansion 
of similar production lines within their own territories (see 
pp. 6-11). Furthermore, the production of substitutes—synthetic 
rayon, aluminium, plastics, fibres, rubber and detergents—in-
creased in the aggregate twice as fast as the output of manu-
factured products. Since industrial areas depend for their sup-
plies of raw materials of natural origin on regions that are not 
industrialized, the continued replacement of such raw materials 
by artificial substitutes is bound to have a profound effect on 
the exports of the countries which produce them. It is esti-
mated that import requirements for industrial regions in 1955 
would have been 40 per cent higher than they actually were, 
if the substitutes referred to had not been manufactured. Final-
ly, the report puts forward this further conclusion. If the pro-
duction of synthetic substitutes continues to increase at the 
same rate as in recent years, the improvement in the terms of 
trade for the non-industrial areas will rapidly disappear, while 
at the same time their income from exports will decrease in 
absolute terms (see pp. 11-14). 
As already pointed out,13 industrialization, because it 
has been confined within the limits of each country's 
domestic market, instead of bringing about greater 
diversification, has produced no new exports and has 
actually discouraged others by competing for the factors 
of production, thus tending, to a certain extent, to 
concentrate Latin American exports within a smaller 
number of goods, highly vulnerable to fluctuations in 
the terms of trade. Far from achieving the distribu-
tion of exports over a wider range of markets and 
products, trade—especially within the region—is mov-
ing in the opposite direction, and this shows signs of 
being a long-term trend. Certain raw materials of 
secondary value are playing a lesser part in trade at 
the very time when it would be both possible and desir-
able for them to help to augment it. Foreign trade 
confined to a few lines and countries, in which the 
United States and Europe are of paramount importance 
and the share of the region itself is small, does not 
offer the most hopeful prospect for the industrializa-
tion of Latin America. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the mistakes that have been 
made, it is thought in the most competent circles that 
on balance industrialization shows positive results in 
conformity with the best interests of Latin America, 
whether from the standpoint of individual countries 
or from that of the region as a whole. It is the lines 
along which it has been effected that have not been 
satisfactorily adapted to the march of events. Such 
adjustments and adaptations will depend, in the final 
analysis, on motives and incentives that will have to 
be found in the regional market. Consequently, opinion 
in the circles concerned advocates the simultaneous 
development of domestic industry in the Latin Amer-
ican countries in two directions, i.e., horizontally and 
geographically through the regional market, and along 
the vertical line of the domestic market determined 
by the growth of real per capita income. The former 
would need only a conscious effort based on solidarity 
to become a reality in the course of time. 
(b) The trend towards integration 
Amongst those who believe in the idea of the regional 
market14 there is certainly no sign of a "regionalistic" 
concept in the exclusive sense of the word. On the 
contrary, it is considered that the economic develop-
ment of Latin America might be considerably stimulated 
by an intensive expansion of its trade with other econo-
mic areas. Furthermore, the idea of a regional market 
would reflect a trend which in these days is making 
itself felt throughout the whole world. The world 
economy seems to be developing in the direction of the 
13 See, for example, the Estudio sobre la Unión Iberoame-
ricana de Pagos, Instituto Iberoamericano de Cooperación Eco-
nómica, Oficina Bancaria Interamericana, Madrid, 1955, p. 100, 
and the Study of the Prospects of Inter-Latin-American Trade 
(E/CN. 12/304/Rev.2), United Nations publication, Sales No.: 
1953.II.G.4, p. 5. 
14 In this document the term "regional market" is understood 
to mean the common trade zone which might be opened up by 
agreements between more than two countries for specific goods 
produced by the contracting parties. The agreements would be 
so drafted as to leave room for the possibility that sooner or 
later other countries in the region might accede to them. For 
purposes of this section of the report, the term is used with 
special reference to South America. 
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organization of large economically-integrated areas,15 
and no longer in terms of single countries. This does 
not necessarily imply that international economic rela-
tions must be conducted between large unified blocks; 
the flow of capital and trade from country to country 
will have to continue. It means that by some measure 
of identification of their reciprocal interests, the dif-
ferent countries would seek the natural development 
of their own markets in more or less adjacent terri-
tories, thus increasing their economic stability by re-
ducing their present excessive dependence on distant 
commercial centres. This would be the beginning of a 
new phase, that of regional inter-dependence, in which 
the old-free trade binomial—the individual and the 
world market—which had been modified by the intro-
duction of the unit "country", would now be extended 
to include the element "regional market". In this con-
nexion, the evolution of the world economy would 
merely be brought into line with political evolution. 
In the view of many, in this de facto situation would 
seem to lie the main reason why certain forms of inter-
national action, undertaken since the war, have not 
produced the results forecast. In effect, the point of 
departure was the assumption that world trade would 
shortly resume its classic patterns. And, while subse-
quent events disproved this theory, regional groups 
emerged of a kind unforeseen in post-war programmes. 
Since the economic integration of Latin America would 
arise from the same cause, a number of opinions have 
been expressed to the effect that the bases of these 
international forms of action should be revised to some 
extent, stress perhaps being laid on the regional 
aspect, but without losing sight of international inter-
dependence. 
Be this as it may, evolution towards a regional market 
will come slowly and gradually, beginning in practice 
with those countries or zones where circumstances are 
most favourable. In those visited by the group of 
experts, this is considered the most feasible solution 
of the problems which the lack of co-ordination in 
Latin America's economic development has created. 
(c) Multilateral and competitive system 
The point of view no longer seems prevalent in 
Latin America which advocated seeking a solution to 
the market problem on a bilateral basis, through agree-
ments between pairs of countries, since this procedure 
is felt to be too restricted in its scope. Nor is much 
support given in competent circles to the method of 
compensation by means of recriprocal market reserva-
tions for industries which might, for example, be set up 
in one country that would have the exclusive right of 
supplying others, a development which would in most 
cases depend upon a substantial contribution from 
public funds. It is feared that, besides promoting the 
creation of national monopolies (and even according 
similar privileges to private enterprises), this system 
would prove in practice little more advantageous than 
the industries already existing in the various countries, 
since in many instances the markets would still be small 
in relation to what is considered desirable. This general 
concept does not preclude the envisaging of circum-
15 Understood as organic territorial units. 
stances which might make it advisable—especially in 
the case of adjacent countries, or frontier zones with 
possibilities of economic complementarity—to sign 
market agreements on a reciprocal basis, without exclud-
ing other countries in the region which might wish 
to participate. 
However, the idea expressed with most conviction is 
rather that of instituting a wide area—such as the 
South American market might gradually become— 
within which would be established a multilateral and 
competitive system based on private enterprise. This 
does not imply failure to recognize the part that must 
properly be played by the State in guiding the country's 
economic activities and supplementing private enter-
prise, especially in the case of under-developed coun-
tries. Nor can the need be ruled out for funds pro-
vided by foreign Governments or international agencies. 
Under such conditions the resources available would 
be large and varied enough for the area's potentialities 
to be developed, with due regard to the best economic 
criteria and to the principles of productivity, speciali-
zation and competition—in other words, those appro-
priate to a regional division of labour. 
Although industrial specialization is at times no more 
than a historical accident, in South America (to limit 
the analysis to the area visited by the group), much of 
the informed opinion supports the view that, subject to 
the principle of reducing costs, the first consideration 
in the location or transfer of new or existing industries 
should be the availability of natural resources. Some 
exceptions must be regarded as admissible, however, 
since the necessity of raising the standard of living in 
regions where per capita income is low, and the need 
to correct persistent disequilibria, may justify, from 
the social angle, investment which would otherwise 
have to be subjected to the order of priority determined 
by the requirements of a gradual advance along the 
economic front. 
The negotiation of a common market for specific 
industries between various countries would facilitate 
this shift of activities, on account of the interest which 
industrialists would have in transferring their busi-
nesses or fusing them with others outside the country, 
and thus securing better yields from their investment. 
Would the country or countries prejudiced thereby, 
either from the fiscal standpoint or through temporary 
disemployment, find sufficient compensation in the 
higher returns on capital exported, and in the lower 
prices and improved quality of the products concerned 
when they reached the hands of the general consumer? 
Would there be possibilities of reciprocity—given the 
diversity of natural resources—in relation to those 
products where their comparative advantages were 
greatest ? The answer is thought to be in the affirmative, 
and it is also felt that the incorporation of large sectors 
of the population into the monetary economy and the 
steady" rise in over-all purchasing power would have 
so dynamic an effect on the regional economy that the 
shifts referred to would really be of little importance. 
It is not only the industrialization of the countries 
forming the trade area that would be benefited by the 
organization of a competitive regional market. Accord-
ing to the survey, it is believed that this system would 
also provide an ever-increasing outlet for exports of 
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raw materials and foodstuffs, without the possible dis-
advantages of sudden price fluctuations and a deteriora-
tion in the terms of trade. Industrialization itself would 
promote a growing regional consumption of each coun-
try's basic raw materials, thus turning into a reality 
the latent complementarity already existing, and avert-
ing the negative effects on the terms of trade which 
might result from the integration of Europe and Africa 
and the production in the industrialized countries both 
of synthetic substitutes and of raw materials and sub-
sidized foodstuffs. It would be impossible to avoid 
such effects by. a policy of separate action in each 
individual Latin American country. 
(d) Reflections in world trade 
It is also argued that such a system might have 
positive repercussions on the world economy, since it 
would be a mistake to imagine that the countries of the 
region would neglect their trade with the rest of the 
world, or that it would be either desirable or possible 
to set up a closed system. It is pointed out that nothing 
of the kind has taken place in the two largest economic 
areas existing at the present time—the United States 
and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, both countries 
constitute markets of vital importance in world trade, 
with one difference as regards the former; although 
its foreign trade does not represent a high percentage 
in terms of the gross national product, it is of decisive 
importance for the rest of the world, on account of 
the indices attained.16 It is easily conceivable that the 
flow of capital goods from the United States and 
Europe towards Latin America might greatly increase 
at once. Moreover, trade flows among the three areas 
might also tend to rise in value with the natural growth 
of income in the Latin American region, thus counter-
balancing any possible trend towards a decline in trade 
between Europe and Latin America—especially as a 
result of increasing African competition—and its re-
percussions on the United States market. Further, it 
seems clear that industrialization built up on regional 
bases would also progressively improve the capacity 
of its products to compete in the world market. 
(e) Opportunities for foreign capital 
It is anticipated that the new prospects which would 
be opened up for the investment of foreign capital 
would surpass any hitherto foreseen. In fact, the 
evolution of the regional market would depend greatly 
on such capital, which would supplement the capacity 
to export on the one hand, and on the other, the 
capacity to import. It would not be surprising if Euro-
pean availabilities were increasingly absorbed by in-
ternal and African requirements, whence it follows that 
the most important role would perhaps be played by 
United States capital. 
Presumably the inflow of this latter would increase, 
since what would seem to have been the principal limit-
ing factors—namely, post-war reconversion and mo-
dernization of United States industry, assistance in 
European reconstruction and the promotion of develop-
ment in the Southern and Far West areas—are begin-
16 In 1955, United States exports represented 4 per cent of 
the gross national product and 18.2 per cent of total world 
exports. 
ning to operate less intensively. Furthermore, the basic 
obstacles to large-scale investment in Latin America— 
i. e., limited markets,17 devaluation of currencies, double 
taxation, discriminatory legislation, etc.—would in-
creasingly tend to disappear. At this moment there is 
an apparently widespread trend towards improving the 
treatment hitherto accorded to such investment. In 
addition, the system outlined, by giving less occasion 
for the manifestation of national prejudices—with 
or without foundation—would create an atmosphere 
of better understanding that also seems likely to favour 
larger contributions of foreign capital. 
( f ) Transition in the direction of customs agreements 
It should be made clear that the same circles which 
laud the advantages of the regional system do not con-
17 The difficulties placed in the way of investment by the 
small size of most of the Latin American markets have lately 
been the object of growing attention in the United States on 
the part of politicians and businessmen. Thus, for example, 
in connexion with the recent Panama conference, A. N. Spanel, 
Chairman of the International Latex Corporation, commenting 
on the opinions of those who affirm that Latin America needs 
a large inflow of foreign capital such as was received in an 
earlier period by the United States, observed: " . . . It must be 
remembered that such capital came to a young federation of 
States among which no economic barriers existed. Being united, 
not divided, the United States offered vast markets as well as 
possibilities of expansion, such as the Latin American countries 
will lack as long as they remain cloistered in twenty separate 
economic groups, among which there are immense disparities 
and differences". Emphasizing the advantages of wide markets 
for investment, he pointed out how in Latin America it is the 
biggest countries that tend to benefit most by the inflow of 
United States capital: "More than 90 per cent of this capital 
has been invested in the three countries with the largest mar-
ket potentialities, that is, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. The 
other seventeen countries are obliged to share the remaining 
10 per cent". In support of his contention, he added: "Far 
greater sums still have been invested in Canada, an indus-
trialized country, not only because of its growing domestic 
purchasing power, but also on account of the preferential tariffs 
which encourage Canadian manufactures for export to other 
members of the British Commonwealth". Contrasting his own 
country with Latin America—a region he holds to be endowed 
with vast and diversified latent resources—he declared: " . . . Un-
like the United States, where there are no economic barriers to 
hinder trade between the 48 States of the Union, Latin Amer-
ica presents the spectacle of twenty States, twenty separate 
countries, which represent as many frontier barriers, twenty 
obstacles to trade, which result in limited markets and thus 
impede the economic development of each one and of all Latin 
America. By fighting to establish industries within their twenty 
national territories, Latin Americans are at the same time con-
demning their factories to supply limited and fractional mar-
kets. This means that their industries find themselves tied to 
a system of low output, small wages and high consumer prices, 
all of which make up a pattern diametrically opposed to that 
presented by modern industry, which expands with the rise of 
the standard of living and of the purchasing power of the 
population. These restricted markets tend, in effect, to limit 
the standard of living throughout the whole of Latin America. 
A parallel to this dead weight can also be found in Europe, 
which suffers from the same ills". (Article in The New York 
Times, reproduced in El Economista, Buenos Aires, 7 July 
1956). 
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., ex Assistant-Secretary of State and 
United States Ambassador in Brazil, struck by the same prob-
lem, wrote: "Jean Monnet showed the way. . . when he estab-
lished the European Coal and Steel Community, which has 
recently added the development of atomic energy to its list of 
activities". (Article from The New York Times Magazine, 
reproduced in Intermedio, Bogotá, 22 July 1956.) 
(Translator's note: The foregoing quotations have been re-
translated into English, as it was impossible to obtain the 
original texts.) 
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sider it easy of attainment. The foregoing outline serves 
only as a brief summary of current thinking, or as an 
indication of what it is believed might be done if such 
a policy were jointly adopted. This line of thought has 
been pursued for more than a century with more or 
less ardour, but without interruption, throughout Latin 
America. Never before, however, have the idea of 
progress and the quest for better living conditions been 
so much in evidence in Latin American community. 
However, there appears to be a want of rational 
and lucid conceptions of what to do and how to do it. 
Judging by opinions voiced during the course of the 
survey, the moment has now come to give this rational 
impetus, for the belief is spreading that progress 
demands it. Given a genuine spirit of co-operation 
in responsible circles, the question would reduce itself 
to where to start and what should be the instruments 
employed. 
It is a question—as has already been stated—of a 
long-term programme that must be put into effect. 
According to informed opinion, this might perhaps be 
an opportune moment for its inauguration, since a 
favourable atmosphere is created by the balance-of-
payments problems, for the gradual solution of which 
recourse could be had to suitable bilateral agreements 
that would also serve to discipline and encourage inter-
Latin-American trade. Such agreements might well 
prove to be of short duration, and. thought would have 
to be given to more stable and permanent instruments 
for the support of such trade. As the Latin American 
countries achieved monetary stability, balance-of-pay-
ments equilibrium and consequently convertibility, they 
would depend less and less on exchange controls and 
on quantitative restrictions. At the same time, trade 
treaties would have to give increasing importance to 
customs agreements. 
(g) The two phases of the integration programme 
The task would be planned and undertaken in two 
stages. Ideas on this point are clear and practical. First, 
consideration would have to be given to the question 
of what industries, whether recently-installed or not 
as yet established, would from the outset need the 
regional market for their creation or development, given 
the necessary capital formation and consumer demand; 
and secondly, it would have to be determined what 
others, among those already operating at national level, 
depend on such a market for a reduction of their costs 
and for their future expansion. The former would in-
clude mainly production goods industries and some 
of those manufacturing durable consumer goods; pre-
eminent among the latter would be the consumer goods 
industries. 
(h) Integrated industrialization in industrial sectors 
entering operation or projected 
Of the two phases of the problem, the one which 
would more readily lend itself to any more or less 
inmediate action would be, without doubt, the first men-
tioned. In the iron and steel, metallurgical, pulp and 
paper, motor-vehicle, railway and naval material and 
chemical industries, among others, there are many 
opportunities which would justify large-scale investment 
of foreign or Latin American capital or of both—on 
a joint basis or otherwise—if the availability of 
markets wider than those of the individual countries 
allowed satisfactory standards of productivity to be 
maintained, without the necessity of resorting to ex-
change manoeuvres and without the prospect of having 
to endure the effects of idle installed capacity, all too 
common to-day. To this end, the countries interested 
would need at their disposal some pre-established mech-
anism whereby, on each occasion, they could reach 
agreement both among themselves and with the investors 
as to the operations which these latter would effect 
in each of the countries concerned and the facilities 
they could be offered. 
This constitutes a real possibility. Applications have 
already been submitted for the consideration of certain 
Governments, mainly by European firms. And failures 
have already been experienced because of the existing 
lack of any reasonably expeditious means whereby 
investors could conduct simultaneous negotiations with 
the authorities in several countries. In some cases the 
aim would be to carry out the industrial programme 
concerned by complementary production of the prin-
cipal component parts of a given commodity in more 
than one country (always in conformity with the 
criterion of comparative costs) with a view to selling 
the finished product in the territories of the contracting 
parties. To this end various possible combinations could 
be devised, always on the basis of equal advantages 
for all the consignatories. An optimistic view is taken 
of the effect which such a programme would have on 
South America through the resulting—and perhaps 
substantial—increase in the inflow of capital. 
(i) The role of the GATT 
The implementation of production plans such as 
those described would make it desirable for certain 
customs agreements to be concluded between the in-
terested parties. These agreements would take the form 
of a special tariff, for whose negotiation and applica-
tion, according to opinions gathered, the best course 
would be to invoke the services of the GATT, to which 
eight of the twenty Latin American countries already 
belong. The statutes of this body contain clauses under 
which such agreements could be approved, as in the 
case of the Schumann plan, but an indispensable pre-
requisite would be the working out of a concrete pro-
gramme on bases designed to increase trade in general 
and not merely within Latin America. The accession 
to the GATT of those Latin American countries which 
are not already Contracting Parties would, it is thought, 
greatly influence its future decisions on matters con-
cerning the region. Furthermore, as the implementa-
tion of a programme of this sort—in addition to the 
general advantages already noted—also considerably 
affects the interests of groups and enterprises within 
the countries concerned, their accession might con-
tribute, according to very decided opinions expressed 
in South American countries members of the GATT, 
to the achievement of the desired ends. In view of 
the importance attributed to this question, it is to be 
hoped that a satisfactory formula will be found where-
by the existing cohesion within this body can be main-
tained and increased. The preparation of the pro-
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grammes in question could be among the future duties 
that might be assigned to the Trade Committee. 
( j ) Initiation of the programme 
As a practical device for putting these ideas into 
effect, the following may be suggested: the Trade 
Committee might be consulted as to the timeliness 
and expediency of organizing a small group within 
its own set-up, to which the countries participating 
would delegate the tasks of receiving—in conformity 
with certain rules—the proposals of the private in-
vestors interested, and of consulting the different 
Governments, through channels to be determined in 
due course, as to the conditions which might, after 
due study, be offered, prior to the conclusion of a 
multilateral pact, as a result of which the co-operation 
of the international organizations could be secured. 
Here, then, is another point of inmediate practical 
importance with which the Trade Committee might 
deal at its forthcoming meeting, if it thought fit, apart 
from the payments problem. 
(k) Bases for a special régime 
As regards the second phase in the development of 
a unified industrial policy—that relating to industries 
already existing in the Latin American countries and 
dependent on a wider market beyond the national 
frontiers for the reduction of their costs and for their 
future expansion—the programme concerned would 
necessarily have to be worked out as time went on, 
and with the greatest care, since it would call for the 
carrying-out of highly objective studies, as well as the 
formation of public opinion and of a receptive attitude 
among both industrialists and workers; in short, for 
toilsome negotiations. This phase would come about 
in its own due time, hastened, perhaps, by the results 
achieved at an earlier stage through the multilateral 
trade and payments policy. Another helpful factor 
would be the highly essential experience that may be 
acquired in the course of one of the tasks which lies 
ahead. Allusion has already been made to the co-ordina-
tion of the monetary, exchange and trade policies of 
the various countries, which, as was pointed out, is 
an indispensable prerequisite for the special régime 
outlined. In turn, the establishment of this régime would 
already have begun with the execution of the pro-
grammes belonging to the first phase in those sectors 
where no large-scale industry exists, or is to be found 
only in an unambitious form. Subsequent developments 
would inevitably be conditioned by the success of such 
an undertaking. 
With a view to the attainment of these objectives, 
it would be highly desirable for the appropriate inter-
national organizations to collaborate with the various 
Governments, their technical resources and those of 
their industrial circles, in carrying out a study aimed 
at drawing up a sort of map of Latin American in-
dustry, showing which of the existing industries lack 
adequate markets; which might be transferred and 
where their new location should be; what would be the 
possibilities of doing this, and how negotiations should 
be conducted in order to ensure that the different 
countries obtained equal advantages and equitable re-
muneration of the factors of production. The task 
would be of wide scope, and would be directed towards 
the "specialization-effect" and the "employment-effect". 
If , in addition to the first steps sketched out in 
chapter I of this report and the establishment of the 
basic principles described so as to promote the pro-
gramme of industrialization on a regional scale, it 
were also possible for such a study to be carried out, 
considerable progress would have been made towards 
a better grasp of the details of the problem, without 
which criteria and procedures cannot be satisfactorily 
determined. Light would also be shed on such matters 
as comparative standards of productivity among the 
main industrial countries of the region. 
The study in question, which would precede the 
second phase, would constitute the scientific basis of 
the programme under consideration, since it would 
indicate the concrete lines along which such a pro-
gramme could be realistically worked out. By the time 
it was completed, an advance might already have been 
made towards the intensification of reciprocal trade 
and in the direction of a multilateral payments system 
(perhaps with the help of a regional clearing institu-
tion which might be set up and which would serve to 
consolidate such effort). A beginning might even have 
been made, if all went well, on the creation in Latin 
America of certain internationally integrated industries. 
The South American Economic Co-operation Pro-
gramme, planned and developed in the gradual stages 
described, might by progressive degrees bring about 
the ultimate fulfilment of the region's widespread 
aspirations towards its economic integration. 
The task is arduous and complex, but not impos-
sible; and the time is ripe to embark upon it. Such 
is the impression prevalent in almost all the circles 
consulted. It remains to be seen whether at government 
level the consensus of opinion necessary for its 
execution will be forthcoming. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. It is considered that agreements should be con-
cluded with a view to promoting—by means of col-
laboration among several countries, and on a basis 
of financial contributions from both regional and 
foreign sources—the establishment of development of 
industries that require substantial capital and wide 
markets. 
As an initial step it is recommended that a small 
technical organization should be instituted for the pur-
pose of receiving investment proposals, carrying out a 
preliminary study of such applications, submitting them 
to the Governments concerned and facilitating not only 
an understanding between the authorities and the in-
vestors, but also the conclusion of the final agreements. 
2. It is felt to be expedient that in the field of trade 
policy steps should be taken to establish general prin-
ciples and certain specific procedures conducive to the 
gradual building-up of a regional market on multi-
lateral and competitive bases. This regional market 
3. Payments and the regional market 
would permit the intensification of those Latin Amer-
ican lines of industrial production in which a reduc-
tion of costs and future expansion basically depend 
upon an increase in consumer capacity. 
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At this level, and as a preliminary phase, the draw-
ing-up of an industrial map of Latin America is sug-
gested, mainly with a view to the determination of 
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